Starke v. . Etheridge

Bynum, J. The plaintiff, Starke, who was the purchaser at the execution sale;- insists that the deed in trust is void as to him, upon two-.grounds : 1. Eor want of probate in due form. Bat. Rev., chap. 35-, sec. 1, provides that no conveyance of land shall be good and available in law; unless the same shall be acknowledged by the grantor or proved-on oath, by one or more witnesses, in the manner thereafter directed, and registered in the county where the land- shall lie. And the 2nd section provides that “ all deeds, &c., required or allowed to be registered, may be admitted to registration in the proper county, upon being acknowledged by the grantor, or proved on oath, before the Judge, &c., or before the Clerk of such county, or his- deputy.” The specific objection of the plaintiff, Starke, is that there was no adjudication of probate by the Clerk,.and no order of *243 registration, and that the registration on that account was void, as to him. It will be observed that the language of the statute requires^ neither an adjudication of probate or an order of registration,, but only that “ all deeds, &c., may be admitted to registration upon being acknowledged by the grantor, or proved on oath, before the Clerk, &c.” It is true that an adjudication and order in ipsissimis verbis endorsed upon the deed, would be regularly, orderly and more in conformity with the certainty and precision of judicial proceedings, and this course is, therefore, advisable always, yet it is not required as essential, either, by the letter or spirit of the registry act. And should this objection be now allowed to prevail, we apprehend that it would shake the titles of a.large portion of the land owners of the State, owing to the untechnical form of these probates, which are usually made without the - aid of counsel, and by officers unskilled in the laws. The facts agreed upon are that the deed “ was proved on the • oath of the subscribing witness ” before the Clerk, who endorsed upon the deed the word-“ Jurai” opposite the name of.' the witness, “ as a memorial of the fact,” showing that the deedi had been proven before him ; but that the probate of said deed, was not drawn out upon the deeddtself,” or upon the records-of the register’s office. The statute before cited no where requires,.and- no decision of our Courts goes the length of establishing that there must be a formal written adj udication of probate, or order of registration endorsed upon the deed itself, or recorded elsewhere, however proper that it should be so done. The act prescribing the mode of probate and registration, Bat. Bev.,.chap. 35, draws a distinction between deeds and other instruments, acknowledged or proved before the -Clerk himself, and those deeds-and instruments which are not proved before him,.but. are proved before another tribunal, as out of the State, for- instance,.on by a commission issued for that purpose. Take section 7 of the act, as an example: That provides» *244 that “ where the acknowledgement or proof of any deed or other instrument, is taken or made in the manner directed by the laws of the State, before any commissioner, &c., and where such acknowledgment or proof is certified by such commissioner, the Judge of Probate having j urisdicfion, upon the same being exhibited to him, shall adjudge such deed or other instrument to be duly proved, in the same manner as if made or taken before him.” The same language, “ adjudge,” is used in all cases named in chapter 35, where the probate is to be taken by an officer other than the Judge of Probate himself, but is no where used where he takes the proof of a deed to be registered in his county. The reason of the distinction is obvious. The statute prescribes the mode for taking foreign probates, and directs that deeds so probated shall be registered only where the Clerk adjudges that the statute requirements have been complied with, and orders the registration. It may be, and is perhaps, necessary in these cases, that this judgment and this order thus especially enjoined to be made by the Clerk or Judge of Probate, should be formally recorded and ¡perpetuated. But in regard to his own Probates in his own ‘Court, the law imposes no such duty upon the Clerk, but only .prescribes that the deed shall be proved before him, which in 'this ease was done. The fact of probate, in due form, is admitted in the case agreed, but it is contended that the registration thereupon, is void as to the plaintiff, unless that probate is evidenced by a formal judgment and order, endorsed upon the deed. As the statute does not require any such written formula, we do not feel at liberty to say it is necessary. In our case not only was the letter of the law complied with by an actual probate, but the spirit of the law was also .followed. The act of 1829, chap. 20, Bat. Rev., chap. 35, sec. 12, is -entitled “-An act to prevent frauds in deeds of trust and mort..gages,” and .provides “ that no deed in trust or mortgage for •real or personal estate shall be valid to pass any property as •against creditors or purchasers from the donor or mortgagor, *245 but from the registration of such deed of trust or mortgage.’’ The object of this act certainly was to prevent fraud, and to that end it requires all encumbrances upon estates to be registered, so that purchasers and creditors might have notice of their existence and nature, and that all persons might see for what the encumbrance was created. When registration is made the means of knowledge thus furnished, it enables creditors of the mortgagor to avail themselves of their legal remedy against the equity of redemption in the land. This publicity affords the creditor all the benefit he can reasonably ask or that the law intended. Why then, is it required to prove the deed before the Clerk, instead of requiring its registration at once without probate ? In McKinnon v. McLean, 2 Dev. & Bat. 79, it is said, “The person taking the probate does not adjudge and decide the instrument to be a deed, but only sees that the person offered as a witness to prove it is the person who attested it, and he certifies that the execution was proved by that witness. Thefactxim and the identity of the witness are all that the certificates concludes.”. The probate of a deed is but a memorial that the attesting witness swore to the factum of the instrument by the parties whose act it purports to be. The officer who takes the probate does not look into the instrument or the interests acquired-under it, and as the probate is ex parte, it does not conclude Therefore it may be shown by parol that what purports to be a deed is no deed, but a forgery, or was executed by a married woman or an infant, or was not proved so as to make the deed valid, or that it was not proved at all prior to registration, or was proved by an incompetent witness, as in the case of Carrier v. Hampton, 11 Ired. 307. See also McKinnon v. McLean, 2 Dev. & Bat. 79. As the validity of the registration may be thus impeached so it may be supported by the same kind of evidence. Justice v. Justice, 3 Ired. 58; Moore v. Eason, 11 Ired. 568. But assuming that some written memorial of the fact of *246 probate is necessary, it still appears that at the time of probate, the officer who took it did indicate his official act by endorsing upon the deed the word “jurat,” (juratus,) the primary meaning of which is “ sworn,” but the derivative signification is “proved.” In support of the deed, ut res magis valeat guam pereat, such an endorsement upon an instrument, in all respects regularly executed and bona fide, will be held a sufficient compliance with the law against one who now claims against, after having previously claimed under the deed. This view of the law is sustained by various decisions of our Courts. Where the records of the Court of Admiralty were loosely kept on slips of paper, depositions were allowed to be read to prove that an order of sale of property was made in a cause. 2 Hay. 291. In Horton v. Hagler’s, executor, 1 Hawks. 48, it was held that when the Clerk of a Court of Kecord certifies that an instrument has been “ duly proved]’ it is implied that every thing required by law has been, complied with, upon the maxim, Hes judicata fro veritate accipitur. But when the record also states how it was proved and admits a material circumstance required by law, the certificate of due proof is disregarded because the certificate itself shows that it was not duly proved. So in Freeman v. Hatly, 3 Jones 115, it was held that inasmuch as no statute in our State required the register to put in his books the fact that a deed was duly proved, and none which required the probate before the Clerk to conform to any particular formula, there was no mode provided by statute of proving that a deed was duly proved when the deed itself is lost and the record that should establish the fact has been destroyed ; in such case, therefore, the proof must be made according to the rules of the common law, with the aid of the maxim, omniapresumuntur rite acta, &c. II. The second objection is also untenable, to-wit: that the *247 deed is fraudulent and void because the sale is postponed by it for near three years. « A deed in trust postponing a sale of the trust property for three years, and in the meantime -reserving the possession to the grantor, without explanation, is prima facie fraudulent as to creditors, but the presumption of fraud may be rebutted by proof. Hardy v. Skinner, 9 Ired. 191. But where the deed, as in our case, does not reserve the possession or any other benefit to the grantor, no such presumption can arise, because the title is vested in the trustee and with it the right of immediate possession. So far as it appears to us, it was the -duty of the trustee to enter into possession upon the execution of the deed, receive the rents and profits, and apply them in discharge of the trust debts. Hardy v. Simpson, 13 Ired. 132. III. Whether the plaintiff, if he had the legal title by his purchase, could recover in this suit begun in Equity prior to the Code, we do not decide, as the obj ection is not raised. All the parties in interest are before the Court and ask for an adjudication of their respective rights, and to that end we have considered the case as if properly constituted in this Court. The other points raised below, properly enough are not pressed in this Court, and, therefore, are not noticed in this opinion. | Bee CueiaM. Judgment affirmed.