Teague v. . Perry

Peabsok, O. J. We do not concur in the view of the case taken by His Honor. 1. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the note was given to secure the payment of money won at cards, a judgment “in invitum’1'1 was taken against L. T. Teague, before *41 a Justice of the Peace in 1860, from which judgment he appealed, and Peggy Teague, the other plaintiff, became his surety. At Spring Term 1867, judgment was entered against both of them. This put an end to the controversy; and the parties are estopped by record, from now setting up any matter of which they might have taken benefit by way of defence to that action. “ Interest reipiiblicce ut sit finis IMwtm ” is a maxim in every system of law. In pleadings-by the course of the common law, Lord Ooke says, u good matter must be pleaded in due form, apt time and proper order.” After judgment the question touching a gaming consideration, was res adjuMcata, and could not be again presented, except on writ of error. 2. But the note was not given to secure the payment of money won at cards, it was given to secure the price for a judgment on one Emerson. It is true that this judgment had been won at cards, but it had passed to, and became the property of one Dorsett, just as if a horse had been won instead of the judgment. It is settled that money,, or a horse, or a judgment, won at cards and actually paid and delivered, cannot be recovered back, the game being fairly played. Hudspeth v. Wilson, 2 Dev., 372; Warden v. Plummer, 4 Jon. 524, takes this as settled, and is put on the ground that the party was cheated in the play. 3. Mr. Phillips properly yielded these points, and rested his case on the word “ judgment ” in the statute, Eev. Code, ch. 51, sec. 2: .“All contracts, judgments, conveyances and assurances for and on account of any money, or property, or thing in action, so wagered, bet or staked, shall be void;” insisting that the effect of this provision is to make void cmvy judgment rendered on a gaming consideration, and to take it out of the maxim and rule referred to above in reference to res adjudicata. It will be observed that the judgment taken by Perry against the plaintiffs, was not on a note given for a gaming' consideration, but for the price of a judgment; so the point *42 •does not hit our case. But suppose it does: a construction of the statute by which to give to the introduction, of the word “judgments ” in connection with the words “contracts, conveyances, and assurances,” the effect of making an exception to a settled rule of law, is inadmissible. Had it been the intention to make this exception, and allow solemn judgments of the Courts to he avoided by matter which could have been relied on as a defence to the action, plain and direct words were called for, and would have been used; especially as full operation can be given to the word, by treating it as used in the sense of a judgment confessed, or allowed by consent, in order to secure the payment of money won at cards; like a mortgage, deed of trust or other ■ assurance given for that purpose. The use of the word “judgment ” in the sense of a security gwen for money, in the next preceding chapter, ch. 50, sec. 1, in connection with the same words, furnishes a conclusive analogy: “Every gift and conveyance of land, goods, &c., and every bond, suit, judgment and execution made- with intent to defraud creditors shall be void,” &c. Here, “judgment” is evidently used in the sense of a judgment confessed, with intent to defraud creditors. There, it is used in the sense of a judgment confessed with intent to secure money won at cards. There is no reason to infer that the word was used in either statute for the purpose of abrogating a well settled and highly beneficial principle of law, by which an end is put to litigation. There is error. Pee Cuexam. Error.