White v. Richmond & Danville Railroad

Merrimon, C. J.: The very broad and comprehensive purpose of the release of the plaintiff relied upon by the defendant, as this appears from its face, is too manifest to admit of any serious question. The release recites in plain, explicit terms that in consideration of six thousand dollars (no other consideration is expressed or suggested by implication) paid to the plaintiff, he releases the defendant and “its lessor from all claims upon them for damages received by the plaintiff at the place and time specified,” and he covenants that he “ will not sue them, or either of them, for damages received in said collision.” Cautiously, and on purpose, it seems, he further covenants that he releases the defendant “ from any further liability or care of me (himself) on account of said accident.” The purpose to discharge the defendant from all liability, and the consideration paid for the release, could scarcely be more clearly expressed. It is insisted, however, that the plaintiff does not sue to recover damages for the injuries he sustained, but the unpaid compensation due to him which the defendant promised and agreed to pay him as part, and a substantial part, of the consideration of the release. This claim cannot be sustained, because the contract whereby the plaintiff was to receive from the defendant compensation for his injuries sustained, and by which he was to release and acquit the defendant on account of the same, purports to be wholly embraced in the acquittance relied upon by the defendant. It recites and declares that the consideration of such release was six thousand dollars. It is not said or intimated that this was not the whole consideration. Indeed, to cut off any possible inference or contention to the contrary, the plaintiff expressly covenants therein that he thereby releases “ said company from any further liability or care of me (himself) on account of said accident.” *461 It would be singular, indeed, not to méntion so unusual and important a part of the consideration as that which the plaintiff contends was omitted by mere mistake. In the nature of the matter, it was appropriate and orderly to specify the whole consideration. The language employed was appropriate and apt for that purpose, and in the absence of any provision or implication in the release to the contrary, it must be taken that it does. It, by its terms and effect, concludes the plaintiff, and he cannot be allowed to allege that there was other and further consideration for it than therein expressed. The parties made it written evidence of their settlement and they must abide by it, unless, in some appropriate way and for sufficient cause, it shall be made to appear that it does not express truly the contract of settlement it purports to embody, and be evidence of, as expressed therein. The plaintiff alleges that the release “ was given on the understanding and agreement that the samé was not to extend to, and did not extend to, the distinct contract of life employment aforesaid, and if of meaning in law to the contrary, it was so expressed unintentionally and by mistake.” He does not allege mutual mistake of the parties to it, nor does he allege facts and circumstances that give rise to the presumption that its execution was induced by some undue influence, misapprehension, imposition, mental imbecility, surprise, confidence abused, or fraud of the defendant, or the like. He simply alleges that it was .executed by mistake. It is clear that the mere mistake of one party to a contract will not entitle him to relief. He must allege and prove his mistake, and, in that connection, surprise, undue influence, misapprehension, imposition, fraud, or the like cause, which gave rise to and occasioned such mistake. Crowder v. Langdon, 3 Ired. Eq., 476; Briant v. Corpening, Phil. Eq., 325; Day v. Day, 84 N. C., 408; McMinn v. Patton, 92 N. C., 371; Sandlin v. Ward, 94 N. C., 490; Kornegay v. Everett, 99 N. C , 34; Moffitt v. Maness, 102 N. C., 457; Hard *462 ing v. Long, 103 N. C., 1; Bean v. Railroad, 107 N. C., 731; Smith’s M. Eq., 45. The plaintiff insists that there is error in that the Court declined to submit the evidence of mistake to the jury. We do not think so, because there was the simple allegation of mistake, and the absence of allegation that it was occasioned by surprise, misapprehension, fraud, or the like. The evidence of the plaintiff alone tended to prove no more than mistake — not facts that entitled him to have the release corrected if there had been sufficient allegations in the pleadings on his part. There was neither allegation nor evidence that could have entitled him to the relief demanded. The Court was, therefore, warranted in its refusal to treat the evidence as sufficient, in any view of it, to go.to the jury. Affirmed.