Luff v. . Levey

Per Curiam. The warrant of attachment expressly operated upon “all of the property of defendants, Joseph Levey and Rachel Levey, both real and personal,” together with such property as they bad transferred to their codefendants. Consequently the Leveys were parties to the action with sufficient interest in the subject-matter thereof to enable them to make and maintain a motion for vacating the attachment. Moreover, when the clerk of the Superior Court required the bond of the plaintiff to be increased, botb parties appealed to the judge, and be bad the power to require the plaintiff to give further security or an increased bond. Power Co. v. Lessem, 174 N. C., 358, 93 S. E., 836. However’, that part of the order of the judge providing that upon failure to give the increased bond “the attachment heretofore issued in tbis cause shall be vacated and discharged ipso facto, without further action by the court,” constitutes a condition which the law does not permit. Lloyd v. Lumber Co., 167 N. C., 97, 83 S. E., 248; Flinchum v. Doughton, 200 N. C., 770, 158 S. E., 486. Hence, while the order requiring an increased bond, is wholly valid, the condition annexed thereto is invalid. Therefore, the plaintiff is required to give a $5,000 bond to be approved by the clerk of the county in which the action is pending. As it appears upon the face of the record that the time for giving said bond has expired, plaintiff is permitted to file a bond in compliance with the order within a reasonable time. Modified and affirmed.