Millard v. . Smathers

Hoee, J. These deeds, executed by the parties at the same time and for a common purpose, referring to each other and also to a common plat for a more particular description of the property, should be construed together in ascertaining the intent and meaning of the parties as expressed in the instruments and the plat annexed thereto. Gudger v. White, 141 N. C., 507. Considering the case in that aspect and recurring to certain recognized principles in our law of boundary, it has been held: 1. “That the intent of the parties as expressed in the entire instrument must be supported and, in ascertaining such intent, that which is definite and specific shall prevail over that which is uncertain, and, in case of conflicting descriptions that cannot be reconciled, the courts will adopt that construction which best comports with the manifest intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances of the case at the time the instruments are executed.” Ferguson v. Twisdale, 137 N. C., 414; Shaffer v. Hahn, 111 N. C., 1; Campbell v. McArthur, 9 N. C., 33. 2. That none- of the calls of the deed shall be disregarded when they can be fulfilled by any reasonable way of running the lines, which will be defeated only when necessary to give effect to the intent of the parties as expressed in the instrument. Power Co. v. Savage, 170 N. C., 625-629; Bowen v. Lumber Co., 153 N. C., 366; Clark v. Wagner, 76 N. C., 463; Long v. Long, 73 N. C., 370. A position that has been, not infrequently, extended to justify a departure from a straight line between two established points and, at times, requiring that two or more lines be run instead of one. - 3. That when a call of the deed is along a recognized line to a known or established corner and the line does not go to such corner, the usual rule of location is to run the line of the description as far as it will go or tp the nearest point to the corner called for, and thence a direct line to the corner. Boyden v. Hagaman, 169 N. C., 199; Shultz v. Young, 25 N. C., 385. Considering the record in view of these principles, it will appear that there has been no reversible error committed in the way the present case has been determined and certainly none that gives the plaintiff any just ground of complaint. A devise or deed for a house or store has been held to pass the land on which the same is situate, and such a building is frequently regarded as a monument of boundary sufficient at times to control course and distance. Wise v. Burton, 73 Cal., 166-170; Bacon v. Bowdoin, 39 Mass., 401; Common Council v. State, 5 Ind., 334; *61 McMillan v. Solomon, 42 Ala., 654; 2 Dwelin on Deeds, see. 863. And, from a perusal of tbe deeds and plat and facts in evidence, it is perfectly manifest that it was tbe intent and meaning of these parties, as expressed in tbe instruments, tbat tbe bolder of Lot D should have tbe store tbat was situate thereon; a substantial brick building, then erected, occupied as a business site before and since without let or hindrance, it would require very specific and definite description ultra to justify an interpretation tbat would require tbe parties engaged in a division of this property for their mutual advantage to shave off three feet and eight inches from the rear of the store and give it to the holder of the adjoining lot, and so far from having any sufficient description for such purpose appearing in the deeds or plat, the language of the instrument directly appertaining to the divisional line between the lots is very indefinite.. In that of plaintiff the call is from the recognized corner on Main Street “back between lines almost parallel, slightly oblique, to Main Street and along the southern side of an alley between Lots E and E, 110 feet to an open court in the' rear, as shown by the plat.” And that of defendant: “From the corners on Main Street back between parallel lines, slightly oblique, to Main Street, 110 feet to an open court in the rear, designated as Lot D on the plat.” It will be noted that the course of the divisional lines is not given, and there is nothing on the face of the deeds themselves which gives or purports to give the width of plaintiff’s lot at the rear. The plat, however, “which, as shown in above copy, has become very much blurred and indistinct from time and use,” gives this rear width as 16 feet. True, the surveyor testified that he did not measure this, and only put it down from an estimate by taking off other distances called for, but, taking the plat as affording data for the description, the certain definite calls of these deeds and plat by which this divisional line should be determined are the store, as far as it extends, and the next established point is the point in the rear 16 feet from the alley, lying north of the plaintiff’s lot. Taking these two calls as the more definite data and applying the rules heretofore stated, the divisional line in question should properly run: Beginning at the recognized corner on Main Street, run the line of the brick store building to the nearest point opposite the rear corner, 16 feet from -the alley and thence directly to the rear corner. This is in accordance with the ruling of his Honor below, and, in our opinion, his decision should be affirmed in both appeals. There is nothing in either Loan Association v. Bethel, 120 N. C., 344, or in Davidson v. Arledge, 88 N. C., 326, that in any way conflicts with these positions. In both of these cases, there was a full, accurate description of the boundaries, by course and distance, in the one case, and by this record a reference to the lot as designated on the plat of the town *62 In wbicb a full description appeared, and it was beld that these being the more definite descriptions, the same should-prevail. There is decided intimation in the Arledge case that but for the very definite and particular description referred to, the boundaries of the lot, as determined by actual use and occupation, should be adopted. As we have endeavored to show, in reference to the divisional line, the description is not specific and these other and more definite data have been followed. There is no error in either appeal, and the judgment of the lower court is affirimed. No error.