Burwell v. . Chapman

Brown, J. Civil action brought to restrain tbe defendants from interfering with tbe plaintiff in cutting and removing timber from certain lands, and to declare tbe plaintiff to be tbe owner of tbe timber rights on said lands. Tbe defendants denied tbe title of tbe plaintiff to tbe timber in question. Tbe plaintiff presented several contentions upon which be based bis right to cut tbe timber in question, but in tbe view we take of tbe case it is necessary to consider only one. Tbe timber lands in controversy belonged to tbe defendants, who conveyed all of tbe timber of whatever kind and description growing and standing on tbe said lands, subject to certain restrictions, to H. C. "Wolfe of Pennsylvania. Tbe said conveyance is dated 28 June, 1906, and was duly registered on 29 September, 1906, and fully describes tbe land upon which tbe said timber was growing. It is claimed that Wolfe purchased tbe timber for himself and others, and that be and bis associates contracted to form a corporation to whom this timber was to be conveyed, and by *211 which it was to be manufactured. It appears tbat tbe company was incorporated and stock taken as agreed by tbe incor-porators. "Wolfe was elected manager of tbe corporation. He continued to be sucb until July, 1909, wben be resigned. During tbat time a large part of tbe timber was taken from tbe land and sold. On 16 January, 1909, tbis company, by its manager, Wolfe, conveyed certain of tbe timber to tbe plaintiff, wbicb tbe plaintiff proceeded to cut and remove under bis contract, wbicb conveyance was not registered until 1 May, 1911. On 25 January, 1911, tbe said Wolfe reconveyed to tbe defendants all of tbe standing timber and timber rights on tbe said land, specifically describing tbe land as being fully described in a deed from tbe defendants to H. C. Wolfe, recorded in Book 60, page 384, in tbe office of Register of Deeds of Granville County. Tbis deed was registered on 26 January, 1911. 1. Tbé conveyance, or timber contract, whatever it may be called, under wbicb tbe plaintiff claims tbe timber in controversy was not registered until May, 1911, at wbicb time tbe deed from Wolfe, conveying all of tbe property be bad purchased from them, bad been duly executed and recorded, to wit, on 26 January, 19IE Tbe plaintiff-contends tbat the defendants bad notice of tbe existence of tbe said timber contract made with tbe plaintiff, and tbat wben they took tbe reconveyance from Wolfe they took subject to tbe plaintiff’s rights. It is not necessary to discuss tbe fact as to whether there is any evidence as to actual notice to tbe defendant, for no notice of tbe character claimed by tbe plaintiff, however full, can supply tbe notice by registration required by tbe statute. Tbis Court has held in several cases tbat standing trees are a part of tbe realty, and conveyances of title thereto must be sufficient in form to convey realty, and tbat sucb conveyances are governed by all tbe law's relating to tbe transfer of title to land itself. Hawkins v. Lumber Co., 139 N. C., 161. Applying tbis principle, it has been held tbat purchasers-for value under a deed sufficient in form and properly registered are not affected with notice by possession under a prior deed, *212 either invalid or not registered at the time of the other conveyance. Tremaine v. Williams, 144 N. C., 114; Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C., 106; Blalock v. Strain, 122 N. C., 283; Patterson v. Mills, 121 N. C., 267. 2. But it is contended by the plaintiffs that these defendants taking under the deed from Wolfe dated 25 January, 1911, are not purchasers for value, and take subject to the equities of the plaintiff. We find no evidence to support this theory. On the contrary, the recited consideration of the deed from Wolfe to the defendants is the sum of $1 “and in consideration of the parties of the second part releasing the party of the first part (Wolfe) and the Stovall Lumber Company from all claims for damage on account of waste.” It was contended by the defendants that Wolfe had caused the said, timber lands to be denuded of timber in violation of the terms and restrictions contained in the deed of 28 June, 1906, executed by the defendants to Wolfe. This release upon the part of the defendants was undoubtedly a release of a valuable right and formed a valuable consideration as a basis for the reconveyance by Wolfe to them. 3. It is further contended that the reconveyance from Wolfe to the defendants conveyed only such standing timber rights in the land as he, Wolfe, then had, and that having parted with them to the plaintiff, he had nothing to convey to the defendants. As we read the reconveyance, Wolfe reconveyed to the defendants all of the standing timber rights of all kinds which the defendafits had previously conveyed to Wolfe on 2,070 acres of land, particularly described by metes and bounds in the deed from Wolfe to the defendants. Upon a review of the record, the judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed. Justices Hoke and AlleN took no part in the decision of . this case.