Habit v. . Stephenson

Stacy, C. J. The question for decision is whether movable personal property found to be used by a mortgagor in conducting a nuisance, without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee and in violation of a covenant against such use, can be held under an order of seizure and sale when it appears that the mortgagor’s equity of redemption is nil, and that the mortgagee had no knowledge of and did not participate in the nuisance and was not a party to and had no notice of the proceeding in which the property was ordered seized and sold. Speaking to the question of procedure in Daniels v. Homer, 139 N. C., 219, 51 S. E., 992, it was said that an innocent owner of property, thus sought to be forfeited and sold, might assert any rights which he has in an action to recover the property before sale. This the plaintiff seeks to do here. It will be observed that the movable property which is established as having been used in conducting a nuisance, is to be sold “in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution.” C. S., 3184. The manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution applies only to the property of the judgment debtor and is set out in C. S., 677, as follows: “The property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from sale under the Constitution and laws of this State, may be levied on and sold under execution as hereinafter prescribed: 1. Goods, chattels . . . *449 belonging to bim. ... 3. Equitable and legal rights of redemption in personal and real property pledged or mortgaged by bim. But when the equity of redemption in personal property is sold under execution, notice of the time and place of said sale shall be given the mortgagee.” The sole purpose in requiring that notice of the time and place of such sale be given the mortgagee is to afford -him an opportunity to protect his rights in the property. S. v. Johnson, 181 N. C., 638, 107 S. E., 433; Skinner v. Thomas, 171 N. C., 98, 87 S. E., 976. Here, the equity of redemption of the execution debtor in the property directed to be sold is nil, hence there is nothing to be sold “in the manner provided for the sale of chattels under execution.” It results, therefore, that the plaintiff is entitled to the property. The registration of the instrument under which plaintiff claims is not material on the question of forfeiture. Motor Co. v. Jackson, 184 N. C., 328, 114 S. E., 478. The right to abate the nuisance is not questioned. Carpenter, Solicitor, v. Boyles, 213 N. C., 432, 196 S. E., 850. Reversed.