Brown v. . Brown

Barnhill, J. Courts are governmental agencies created for tbe administration of justice. From time immemorial it bas been a recognized fundamental policy tbat tbeir doors are not to be opened to enable one to procure an advantage growing out of or bottomed upon bis own wrongful or unlawful act. As said by Stacy, G. J., in Reynolds v. Reynolds, 208 N. C., 428 : “ ‘It is very generally beld — universally, so far as we are aware — tbat an action never lies wben a plaintiff must base bis claim, in whole or in part, on a violation by bimself of tbe criminal or penal laws of tbe State.’ Hoke, J., in Lloyd v. R. R., 151 N. C., 536, 66 S. E., 604. In Waite’s Actions and Defenses, Yol. 1, p. 43, tbe principle is broadly stated, as follows: ‘No principle of law is better settled than tbat wbicb declares tbat an action cannot be maintained upon any ground or cause wbicb tbe law declares to be illegal,’ citing Davidson v. Lanier, 4 Wallace, 447; Rolfe v. Delmar, 7 Rob., 80; Stewart v. Lothrop, 12 Gray, 52; Howard v. Harris, 8 Allen, 297; Pearce v. Brooks, L. R. 1 Exch., 213; Smith v. White, L. R. 1 Eq. Cases, 626. “To say tbat civil rights, enforceable through tbe courts, may inure to one out of bis own violation of tbe criminal law, and against tbe very person injured, would be to blow hot and cold in tbe same breath, or, Janus-like, to look in both directions at the same time. Tbe law is not interested in such double dealing or sleight-of-hand performances; it sets its face like flint in tbe opposite direction.” While it is a well-settled rule tbat all questions of public policy are for tbe determination of tbe Legislature and not for tbe courts, it will not be assumed tbat any statute enacted by tbe Legislature was intended to override or depart from principles of public policy founded on good morals unless tbe language of the statute clearly and unequivocally indicates such an intent. Tbe courts will not impute to tbe Legislature an intent tbat would be in direct conflict with tbe very purposes for which tbe courts are created or would be violative of sound public policy or would lead to manifest injustice in tbe absence of a direct declaration to tbat effect in language clear and unmistakable. On tbe contrary, whenever permissible, tbe courts will assume tbat tbe Legislature intended its acts to be consonant with, and not violative of, existing public policy and good morals. Plaintiff’s action is instituted under C. S., 1659-A as reenacted by cb. 100, P. L. 1937. Tbe statute was originally enacted in 1931, cb. 72, P. L. 1931, and read as follows: “Marriages may be dissolved and tbe parties thereto divorced from tbe bonds of matrimony, on application of either party, if and wben there bas been aseparation of husband *350 and wife, either under deed of separation or otherwise, and they have lived separate and apart for five years, and no children have been born to the marriage, and the plaintiff in the suit for divorce has resided in the State for that period.” The Legislature of 1933 amended the act by striking out the clause “and no children have been born to the marriage,” and by reducing the required period of separation to two years and the period of residence to one year. Ch. 163, P. L. 1933. The Legislature of 1937 further amended the statute and reenacted the same, omitting the clause “either under deed of separation or otherwise.” Thus it appears that the cause of divorce as defined in ch. 100, P. L., 1937, is identical with the statute as originally enacted, except that the time of separation has been reduced from five to two years, the period of residence from five years to one year, and the clauses “and no children have been born to the marriage” and “either under deed of separation or otherwise” are now omitted. This being the history of the statute, is -the unlawful abandonment of the defendant and her children by the plaintiff a valid plea in bar under the decision of this Court in Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra? Under universally accepted rules of construction this question must be answered in the affirmative. The prevailing view is that where a statute is repealed and all or some of its provisions are at the same time reenacted the reenactment neutralizes the repeal and the provisions of the repealed act, which are those reenacted, continue in force without interruption, so that all rights and liabilities that have accrued thereunder are preserved and may be enforced. 25 R. C. L., 934. The rule of construction applicable to acts which revise and consolidate other acts is that when the revised and consolidated act reenacts, in the same or substantially the same terms, the provisions of the act or acts so revised and consolidated, the revision and consolidation shall be taken to be a continuation of the former act or acts, although the former act or acts may be specially repealed by the revised and consolidated act, and all rights and liabilities under the former act or acts are preserved and may be enforced. 25 R. C. L., 935. Likewise, where the terms used in a statute have acquired a settled meaning through judicial interpretation, and the same terms are used in a subsequent statute upon the same subject matter, they are to be understood in the same sense unless by qualifying or explanatory addition the contrary intent of the Legislature is made clear. Such a construction becomes a part of the law, as it is presumed that the Legislature in passing the later law knew what the judicial construction was which had been given to the words of the prior reenactment. 25 R. C. L., 992. • The language of that portion of the statute which was the subject of consideration in Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra, is identically the same as *351 used in the 1933 and the 1931 acts. And so it follows that the interpretation by this Court of that portion of the statute which was reenacted remains authoritative. The 1937 reenactment of the statute squarely met the decision of this Court in Hyder v. Hyder, 210 N. C., 486, by striking out the clause of the statute on which the decision was based, but made no attempt to override or negative the decision in Reynolds v. Reynolds, supra. That portion of the statute which has been construed by this Court having been reenacted in identical terms, it is conclusively presumed that the Legislature intended such statute to have the meaning, force, and effect theretofore given to it by judicial construction. The unlawful and wrongful conduct of the plaintiff constitutes a complete bar to his cause of action. In the judgment below there is No error.