Hines v. . Williams

Adams, J. Tbe appeal presents tbe question whether tbe commissioner’s deed conveys a good title to the purchaser. It was formerly provided by statute that tbe land of a minor should in no case be liable to sale for taxes, but that bis guardian should pay tbe tax when due; also that in'case of tbe guardian’s default tbe tax list in tbe hands of tbe sheriff should be an execution to be satisfied out of his individual property or out of tbe personal property of bis ward. Laws 1872-73, cb. 115, see. 28(4); Laws 1876-77, cb. 155, sec. 29; The *422 Code, sec. 3691. In 1887 the General Assembly modified the law by appending the following proviso to the section conferring the right to redeem land sold for taxes: "Provided> that infants, idiots and insane persons may redeem any land belonging to them,from such sale within one year after the expiration of such disability, on like terms as if redemption had been made within one year from the date of said sale and from the date of each subsequent payment of taxes thereon at the rate of twenty per centum per annum on the several amounts so paid by the purchaser until redemption.” Laws 1887, ch. 137, sec. 65. Sections 91-93 gave the owner of a certificate of tax sale the right at his election to foreclose it by a civil action at any time before the expiration of two years from the date of the certificate. This proviso is the last clause in section 8038, Article 14, of the Consolidated Statutes. In several material respects Article 14 was amended by the act of 1927. Sections 8028-8037 were repealed and others were substituted. In the latter the holder of a certificate of sale is given the right of foreclosure by a civil action; the purchaser is given a lien as in case of a mortgage on the real estate sold for the amount paid and interest, penalties, costs, and charges; those claiming an interest disclosed by the records must be parties to the action; notice must be given to all other persons claiming an interest in the subject-matter; and a judgment of foreclosure may be rendered. In 1929 statutes were enacted affecting the procedure and providing that the deed shall convey the real estate in fee to the purchaser, free from any claims of the taxpayer, the wife, the husband, or any other person whether or not such claims are disclosed by the records. Laws 1929, ch. 204, ratified on 16 March, 1929, and ch. 334, ratified 19 March, 1929, as of 9 March, 1927. It is not the policy of the law indefinitely to suspend the payment of taxes. The statutes which formerly prohibited the sale of an infant’s land for taxes provided for the enforcement by other means of timely payment. It was a general rule of the common law that an infant should lose nothing by nonclaim or neglect of demanding his right and that his disabilities should be deemed privileges securing him from the harmful consequences of his improvident acts; but when sued he was protected by a guardian who was to defend him from all attacks. Courts of equitable jurisdiction exercised their general power and duty as parens patrice for his protection; and an infant when represented by a guardian, subjected to the jurisdiction of the court, and taken, under the protection of the law, was as a rule bound by the judgment or decree. It is contended that the last clause of section' 8038 should be interpreted as applying only to cases in which the purchaser, instead of foreclosing his certificate, demands and receives from the officer a deed *423 under section 8024 et seq., and tbat tbe clause in tbe act of 1927, cb. 221, sec. 4, declaring foreclosure to be tbe purchaser’s “sole right and only remedy” debars tbe purchaser from calling for a deed under tbe sections referred to and by implication repeals the minor’s right of redemption after bis disability expires. This question does not necessarily arise on tbe record. Tbe plaintiff is not an infant attempting to redeem land sold for taxes, but a purchaser under proceedings to foreclose a tax sale certificate. Tbe last clause of section 8038 evidently has no application to cases in which tbe certificate is foreclosed and tbe infants are properly before tbe court and protected by its judgment. In tbe present case tbe certificate was duly foreclosed; a guardian ad litem was appointed for tbe infant defendants, and, after due service of process, be filed an answer for them; another guardian.ad litem appointed to represent tbe unborn children of Wiley Williams, Plummer Williams and Willard Williams and all other persons who have or may have any interest in tbe land, after due service of process, likewise filed an answer. Tbe clerk, after adjudging a foreclosure of tbe certificate, appointed a commissioner to sell tbe land, confirmed bis report of tbe sale, and directed him to execute a deed to tbe purchaser. It appears tbat tbe infant defendants and all persons having a vested or contingent interest in tbe land have bad their day in court. We must therefore bold tbat they are bound by tbe judgment and tbat tbe deed conveys title in fee to tbe purchaser. Lumber Co. v. Herrington, 183 N. C., 85; Bank v. Alexander, 188 N. C., 667, 671; Matthews v. Joyce, 85 N. C., 258; Glisson v. Glisson, 153 N. C., 185; Rawls v. Henries, 172 N. C., 218; C. S., 452, 1744, 1745. Judgment afiirmed.