Hardison v. . Everett

BeogdeN, J. Tbe defendant asserts tbat, as Y. Sidbury was tbe owner of tbe “Craig place” when tbe judgment was rendered in 1916, between Sidbury and Everett, Hardison, being tbe purchaser of tbe “Craig place” in controversy from Sidbury, since said judgment, is estopped by tbe judgment from claiming tbe land in controversy. Tbe plaintiff asserts tbat tbe record in Sidbury v. Everett, and tbe judgment in tbat cause, determined tbe northern boundary of Sidbury, as to lot No. 3 only, and did not involve title to lot No. 2, wbicb is now in dispute. Estoppel by judgment is thus defined by Pearson, J., in Armfield v. Moore, 44 N. C., 157: “Tbe meaning of wbicb (estoppel) is, tbat when a fact has been agreed on, or decided in a court of record, neither of tbe parties shall be allowed to call it in question, and have it tried over again at any time thereafter, so long as tbe judgment or decree stands unreversed. ... In other words, bis mouth is shut, and be shall not say tbat is not true wbicb be bad before in a solemn manner asserted to be truth.” Tbe underlying reason for recognizing tbe principle of estoppel is tbat a person ought not to be vexed twice about tbe same matter. Estoppel by judgment arises from tbe following essentials: (1) Identity of parties;. (2) identity of subject-matter; (3) identity of issues. Wagon Co. v. Byrd, 119 N. C., 460; Tyler v. Capehart, 125 N. C., 64; Gillam, v. Edmonson, 154 N. C., 127; Coletrain v. Laughlin, 157 N. C., 287; Clarke v. Aldridge, 162 N. C., 326; Whitaker v. Garren, 167 N. C., 658; Price v. Edwards, 178 N. C., 493. It is also fully established tbat estoppels by judgment bind both parties and privies. Price v. Edwards, 178 N. C., 493; Rogers v. Ratcliff, 48 N. C., 225. There is evidence tending to show tbat tbe two-acre Craig place, although north of “West Goose Creek Prong,” is included in tbe boundaries of lot No. 2 claimed by Hardison, and was never a part of lot No. 3 of tbe Ennett land. There is, therefore, lack of identity of subject-matter. Tbe judgment in Sidbury v. Everett, rendered in 1916, enlarges tbe scope of tbat ease, because it was agreed between tbe parties tbat if tbe dividing line between tbe litigants, as tbe jury found, was not tbe line marked Pullen corner to red oak at 6, “tbat tbe true dividing line between tbe lands of said parties is West Goose Creek Prong, as shown on said map from letter Y to letter X.” However, it appears from tbe map tbat tbe line from tbe letter Y to tbe letter X establishes only tbe *375 northern boundary line of lot No. 3 of the Ennett lands; whereas, this cause, now under consideration, involves the title to lot No. 2 of the Ennett lands and the “Craig place” is within the boundaries of lot No. 2. The judgment in the Sidbury case provides “that the plaintiff, Y. Sidbury, is the owner of lot No. 3 in the division of the Thomas Ennett land, and that its northern boundary is the West Goose Creek Prong from Y to X.” This clause of the judgment in the Sidbury case confines and interprets the complaint, the issue, and the judgment, as relating only to lot No. 3 of the Ennett lands and fixes the northern boundary of said lot No. 3 at the West Goose Creek Prong. Therefore, the judgment, relied upon as an estoppel, having restricted the scope of the proceeding to a fixed area, to wit, lot No. 3 of the Ennett lands, and it appearing from the evidence that the land in controversy in this action is outside of the area designated as lot No. 3, the principle of estoppel does not apply. ■ Beversed.