Knott v. . Cutler

DeNNT, J. It is regrettable tbat tbe defendant entered into an agreement for tbe sale of ber property for a consideration less than half of its fair market value. Nevertheless, neither tbe jury nor tbe trial judge found tbat tbe execution of tbe agreement for tbe sale of tbe property was procured by tbe fraudulent misrepresentation of tbe plaintiff. Therefore, tbe sole question for our determination is whether or not, under the facts and circumstances disclosed on this record, tbe plaintiff is entitled to a decree for specific performance, or should be be left to bis remedy at law for damages? Tbe facts certainly do not warrant tbe cancellation or rescission of tbe contract in equity. Do tbe facts, on tbe other band, entitle tbe plaintiff to a decree for specific performance, under tbe rules and principles of equity as administered in this jurisdiction ? It is said in 49 Am. Jur., sec. 8, p. 13: “Assuming tbat tbe contract in question in an action for specific performance is one of tbe class of contracts of which specific performance may be granted because of inadequacy of tbe remedy at law, tbe granting of tbe decree of specific *431 performance is not a matter of absolute right. As the rule is usually-stated, the granting of relief by a decree requiring specific performance of a contract rests in the sound discretion of the court before whom the application is made, which discretion is to be exercised upon a consideration of all of the circumstances of the case, with a view of subserving ends of justice. This discretion of a court of equity to grant or withhold specific performance of a contract is not an arbitrary or capricious one, but is a judicial discretion to be exercised in accordance with settled rules. and principles of equity, and with regard to facts and circumstances of the particular case. The remedy of specific performance will be granted or withheld by the court according to the equities of the situation as disclosed by a just consideration of all the circumstances of the particular case, and no positive rule can be laid down by which the action of the court can be determined in all cases. . . . Accordingly, the rule is well settled that equitable relief by way of specific performance does not follow as a matter of course merely by establishing the existence and validity of the contract involved. . . . Specific performance is not a matter of absolute right even though a legal right to damages for breach of the contract may exist, and it may be refused even though the defense is not such as would warrant the rescission of the contract.” Likewise, it is held in the same authority, sec. 51, p. 66: “As a general rule, when it appears that a contract was unfairly procured by overreaching or overkeenness on the plaintiff’s part, or was induced or procured by means of oppression, extortion, threats, or illegal promises on his part, the plaintiff cannot obtain specific performance. These matters need not be of such character as would justify a court of equity in rescinding the contract or a court of law in refusing relief. There is a difference between that degree of unfairness which will induce a court of equity to interfere actively by setting aside a contract and that which will induce a court to withhold its aid. Relief may be denied upon ground that the contract is harsh, unjust, or oppressive, regardless of any actual fraud, and regardless of the fact that the contract is valid.” Should specific performance be denied in this case on the ground that the contract is harsh, unjust or oppressive, regardless of the absence of fraud in its procurement ? It must be conceded, we think, that the only evidence of harshness or oppression is the inadequate consideration. And the mere fact that the consideration is inadequate will not warrant a finding that the contract is harsh, unjust or oppressive, unless the inadequacy is so great as to amount to evidence of fraud. 49 Am. Jur., sec. 65, p. 80. Barnett v. Spratt, 39 N. C., 171; Heyward v. Bradley, 170 F., 325; Eyre v. Potter, 15 How., 42, 14 L. Ed., 592. A bad bargain, in the absence of fraud, will not relieve the defendant from the specific performance of her contract. Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N. C., *432 503, 47 S. E., 19; Whitted v. Fuquay, 127 N. C., 68, 37 S. E., 141; Moore v. Reed, 37 N. C., 580. As to when specific performance will be enforced in this jurisdiction, the rule is clearly stated in Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C., 64, 63 S. E., 186, where Hoke, J., speaking for the Court, said: “It is accepted doctrine that a binding contract to convey land, when there has been no fraud or mistake or undue influence or oppression, will be specifically enforced. Rudisill v. Whitener, 146 N. C., 403; Boles v. Caudle, 133 N. C., 528; Whitted v. Fuquay, 127 N. C., 68. This last decision being to the effect that mere inadequacy of price, without more, will not as a rule interrupt or prevent the application of the principle.” This doctrine or principle has been cited with approval in Ward v. Albertson, 165 N. C., 218, 81 S. E., 168; Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N. C., 622, 97 S. E., 654; and Harper v. Battle, 180 N. C., 375, 104 S. E., 658. It must be conceded that the defendant made a bad bargain and that the consideration is inadequate, but, since the agreement for the sale of the property was not procured by fraud on the part of the plaintiff, it is a binding agreement, and we believe the ends of justice will be subserved by granting a decree of specific performance. To deny a decree of specific performance in this case would in all probability not be advantageous to the defendant, since she would be liable in damages to the plaintiff for the difference between the contract price and the value of the property. Rodman v. Robinson, supra. This cause is remanded to the end that a decree for specific performance may be entered, in accord with this opinion. Error and remanded.