Reynolds v. . Palmer

"Walker, J. The only question in the case arises upon the exceptions to the charge upon the adverse possession of the defendants under their color of title. If there is any inexact or inaccurate expression of the court, when read by itself, we think the charge, when taken and construed as a whole, each part being given its proper connection and its relation to the other parts, would be perfectly understood by an intelligent jury. "We are not authorized to construe it disconnectedly, but must give a fair and reasonable interpretation to the context; Sackett Instructions to Juries (2 Ed.), secs. 23 and 24; Hodges v. Wilson, 165 N. C., 323; Aman v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C., 369. "When thus considered the charge fully explained to the jury, with proper reference to the evidence, the law in regard to adverse possession. The jury were told that the possession must be open and notorious and under a claim of right; that it must be continuous and not consist merely in an occasional act of trespass, and that it must be adverse or hostile in its character; and further, the court said substantially that possession of land is denoted by the *455 exercise of acts of dominion over it, in making tbe ordinary use and taking tbe ordinary profits of wbicb it is susceptible, sucb acts to be so repeated as to sbow tbat tbey are done in tbe character of owner and not of an occasional trespasser. Tbat is tbe definition of possession given by Judge Gaston, for tbe Court, in Williams v. Buchanan, 23 N. C., 537, and has generally been followed since tbat case was decided in 1841. Baum v. Shooting Club, 96 N. C., 310; Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N. C., 115; Gilchrist v. Middleton, 107 N. C., 680; Hamilton v. Ichard, 114 N. C., 538; Currie v. Gilchrist, 147 N. C., 648; Berry v. McPherson, 153 N. C., 4; Coxe v. Carpenter, 157 N. C., 559; Locklear v. Savage, 159 N. C., 238. While tbe judge did say tbat “possession is making tbat use of tbe land to which it is best suited,” be immediately and in tbe same connection explained fully to tbe jury what was meant by tbat expression, and finally brought bis words within tbe definition, as given above, so tbat tbe jury could not have been misled as to what was necessary to ripen defendants title under' color. It was entirely proper for tbe court to submit tbe conflicting evidence to tbe jury, so tbat tbe fact as to tbe adverse possession might be found under proper instructions of tbe court. It was not a question of law for him to decide, but a mixed question of fact and law. Hoilman v. Johnson, 164 N. C., 268; Coxe v. Carpenter, supra. There'was no error in tbe trial of tbe cause tbat we have been able to discover. Tbe jury simply found tbe fact, upon tbe eyidence, tbat defendant’s possession was not of tbe kind required by the law to divest plaintiffs of tbe true title and vest tbe same in defendants. No error.