Causey v. . Guilford County

Adams, J. For several years prior to 15 March, 1923, tbe corporate limits of tbe city of Greensboro formed a square, tbe center of which was tbe center of tbe intersection of Elm and Market streets, tbe sides being each two miles in length, cutting at right angles imaginary lines drawn north, south, east, and west from tbe center, and enclosing an area of four square miles. This area, it is admitted, constituted a special charter district in tbe public school system of Guilford County. Private Laws 1911, ch. 2, sec. 19 et seq. In 1917, pursuant to C. S., 2903, tbe city adopted a new charter, in which it was provided that tbe city should continue to be an independent school district and as sucb should have exclusive control of tbe public free schools within tbe corporate limits as they were then prescribed and as they might subsequently be extended, and that tbe board of education should be charged with tbe duty of erecting buildings and maintaining an adequate system of schools within tbe district. Tbe legal title to tbe school property was vested in tbe city. Some time in tbe same year (1911) in an election duly held there was authorized by tbe vote of a majority of tbe qualified voters of tbe city a maximum property tax of fifty cents on tbe one hundred dollars valuation of property, to be used for tbe mainte *304 nance of the public schools within the district, and this tax has since been annually levied and collected. Also, there was authorized by a like vote an issuance of bonds in the sum of one million dollars, the proceeds of which were to be used in acquiring land and erecting suitable buildings and equipping them for school purposes. These bonds were issued and sold as the obligation of the city of Greensboro (Duffy v. Greensboro, 186 N. C., 470), and the city has annually levied a tax to pay the interest and to retire the serial bonds as they mature. The plaintiffs allege that the special charter district owes in addition a floating debt of about $300,000 and that no provision has been made for assuming or paying this indebtedness; but in reply the defendants aver that the General Assembly has provided that this obligation “shall be and remain” the indebtedness of this particular district. Private Laws 1923, ch. 37, secs. 31, 32, 91. This act, in like manner with the charter adopted in 1917, continued the old.city limits as an independent school district under the name of the “Greensboro School District.” In 1921 the whole of Guilford County, save the special charter district and High Point Township, was made'a special school taxing district (Public-Local Laws 1921, ch. 131; Public-Local Laws 1921, Ex. Ses., ch. 38); and in 1922 a majority of the qualified voters therein authorized the annual levy and collection of a tax not exceeding twenty-five cents on the one hundred dollars valuation of property situated within the territory. This tax also has been regularly collected. At the session of 1923 the General Assembly enacted a series of statutes, effective on 15 April, 1923, amending and codifying the laws relating to public schools, therein prescribing a method for the adoption of a county-wide plan of organization. Public Laws 1923, ch. 136, Art. VI; 3 C. S., 5481. The defendants allege that on 19 May, 1923, the county board of education in the exercise of authority conferred upon it by this act adopted a county-wide system or plan of organization and retained the plan until modified on 10 April, 1926, as a means of providing an adequate school system for the benefit of all the children of the county; but this allegation is specifically denied by the plaintiffs. In a meeting held on 2 February, 1926, the board of county commissioners, pursuant to a request of the county board of education and in compliance with 3 C. S., 5663, ordered that an election be held on 30 March, 1926, to ascertain whether the voters of the county favored the levy of a special county tax not to exceed thirty cents on the one hundred dollars valuation of property to supplement the six months school fund and, if authorized, to be levied in lieu of the tax of twenty-five cents imposed in the special taxing district created under the act of 1921. The election was held, the returns were canvassed, and it was *305 declared tbat a majority of tbe qualified voters of tbe county bad voted in favor of tbe proposed tax. Tbe plaintiffs allege tbat on 8 April, 1926, tbe county board of education attempted to create a new school district, wbicb was to function on and after 1 July, 1926, including tbe special charter district and tbe territory embraced in several other districts; tbat on tbe same day tbe trustees of tbe special charter district formally requested tbe county board of education to assume full jurisdiction therein and directed tbe execution and delivery to this board of a release or quitclaim to all tbe school property therein situated. It is alleged by tbe plaintiffs tbat tbe proposed new district was never legally established and tbat tbe special charter district remains as it was originally created. This tbe defendants deny. On 15 April, 1926, tbe board of county commissioners, in agreement with a resolution passed by tbe board of education on 8 April, ordered a special election to be held in tbe alleged new district on 25 May, for tbe purpose of submitting to tbe qualified voters thereof tbe two questions of authorizing a maintenance tax of thirty cents on tbe hundred dollars valuation of property in addition to all other taxes and of issuing bonds for tbe district in tbe sum of $2,300,000, and levying a tax in addition to all other taxes, sufficient to pay tbe interest and to provide a sinking fund for tbe payment of tbe respective bonds at maturity. Tbe election was held, and it was formally determined tbat a majority of tbe qualified voters favored tbe taxes and tbe bonds. This synopsis in connection with tbe findings of fact forms a background against wbicb tbe assignments of error may be viewed; and as these assignments involve, not only inferences of law, but findings of fact, we may recall tbe rule tbat in appeals of this character tbe court is not concluded by tbe facts as found by tbe trial judge, but is at liberty to review tbe evidence and to determine tbe facts for itself — a rule none tbe less available because in tbe judgment of tbe court tbe findings of fact and tbe conclusions of law are in some instances apparently intermingled. Howard v. Board of Education, 189 N. C., 675; Cameron v. Highway Commission, 188 N. C., 84; Lee v. Waynesville, 184 N. C., 565. One of tbe points on wbicb tbe briefs exbibit wide divergence of reasoning relates to tbe alleged adoption of tbe county-wide plan of organization. Tbe defendants say tbat it is immaterial whether or not tbe county board of education legally adopted tbe plan on 19 May, 1923, and thereafter continued it in effect as set forth in tbe affidavit of T. E. Foust, for tbe reason tbat a new plan, wbicb was essential to tbe creation of tbe greater Greensboro school district, was legally adopted on 8 April, 1926; while tbe plaintiffs insist tbat there is no recorded *306 adoption of the system and that it never became effective. This disagreement invites an examination of the evidence on the point. In several of its meetings, held on and after 7 November, 1925, the county board of education considered a petition requesting an extension of the city school district. The question was again presented in a meeting held 29 December, 1925. At that time the board of education was working under a county-wide plan, .legal or otherwise, and it was concluded that an extension of the city school district — the old Greensboro school district — could not be effected without making a change in the “existing” plan. 3 C. S., 5481(2). Accordingly, in this meeting the county superintendent of public instruction exhibited a map of Guil-ford County, “showing the present location of each school district, the position of each, the location of roads, streams, and their natural barriers, the number of children in each district, and the size and condition of each school building in each district.” This was in strict compliance with the statute. 3 C. S., 5481(1). Thereupon a plan “was prepared, indicating proposed changes so as to work out a more advantageous school system for the entire county”; it was filed with the secretary and marked, “Tentative modification of county-wide plan, 29 December, 1925.” Before adopting the proposed plan the county board of education was required to call a meeting of all the school committeemen and the boards of trustees and to lay the plan before them for their advice and suggestions (3 C. S., 5481, sec. 2) — notice to those affected to be given by one publication, at least ten days before the meeting or hearing, in a newspaper published at the county seat, giving the hour, day, and place of the meeting or hearing and the purpose thereof, and by mailing to or serving notice upon all committeemen and trustees. Public Laws 1924, Ex. Ses., ch. 121, sec. 2. The county board of education called a meeting of all the committeemen and all the trustees to be held at ten o’clock on 16 January, 1926, to consider a modification of the county-wide plan. Notice that the meeting had been called and that the tentative plans contemplated the creation of a new school district was published in a newspaper and sent by registered mail to every committeeman and trustee in the county, as the statute requires. In the meeting not only the extension of the city school district was considered, but the “whole educational program” of the county. Objection was made that the extension of the city school district would result in removing taxable property from the county taxing district to the city district; but the election held on 30 March, 1926, removed this objection. Until the election was held the county board of education deferred action involving any change in the boundaries of the school districts. It was a few days thereafter, 8 April, that the board “took up the consideration of the adoption of the county-wide plan discussed *307 at the meeting on 16 January, 1926, and at the joint meeting beld on 16 January, 1926, witb the school trustees, committeemen and- school patrons of the county” and resolved “that the existing county-wide plan or organization of schools be and is hereby changed and modified,” as set forth in the resolution. If at this time there did not “exist” a county-wide plan which had been legally adopted, the board since 19 May, 1923, had proceeded on the theory that the plan was in practical operation and the repeated references in the minutes to the “existing plan” should be considered in the light of this fact. Moreover, the new plan affected every school district in the county. R. 36, 37, 38. Against the legality of this procedure the appellees urge the contention that the provision for giving notice is mandatory and that no notice was given of the meeting held on 8 April. Whether under Spruill v. Davenport, 178 N. C., 364, and other cases, the direction is mandatory we need not now adjudge, for we do not concur in the appellees’ interpretation of the statute requiring notice to be given. The act of 1923 (3 C. S., 5481) requires the board of education before changing the adopted plan to notify interested patrons and the committeemen whose advice is sought, and the act of 1924 (Ex. Ses., ch. 121) points out the method by which the notice shall be given; but this notification is designed to provide a hearing for the committeemen, trustees, and interested patrons before the modification or adoption of the county-wide plan. This in our judgment is the reasonable construction of the statutes. There is no machinery for adopting the plan in a joint meeting and no requirement that-there shall be notification of the meeting at which the plan is to be adopted by the board of education. The joint meeting is advisory; the plan can be adopted only by the board. We conclude therefore that his Honor was in error in finding as a fact (twelfth paragraph of the judgment) that the county-wide plan had never been adopted. Harrington v. Comrs., 189 N. C., 572; Blue v. Trustees, 187 N. C., 431. Since the boundary lines of a school district can be changed only as the statute provides (C. S., 5481(2), it is essential to determine whether the greater Greensboro school district was created in accordance with an adopted county-wide plan of organization. The plaintiffs aver that the special charter district has never ceased to exist, and, indeed, that its charter could not legally be repealed under C. S., 5555 (School Law, sec. 157). Their argument on the latter proposition is based upon sections in the city’s amended charter of 1917 and 1923 to the effect that the city is and shall continue to be an independent school district and shall have exclusive control of its public free schools. This position, they say, is fortified by the provision that *308 other school districts in the county may be changed in the manner provided by law. Their deduction is obvious: the special charter'district is the creature of a local law which is inconsistent with and is neither modified nor repealed by the general law; the special charter district therefore is established and is not subject to change in like manner with other districts.' They cite Felmet v. Comrs., 186 N. C., 251, in which it is held that a local statute enacted for a particular municipality is intended to be exceptional, and is not repealed by the enactment of a subsequent general law. The opinion goes further: “Unless the repeal is provided for by express words or arises by necessary implication.” Is not a definite repealing clause included in the School Code? This law went into effect on 15 April, 1923, and in “express words” repealed all laws in conflict with it, including those “passed by the General Assembly of 1923.” Public Laws 1923, ch. 136, sec. 378. The repealing clause embraced the amendment of 1917 and that of 1923, which was effective from and after 15 March. Private Laws 1923, ch. 37, sec. 106. This clause points out the legislative purpose to repeal conflicting laws and to provide the means by which a special charter district, municipal or other, may surrender its charter rights and become a local tax district. We advert now to the other proposition: that the special charter district has never ceased to exist. As we understand it, the plaintiffs’ argument is this: Under section 157 (C. S., 5555) when the petition of the special charter district is accepted by the county board of education, the trustees of the special charter district must convey to the county board the title to all the school property; here the deed was not executed until 25 June, 1926, and was not recorded until 29 June; it is the registration of the deed which repeals the special charter; therefore the special charter was not repealed, if at all, until 29 June; if the charter was not repealed before that time the special charter district was not legally included in the greater Greensboro school district, and the attempted creation of this district was void. The situation, we grant, is not free from difficulty; but the argument, while not without force, in our judgment is not conclusive. On 8 April, 1926, the board of education resolved: “That in accordance with the county-wide plan adopted 8 April, 1926, there be and hereby is created a new school district to be known as greater Greensboro school district, which shall begin to operate as such on 1 July, 1926,” made up of the existing Greensboro school district and eleven other districts, together with a part of Muir’s Chapel District. Blue v. Trustees, 187 N. C., 431. C. S., 5430, provides: “Whenever duties are assigned to the county board of education in this subehapter it shall riot *309 be construed so as to take away from tbe board of trustees of any special charter district any duties or other powers assigned to said board of trustees by the General Assembly”; and the Court has said that special charter districts do not as a rule come within the compulsory regulations of the public school authorities unless and until they have surrendered their special charters according to the provisions of the school law. Blue v. Trustees, supra; Sparkman v. Comrs., 187 N. C., 241. As indicated, the school law prescribes the method. 3 C. S., 5555; School Code, sec. 157. Now, what was done? On the same day (8 April, 1926), the special charter district adopted a resolution requesting the county board of education to assume full jurisdiction of the Greensboro school district and directing the execution of a quitclaim deed conveying title to the school property. R. 39. Intending to form the new school district the board of education deferred final action, but requested its secretary meanwhile to secure the necessary conveyance of the property. It is alleged in the complaint and admitted that again on 22 June, 1926, the city council by a vote of five to two directed the conveyance to be made; but in making this order they were responding to legal advice that they held the title to the property only as trustees. In the resolution creating the greater Greensboro school district the board of education declared that it immediately came into being, but that it should “begin to operate as such on 1 July, 1926.” It was deemed necessary to hold an election in the new district before the close of the fiscal year; to this end the new district must exist. The request that the county board of education should assume full jurisdiction of the special charter district manifested a purpose on the part of the board of trustees to surrender its charter rights. The trustees concluded that they no longer had control; that they were naked trustees; and that jurisdiction was then vested in the county board. The board of education, however, as suggested by the appellants, was in this dilemma: immediate acceptance would have been followed by immediate conveyance of the school property and immediate registration of the deed; the county board would then have been compelled to assume immediate control of the special charter district. This would have disarranged the schools in the special charter district and in other districts forming a part of the new district; it would have broken into the full term of the special charter district and would have left the new district without money for the remainder of the fiscal year; for the money raised by taxation in the special charter district could not have been used for the benefit of the new district. Apparently the only present escape from this predicament was in the course pursued *310 by the board of education: to make tbe necessary changes without trammeling some of the schools it proceeded on the principle that the special charter district, upon surrender of jurisdiction by the trustees, became an inchoate local tax district. However this may be, it brought into existence the new school district which should not “begin to operate as such” before the end of the fiscal year lest the hazard of deranged schools be incurred; it prescribed new boundary lines; it procured an election; it took other necessary steps. These measures, while not concurrent in time, were directed to a common end — the ultimate technical repeal of the special charter and the synchronous functioning of the new district. Every separate measure was a unit; the combined units were one transaction, the several components of- a unified whole. With respect to statutes construction is strict or liberal. Strict construction refuses to extend the import of words used in a statute so as to embrace cases or acts which the words do not clearly describe; liberal construction is that by which the letter of the statute is enlarged or restrained so as more effectually to accomplish the purpose intended. In this case we are convinced that the legislative intent calls for a liberal, comprehensive and rational construction of the statutes in question; and this construction leads to the conclusion that the special charter of the old city district did not function after the jurisdiction of the trustees was surrendered, and that the new district was lawfully created. The plaintiffs refer to the defendants’ allegation that the county board of education intended that the special charter district withdraw the surrender of its charter rights if the voters in the new district failed to vote the proposed tax and bonds. Whether the board of education could permit the trustees to withdraw the petition or whether it could be withdrawn without such permission is academic; the election was held and the tax and bonds were voted. With the mere motive of the county board in deferring action we are not concerned. The validity of the election held on 25 May is questioned by the appellees on the ground that there was no separate vote in that part of the district which is outside the special charter district, and that it does not affirmatively appear that a majority of the voters in the outlying territory approved the proposition submitted. The cases of Hill v. Lenoir County, 176 N. C., 572, Hicks v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 394, Perry v. Comrs., ibid., 387, and Barnes v. Comrs., 184 N. C., 327, were decided before the enactment of the school code. Public laws 1923, ch. 136. We have held that the county-wide plan was duly adopted; these cases, then, are not pertinent. Sparkman v. Comrs., supra, Coble v. Comrs., 184 N. C., 342, and Plott v. Comrs., 187 N. C., 125, dealt with special taxing *311 districts. Harrington v. Comrs., supra, applied or extended tbe doctrine to school districts created under an adopted county-wide plan of organization and must now be regarded as controlling on this point. We tbink it unnecessary to dwell on the exception to the seventeenth finding of fact. There is nothing in the judgment to indicate that this finding had any appreciable bearing upon any of the conclusions of law, or that the voters did not know that the conveyance would be made, or, if they did not know, the effect of their ignorance on the election. The statute was constructive notice and no other notice was required. 3 C. S., 5555. It is finally urged on behalf of the plaintiffs that the judgment should be upheld because in the creation of the new district no provision was made for the indebtedness of the special charter district or the special taxing district. It is not clear that the judge considered 'this question, though it is a subject of discussion in the briefs. We have referred to the provision that all obligations of the special charter district shall be and remain the indebtedness of the district. In the -notice of the election held on 25 May, 1926, was the following: “The voting of the maintenance tax will repeal the maintenance tax heretofore voted and levied for the old Greensboro school district, but not any tax required by law for payment of outstanding indebtedness nor will it affect the county-wide maintenance tax of not exceeding thirty cents voted 30 March, 1926.” The territory in the old city district is still liable for the floating indebtedness of the district ($300,000) and for the bond issue of a million -dollars, the obligation of the city. See School Code, sec. 5. With the repeal of the special charter the old city district became a local tax district (School Code, 157) subject to sec. 228, which prohibits its abolition while it is in debt. The statutes formulating the county-wide plan have no provisions for existing debts; but section 238 of the School Code, dealing with special taxing districts, confers upon the county board of education authority to assume all the indebtedness, bonded or otherwise, of a local tax or special charter district. The county board was not obliged to assume such indebtedness and did not do so; we must therefore conclude that the property originally affected remains liable. Plott v. Comrs., 187 N. C., 125; Coble v. Comrs., supra. After giving to the entire record, the briefs, and the oral argument our careful and deliberate consideration, we are of opinion that all the exceptions taken by the appellants should be sustained and that the judgment of the Superior Court should be and it is hereby Beversed.