McCall v. . Wilson

Davis, J. (after stating the case.) 1. The first exception is to the admission of the testimony of S. C. McCall. She testified to no “ personal transaction or communication ” between her and the deceased. What she saw, and the fact that the deceased had land in Union County,involved no such “transaction or communication.” Loftin v. Loftin, 96 N. C, 94. There was no error in admitting her testimony. 2. The second exception was to the admission of the testimony of D. H. McCall. He testified to what he “ saw,” and the exception cannot be sustained. 3. The third exception, and the only one relied on in the brief of counsel for defendants, was to the refusal of his Honor to give judgment for defendants, upon the ground, as insisted, that the deed from Moore to .Josiah McCall was void as against the deed from the administrator of Moore, because the former was not registered within the time prescribed by law. It is insisted that the Acts of 1883 did not extend the time for registration of deeds, and that section 1279 of The Code, giving further time, did not go into effect until the first day of November, 1883, more than two years after the extending act of 1881, and that there was no law in force that authorized the registration of the deed from Moore to Josiah McCall on the second day of ¡September, 1884, which could have relation back to defeat the title acquired under the deed from the administrator of Moore, registered in February, 1882, under which the defendants claim title. It is a misapprehension to suppose that section 1279 of The Code, extending the time for registering grants and other instruments, did not take effect till November 1, 1883, and that there was an intervening period between the expiration of two years, or after the extending act of 1881, and the *601 first day of November, 1883, during which there was no law in force extending the time for registering grants, &c. Section 1279 of The Code, as appears upon its face, is a re-enactment of chapter 180, section 1, of the Acts of 1870-’71, and provides that “all grants of land in the State, or all deeds of conveyance * * * required by law to be registered within or by a given time,” and which “ have not been proved and registered within or by such time, may be proved and registered within two years after the passage of this Code, under the same rules,” &c. The Code was passed and ratified on the 2d day of March, 1883. The Code, Vol. II, page 601, section 3866, is as follows: “All the provisions, chapters and sections contained in this Code shall be in force from and after the first day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three, except only such parts thereof as to which a different provision is expressly made therein.” By the express provision in section 1279, the time is -extended two years “ after the passage ” of The Code — that is, after March 2d, 1883 and not after November 1st, 1883. The Acts of 1881, chapter 313, extended the time two years from its ratification, March 11, 1881, and, as we have seen, the provision in The Code, § 1279, was passed March 2d, 1883; so there was no intervening period of time when no law was in force allowing further time for the registration of grants, &c., as there was in the case of Scales v. Fewell, 3 Hawks, 19, and Haughton & Slade v. Roscoe & Gray, 3 Hawks, 21, relied on by counsel for defendants. The third exception cannot be sustained. There is no error. Affirmed.