Hinson v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp.

WiNBORNE, J. Defendant, in brief filed in this Court, very frankly states that there is no serious dispute but that Strickland, who was one of its employees and who was operating its truck at the time of the accident, was guilty of negligence. And, assuming this to be true, defendant contends, and rightly so, that the real question presented is as to whether the doctrine of respondeat superior applies under the facts of this case. That is, the underlying and basic question presented by defendant’s exception to the denial of its motions, aptly made, for judgment as in ease of nonsuit, is this: Was Strickland acting within the scope of his employment by defendant at the time of and in respect to the collision resulting in damage to property, of which plaintiffs complain ? In the light of pertinent decisions of this Court, we are of opinion and hold that the answer to the question is “No.” See Martin v. Bus Line, 197 N.C. 720, 150 S.E. 501; Parrott v. Kantor, 216 N.C. 584, 6 S.E. 2d 40; McLamb v. Beasley, 218 N.C. 308, 11 S.E. 2d 283; Riddle v. Whisnant, 220 N.C. 131, 16 S.E. 2d 698; Rogers v. Town of Black Mountain, 224 N.C. 119, 29 S.E. 2d 203; Carter v. Motor Lines, 227 N.C. 193, 41 S.E. 2d 586. *480 From these and numerous other decisions of this Court to like effect, these applicable principles are found: The owner of an automobile is not liable for damages caused by it merely because of its ownership. The liability, if any, of the owner of an automobile operated by another rests solely upon the doctrine of respondeat superior. And this doctrine applies only when the relation of master and servant is shown to exist between the wrongdoer and the person sought to be charged for the result of the wrong at the time of, and in respect to the very transaction out of which the injury and damage arose. The rule is well settled that the master is responsible for the tort of his servant which results in injury to another when the servant is acting in the course of his employment, and is at the time about the master’s business. And it is equally well settled that the master is not liable if the tort of the servant which causes the injury occurs while the servant is acting outside the legitimate scope of his authority, and is then engaged in some private matters of his own. McLamb v. Beasley, supra. “A servant is acting in the course of his employment, when he is engaged in that which he was employed to do, and is at the time about his master’s business. He is not acting in the course of his employment, if he is engaged in some pursuit of his own. Not every deviation from the strict execution of his duty is such an interruption of the course of employment as to suspend the master’s responsibility; but, if there is a total departure from the course of the master’s business, the master is no longer answerable for the servant’s conduct,” Tiffany on Agency, p. 270. Robertson v. Power Co., 204 N.C. 359, 168 S.E. 415. And, with respect to departure from employment, without consent of owner, it is stated in 5 Blashfield’s Cyc. of Automobile Law and Practice, Section 3029, that “the general rule is that a servant in charge of his master’s automobile, who, though originally bound upon a mission for his master, completely forsakes his employment and goes on an errand exclusively his own, and while so engaged commits a tort, does not thereby render the master answerable for such tort under the rule of respondeat superior.” See Parrott v. Kantor, supra. The trend of judicial decisions, as stated in Parrott v. Kantor, supra, is that the departure commences when the servant definitely deviates from the course or place where in the performance of his duty he should be. And while there is conflict of authority on the subject, better reason supports the view that after a servant has deviated from his employment, for purposes of his own, the relation of master and servant is not restored until he returns to the path of duty, where the deviation occurred, or to some place, where in the performance of his duty, he should be. Applying these principles to the evidence in the case in hand, we hold that the moment when Strickland, the operator of defendant’s truck, *481 after completing delivery of tbe employees to tbeir bornes, tbe last one to a point near Delco, in tbe course of bis employment, turned aside from bis duty to drive tbe truck back to tbe plant at Navassa, where be says be was ordered to keep it at nigbt, and drove on to Hallsboro, 20 miles farther away from tbe plant, without permission of any authorized superior, and in pursuit of private purposes of bis own, be departed from bis employment and remained outside of it until be returned to tbe point of departure. Until be reached that point, be was only returning to bis employment. See Parrott v. Kantor, supra. And, tbe collision having occurred before be reached there, tbe defendant, bis master, is not liable for bis tort in bringing about tbe collision, and tbe consequent damages of which plaintiffs complain. For reasons stated, tbe motions of defendant for judgment as in case of nonsuit, should have been sustained. Hence tbe judgment below is Reversed.