Brown v. . Miller

MekrimoN, C. J. after stating the case: The deed of mortgage under which the plaintiff claims title to the bale of cotton in controversy sufficiently designates and identifies the land upon which it was to be produced, and the cotton itself, to render this deed operative and effectual for the purpose contemplated by it. The purpose of this description ■was not to designate land to which the mortgagor certainly had absolute or perfect title, but the land claimed by him as his at the time he executed the deed, and upon which he intended that himself or his tenants should thereafter produce the cotton crop that the mortgage was intended to embrace. The simple purpose was to identify the land claimed by him as his on which the crop of cotton was to be produced. The mere fact that a third party, after the deed was executed, recovered the land sufficiently described by it, could not affect the sufficiency of the description or the deed. The land described as “ my (the mortgagor’s) land” remained the same. The description, the designation of it, was not destroyed or rendered less certain. The cotton crop conveyed by the deed was sufficiently designated It was not an indefinite part of it, but all— *398 “ the entire crop of cotton to be raised by me (the mortgagor) or my tenants on all my lands during the year 1889” — that is, the “ entire crop ” so raised on the land described as “ my (the mortgagor’s) land.” The deed identified the land and the cotton crop embraced by it with such definiteness as that the same could be certainly ascertained and known. Woodlief v. Harris, 95 N. C., 211; Gwathney v. Etheridge, 99 N. C., 571; State v. Logan, 100 N. C., 454. Nor could the supervenient rights of Fisher, after he recovered the lands from the mortgagor, as the latter’s landlord, to rent — the one bale of cotton — render the mortgage inoperative, excppt to the extent of the rent. As to this, the statute {The Code, § 1754) gave the landlord a prior lien for the rent; but the whole cotton crop belonged to the plaintiff, subject only to that lien. As between the plaintiff and the mortgagor the mortgage remained effectual, except as to the rent. The defendants contend, however, that the mortgagor, Patterson, executed to them in March next after Fisher recovered the land from him a mortgage to secure a debt created for “supplies,” which embraced the bale of cotton in controversy, and, therefore, they had good title .to the same. This contention is without force. The last mentioned mortgage was, in effect, a mortgage second to that of the plaintiff as to the cotton crop, including the bale in question. In no aspect of this second mortgage, so far as appears, can it be treated as creating a prior lien in favor of the defendants, as allowed iu certain cases b,y the statute (The Gode, § 1799). It does not appear how, or for what purpose, or on what account the “supplies” were made by the defendants to the mortgagor. Raw lings v. Hunt, 90 N. C., 270, and cases there cited. The defendants further contend that the bale of cotton in question belonged to Fisher, the landlord, as and for the rent due to him from Patterson. We do not think the evidence went to prove that this bale of cotton- was delivered *399 to the landlord to pay the rent so due to him Accepting the evidence pertinent as true, it only showed that Patterson, the tenant, at first intended that it should go to pay the rent, but the defendants did not so receive it for the landlord; they insisted that they' should have it on account of their mortgage debt; the tenant, their mortgage debtor, consented, and afterwards he delivered to his landlord another and different bale in discharge of the rent due to him. This certainly is the fair and just interpretation of the facts as they appear. Affirmed.