In Re T. J. Parker

Walker, J., after stating tbe case: Tbe statute provides, among other things, that any person found guilty of wilful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any court, or of resistance, wilfully offered, to tbe lawful order or process of any court, shall be adjudged as having committed a contempt of tbe court, and fined not exceeding two hundred dollars, or imprisoned not exceeding thirty days, or both, in tbe discretion of tbe court. Rev., secs. 939 and 940. Tbis is not a contempt committed within tbe immediate jtresence or verge of tbe court, and an appeal, therefore, lies from tbe judgment below. Ex parte McCown, 139 N. C., 95; In re Deaton, 105 N. C., 59; Cromartie v. Comrs., 85 N. C., 211; In re Daves, 81 N. C., 74; Ex parte Robins, 63 *467 N. C., 309. The findings of fact by the judge are conclusive upon us when there is evidence to support them, which is the case here. Ex parte McCown, supra; Young v. Rollins, 80 N. C., 125, and are reviewable only for the single purpose of passing upon the sufficiency of the facts, when there is competent evidence of their existence, to warrant the judgment. Green v. Green, 130 N. C., 578. It has been held, though, that when the facts are found by an inferior court they may be reviewed by the Superior Court. In re Deaton, supra; S. v. Aiken, 113 N. C., 653. When the Superior Court finds the facts in a habeas corpus proceeding, the revising tribunal, which is this Court, may adjudge whether they make out a case of contempt. Ex parte Summers, 27 N. C., 149; Ex parte McCown, supra. The court below was well within the provision of the statute as to punishment, as it imposed only one-half of the maximum allowed. Rev., sec. 940. We agree with the court, though, as to the facts, being of the opinion that the evidence fully justifies its findings, and that it heard only competent proof of them. So that it brings us to this question, whether the findings show a case of contempt, for which the respondent could be punished. We have no doubt of the correctness of the decision upon this question. The court had issued a restraining order, in an action to which respondent was a party, forbidding him to interfere with the officers and agents of the law in laying out a public road, and especially by preventing them from removing his fence, which obstructed the way. This was a plain and direct order, which could be easily understood and obeyed, and yet the respondent, after he had full knowledge of its terms, deliberately, openly and defiantly refused to observe it, or to comply with its mandate, but on the contrary, by a display of his gun, accompanied by a bloody threat to take the life ,of any man who dared to remove the fence, he intimidated the officers and prevented them from executing the order of the court. His conduct was not only illegal but very reprehensible and contemptuous. If it was not a contempt, within the meaning of every definition of that term, we can hardly comprehend what combination of facts would present a case within the provisions of the statute. It was as plain a contempt as could be imagined or conceived. This was not a case where the respondent ■ could purge himself by disavowing that he intended to be disrespectful to the court, as the intention or motive was not involved, but, on the contrary, he is tried upon the fact of disobedience, which is of itself a contempt from the very nature of the act. He will not be heard to say that he did not intend to be contemptuous when he wilfully and obstinantly obstructed the coercive process of the court, and especially when he repeated the áct and persisted in his resistance to the order. The court, too, finds *468 that he did intend to do what was done with the purpose of setting at defiance the order of the court, which was that he refrain from doing the very act. An apparent recalcitrant may purge himself of the charge that he has committed a contempt when the gravamen of the alleged offense rests upon intention or motive, but not when the intent is not ■involved and the contempt consists in doing the act. Respondent was allowed to purge himself of the contempt in Hannan v. Grizzard, 89 N. C., 115 (failure to induct an elected officer, believing him to be ineligible); In re Walker, 82 N. C., 96 (where he was allowed to excuse himself by showing that he did not have possession or control of a child he had been ordered to produce in court in a habeas corpus proceeding for the surrender of the child to its proper custody. Justice Dillard, with his usual clearness, draws the line of demarcation there between cases where intention or motive is involved and when it is not) ; In re Moore, 63 N. C., 397 (attorney’s disbarment cases, where intent was the.gravamen). Other notable cases are Ex parte Biggs, 64 N. C., 217; In re Robinson, 117 N. C., 533; Kron v. Smith, 96 N. C., 386; Boyett v. Vaughan, 89 N. C., 27; In re Gorham, 129 N. C., 481; In re Young, 137 N. C., 552; Baker v. Gordon, 86 N. C., 120; Herring v. Pugh, 126 N. C., 852. The party must, of course, possess the ability to comply with the order, and a lack of it excuses, as in the case of In re Walker, supra. But the motive to act in contempt of the court was manifest in this case, and was also found by the court to exist, so that tested by any rule the respondent was properly held to he guilty of contempt under the statute. It is not required that we decide whether he would be guilty at common law, because the power to punish in such a case is inherent in the court, as essential to its very existence and in order to preserve its dignity and power to enforce its orders and judgments. Ex parte McCown, supra; Ex parte Schenk, 65 N. C., 366; In re Patterson, 99 N. C., 418; In re Oldham, 89 N. C., 26; In re Robinson, 117 N. C., 533. We see, therefore, that Walker’s case, relied on by appellant, has 'no application, as it does not decide what is supposed by him to be its legal effect. Nor does Huet v. Lumber Co., 138 N. C., at p. 445, hit any nearer the mark. There the injunction was ineffectual because the act to he restrained was not only threatened but had been accomplished, as in the New Bern case of felling the tree (Harrison v. Bryan and City of New Bern, 148 N. C., 315), and there was no practical way of preventing an apprehended or threatened wrong, or of protecting-fhe right by an injunction. Pickler v. Board of Education, 149 N. C., 221; Huet v. Lumber Co., 138 N. C., at 445; Wallace v. Wilkesboro, 151 N. C., 614; Moore v. Monument Co., 166 N. C., 211; Little v. Lenoir, 151 N. C., 417. We may well close with a reference to what was held in several recent *469 eases covering fully the points herein raised. A party and his agents who wilfully violate a temporary restraining order enjoining the party and his agents from doing a specified act pending litigation are guilty of contempt of court. In re Caro. C. and O. Rwy. Co., 151 N. C., 467. The motive of a party who directly and plainly violates a temporary restraining order is immaterial on the question whether he was in contempt for violating it. Weston v. Lumber Co., 158 N. C., 270; and in such cases when guilt does not depend upon the motive, the violator cannot purge himself of the contempt by claiming that he did not intend to disregard the order or to be disrespectful to the court, as the baneful result flows logically and necessarily from his acts, Mocksville Lodge No. 134 v. Gibbs, 159 N. C., 66, and advice of counsel will not relieve him in law from liability for the penalty, but may be material on the question of punishment. Weston v. Lumber Co., supra. In this ease, and those just cited, the act which necessarily obstructed the execution of the court’s order was intentionally, and even wilfully, committed. Facts less strong than those found in this case were held sufficient to show that the restraining order of the court was knowingly and intentionally violated in Davis v. Champion Fibre Co., 150 N. C., 84, and Mocksville Lodge, etc. v. Gibbs, supra, and in the case last cited it was also held that the finding by the court of the facts is not reviewable here, when the respondent was adjudged guilty of violating a restraining order, if supported by evidence. This is the general rule. See Mormand v. Carlisle, 131 Ga., 493. It follows that there was no error in the proceedings and judgment of the lower court Affirmed.