Stanback v. Winston Mutual Life Insurance

’WiNBORNE, J. Appellant concedes that if tbe insured bad died witbin six months from tbe time tbe policy took effect, as result of any other natural cause than those enumerated in paragraph “4. Limitations,” tbe beneficiary would be entitled to recover one-balf of tbe “ultimate amount of insurance specified in tbe policy,” that is, $150. But it contends that since tbe insured died of pneumonia witbin such period of six months— pneumonia being one of tbe causes of death named in said paragraph 4, tbe beneficiary would be entitled to receive only one-fourth of tbe amount of $150, which would be payable under tbe policy for death resulting from any other natural cause, that is, only tbe sum of $37.50. We think tbis is tbe correct interpretation of tbe policy. “An insurance policy is only a contract, and is interpreted by tbe rules of interpretation ’ applicable to other written contracts, and tbe *498 intention of tbe parties is tbe object to be attained,” Varser, J., in McCain v. Ins. Co., 190 N. C., 549, 130 S. E., 186. See, also, Crowell v. Ins. Co., 169 N. C., 35, 85 S. E., 37; Powers v. Ins. Co., 186 N. C., 336, 119 S. E., 481. In tbe Powers case, supra, Adams, J., speaking for tbe Court, said, "But tbe rule is equally well settled that contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to tbe sense and meaning of tbe terms wbicb tbe parties have used; and if tbey are clear and unambiguous tbeir terms are to be taken and understood in tbeir plain, ordinary and popular sense.” See, also, Bray v. Ins. Co., 139 N. C., 390, 51 S. E., 922. “In determining tbe intention of tbe parties to an insurance policy, tbe policy should be considered and construed as a whole, and if it can reasonably be done, that construction will be adopted which will give effect to tbe whole instrument and to each of its various parts and provisions.” 29 Am. Jur., 176, Insurance, 160. In other words, tbe.policy should be taken by its four corners and considered as a whole. Penn v. Ins. Co., 160 N. C., 400, 76 S. E., 262. Applying these principles, tbe policy in this case has a clear meaning. If tbe concluding clause of tbe “Preliminary Provision,” reading “except as is provided on tbe following pages,” relates to amounts payable only in instances where tbe insured at date of tbe policy is less than ten years of age at next birthday, “tbe terms and conditions ... on tbe following pages . . .,” to wbicb tbe contract is stated to be subject, particularly tbe “limitations” in paragraph 4, would have no tangible meaning, and would be nullified. Indeed, it would be strained ruling to bold, as a proper interpretation, that tbe parties intended to contract with relation to death of a child less than ten years of age (a) “from pregnancy, childbirth or miscarriage, if legally married,” or (b) while in act of violating any Federal, State or Municipal law, or as a punishment therefor, or (c) while engaged in military or naval service in time of war. On tbe other band, if tbe clause be interpreted to relate to all that precedes it in tbe paragraph entitled “Preliminary Provision,” each clause of paragraph 4 “limitations” might reasonably have a subject to wbicb it would apply. Manifestly, when tbe policy is read as a whole, such is its clear meaning and tbe patent intention of tbe parties. But it is contended by appellee that tbe first two clauses of tbe “Preliminary Provision” being separated by a semicolon, each is complete in itself. It is further contended that, hence, tbe exception being separated from the- latter of tbe two by a comma, qualifies tbe latter only, and, when tested by tbe ordinary rules of English grammar, or legal construction, cannot under any circumstances be construed to limit or *499 modify the first clause. However, in this connection it is the law in this State that although the rules of punctuation may be used to assist in determining the intent of the parties, punctuation or the absence of punctuation in a contract or deed is ineffective to control its construction as against the plain meaning of the instrument. Bunn v. Wells, 94 N. C., 67; Redmond v. Comrs., 106 N. C., 122, 10 S. E., 845; Real Estate Co. v. Bland, 152 N. C., 225, 67 S. E., 483; 3 A. L. R., 1062, Annotations I and III on “Punctuation as affecting construction of contract.” In accordance with this opinion, the judgment below is Reversed.