Austin v. . Crisp

Adams, J. Tbe seventh, eighth, and ninth exceptions involve, directly or indirectly, tbe alleged estoppel of tbe defendant to deny tbe plaintiff’s title, but in our opinion neither of them can be sustained. It is established as a general rule of law tbat a tenant who is in tbe undisturbed possession of tbe demised premises may not dispute tbe title of bis landlord; but as tbe relation of landlord and tenant is tbe result of a contract, tbe rule is based on tbe assumption tbat such relation exists by the mutual agreement of tbe parties. Unless there is “an agreement which creates an obligation,” there is no contract. There must be mutuality of obligation as well as mutuality of agreement. Clapp v. Coble, 21 N. C., 179; Davis v. Davis, 83 N. C., 71; Dixon v. Stewart, 113 N. C., 410; Shew v. Call, 119 N. C., 450; Shell v. West, 130 N. C., 171; Hargrove v. Cox, 180 N. C., 360; Hobby v. Freeman, 183 N. C., 240. *618 The doctrine of estoppel applies to the simple relation of lessor and lessee, unaffected by other complications, and does not preclude the tenant from showing there was no contract of tenancy, or from invoking the interposition of a court of equity for his relief. Timber Co. v. Yarbrough, 179 N. C., 340. The defendant alleges, in substance, that he relied upon the plaintiff’s representations, and was misled by reason of his ignorance of the boundary lines; and his evidence tends to show that he leased his own land through inadvertence and mistake. By reason of such mistake, the jury evidently concluded that no contract had been made. One is not permitted to accept a promise when he knows the other party understands it in a sense different from that in which he understands it, for in such case there is no agreement. Mistake may be such as to prevent any real agreement, and in such case the agreement is not merely voidable, as in the case of fraud, but is absolutely void, both at law and in equity. A meeting of the minds is essential. Freeman v. Croom, 172 N. C., 524. It is also worthy of notice that the plaintiff does not plead the estop-pel, but seems to depend on the lease as evidence of the alleged mistake in the execution of the deed. In fact, the object of the action is the correction of the deed, the plaintiff in express terms praying the court to reform the conveyance so as to make it speak the truth and comply with the agreement, and his Honor’s instruction upon this phase of evidence was certainly not unfavorable to the plaintiff. The third and sixth exceptions have reference to' excluded evidence, but the record does not show what the answer would have been or what evidence was proposed, and we must follow the ruling in several familiar precedents and hold that these exceptions also are without merit. The others are not discussed in the appellant’s brief. Schas v. Assurance Society, 170 N. C., 420; Fulwood v. Fulwood, 161 N. C., 601. We find No error.