Cutter Realty Co. v. Dunn Moneyhun Co.

Connor, J. When the General Contract Purchase Corporation, from time to time, delivered to the defendant the ten automobiles described in its petition, the said corporation was the owner of each of said automobiles. Its title and right to the possession of said automobiles was not and could not have been challenged by the defendant, notwithstanding the provisions of its contract with the said corporation, under which the delivery was made. The said corporation had repossessed or recovered each of said automobiles from the purchaser, under and by virtue of the conditional sales contract which had been transferred and .assigned to it by the defendant, without recourse. The failure of the defendant or of said corporation, to have the conditional sales contract recorded, did not render the said contract void as between the purchaser .and the defendant, or as between the purchaser and the General Contract Purchase Corporation, the assignee of the defendant. It has been ^uniformly held that a mortgage or conditional sales contract although not recorded, is valid as between the parties. It is void only as against ■creditors or purchasers for value. C. S., 3311, 3312. Ellington v. Supply Co., 196 N. C., 784, 147 S. E., 307. The automobiles were delivered to the defendant under the provisions ■of its contract with the General Contract Purchase Corporation. It is provided in said contract that “the dealer will repurchase each repossessed or recovered car, after the car has been tendered or delivered *654 to tbe dealer at tbe dealer’s place of business . . . and will pay G-. C. P. at its office, upon demand in casb tbe amount of tbe unpaid balance due Gr. C. P. on tbe note or other obligation. Until demand followed by actual payment by tbe dealer and delivery of official bill of sale by Gr. 0. P. title to tbe repossessed car remains in Gr. C. P. and dealer’s possession remains merely tbat of a bailee witb duty to safely store for Gr. C. P. and redeliver to Gr. 0. P. on demand.” By reason of tbis provision, tbe contract between tbe defendant and tbe General Contract Purchase Corporation, under which tbe automobiles described in tbe petition were delivered to tbe defendant, is not a conditional sales contract. It is not subject to tbe provisions of C. S., 3312, which requires tbe registration of all conditional sales of personal property in which tbe title is retained by tbe bargainor. At tbe date of tbe commencement of tbis action, tbe defendant bad acquired no right, title or interest, legal or equitable, in tbe automobiles, except tbat of a bailee for storage. For tbat reason, tbe instant case is distinguishable from Trust Co. v. Motor Co., 193 N. C., 663, 137 S. E., 874, and cases cited in tbe opinion in tbat case. Tbe General Contract Purchase Corporation was tbe owner and entitled to tbe possession of tbe automobiles described in its petition, at tbe date of its demand tbat tbe receiver of tbe defendant redeliver said automobile to it. There was no error in tbe order of tbe court directing tbe receiver to pay to tbe petitioner, General Contract Purchase Corporation, tbe proceeds of tbe sale of tbe automobiles which were in tbe possession of tbe defendant at tbe date of tbe commencement of tbis action. Tbe order is Affirmed.