Teeter v. Cole Manufacturing Co.

Beown, J. 1. We are of opinion that tbe nonsuit, taken voluntarily by plaintiff, was premature. He should have excepted to tbe ruling of tbe court and proceeded with tbe trial. In any view, be was entitled to a judgment for some amount. We again call attention to repeated rulings of this Court, that, “In order to avoid appeals based upon trivial interlocutory decisions, tbe right thus to proceed (viz., to take a nonsuit and appeal) has been said to apply ordinarily only to cases where tbe ruling of tbe court strikes at the root of the case and precludes a recovery by the plaintiff.” Hayes v. Railroad, 140 N. C., 131. “An intimation of an opinion by tbe judge adverse to the plaintiff upon some proposition of law which does not take the case from the "jury, and which leaves open essential matters of fact still to be determined by them, will not justify the plaintiff in suffering a nonsuit and appealing.” Midgett v. Mfg. Co., 140 N. C., 361; Merrick v. Bedford, 141 N. C., 504; Hoss v. Palmer, 150 N. C., 17. 2. As tbe result to plaintiff is tbe same, whether we dismiss bis appeal or affirm tbe ruling of tbe trial court, we will pass on tbe merits of the case, as it may tend to a settlement of tbe controversy. Tbe plaintiff’s complaint contains two causes of action — one for conversion of tbe lumber, and tbe other on a contract of purchase. Tbe facts are, that plaintiff contracted to sell and deliver to defendant, whose place of business was in Charlotte, a car load of lumber, two inches thick. While tbe lumber was in tbe ear, plaintiff conferred with defendant’s agents in Charlotte about if, and-this conversation occurred, as detailed by plaintiff: “I said, 'I am sorry there is a misunderstanding about it. You can use every stick of this lumber in your business here, some way. What will you give me for this lumber?-’ He said, ‘I can’t use a stick under two inches thick.’ I said, ‘Well, I can’t afford to have my lumber tore up for what little is over two inches. You need not take any of it.’ He said, ‘Well.’ I asked him if be bad any room of bis yard I could stack it until I could dispose of it. He said, ‘No; but you can stack it on tbe right of way of the railroad track.’ ” *604 Plaintiff then authorized Mr. Ogglesby to sell the lumber for him, and went home. Some days thereafter, the defendant’s agents and employees entered the ear and took out and used all the two-inch lumber in it. The plaintiff cannot recover on the contract — first, because he did not perform it by delivering two-inch lumber; secondly, because, according to his own evidence, the contract was rescinded by mutual agreement and the lumber placed again on sale by plaintiff. It necessarily follows that if the original contract of purchase was rescinded by agreement of the parties, and the defendant went in the car and took a part of the lumber after that time, that would be a conversion, and the plaintiff could recover only the value at the time of the conversion of the lumber actually taken, together with such damage to the car-load lot as plaintiff sustained by reason of the defendant unlawfully taking a portion of the lumber and leaving the remnánt. Even if the contract had not been rescinded by mutual consent, the defendant, by taking the part of the lumber that was two inches thick, was not bound under the contract to receive the remainder, which did not come up to the contract and was less than two inches in thickness. Freeman v. Skinner, 31 N. C., 32. Affirmed.