Ford v. . Manning

Hoke, J. Tbe right to award a cartway over tbe lands of another, in favor of an individual citizen, referred by most of tbe cases to tbe police power, when tbe necessity for it exists and in a manner tbat is reasonable and just, has been too long established with us to require or permit discussion. May v. Thigpen, 107 N. C., 63; Warlick v. Bowman, 103 N. C., 122; Pool v. Trexler, 76 N. C., 297; Norfleet v. Cromwell, 70 N. C., 634. And while many of the decisions are to tbe effect tbat these statutes, being in derogation of common right, should be strictly construed, and tbe petitioner required to bring himself clearly within tbe meaning of their terms, there is doubt if some of tbe cases have not gone too far in applying this principle of construction, and if it is not a more wholesome rule to construe tbe statute in a way to promote its principal and beneficent purpose. In any event, on perusal of tbe petition filed in the present case, it appears by fair intendment that the petitioner is both settled upon and cultivating the land, and so comes within tbe express terms of the law. Though not directly apposite to any question presented here, we think it well to note that the law on cartways, as it appeared in The Code of 1883, sec. 2056, and on which many of our deci *154 sions were rendered, bas been amended by subsequent statutes so as to give the owner of standing timber tbe right to a cartway under specified conditions, these amendments having been brought forward in Revisal of 1905, sec. 2686. Nor do we think any valid objection can be made to the order because not made at one of the public meetings provided for in 'the statute, sec. 2712. This section directs that the board of supervisors, at some place in their -township, to be agreed upon by themselves or on the appointment of their chairman, shall meet on the first Saturday in February and August, "for the purpose of consulting on the subject of the condition of the roads in their townships-; and once a year, during their August meeting, they shall go over and examine all the roads in their township,” etc. These are public meetings required by the law chiefly for purposes of looking after the public roads, appointing overseers, assigning hands, etc., and these public meetings shall not be omitted; but this requirement in nowise forbids that the board shall meet at other times, and for other purposes, when the well ordering of the township affairs committed to their keeping shall require it. Even in matters pertaining to public roads, the statute clearly contemplates that in certain specified matters the board may act otherwise than at these two public meetings. Thus, in section 2715, with -regard to the appointment of overseers, assignment of hands, etc., the statute provides: “The board may at any time alter the sections or allotment, but shall give notice,” etc. And in the performance of other duties imposed upon them, and not contemplated by the section, providing for these public meetings, there is nothing in the letter or spirit of the law which prevents their having call meetings on giving notice to parties interested. There is nothing in this connection which in any way conflicts with a decision of this Court made at the present term in Wolfenden v. Commissioners, ante, 83. In that case the statute both fixed the time and designated the work to be done, and it was held to be mandatory. This question, however, has-ceased to be of importance, as the Legislature, to remove all doubts upon the subject, has now provided in express terms, “that special meetings of the board may be called.” Laws 1909,. ch. 364, sec. 2. On the third question we are of opinion, and so hold, that section 2681, in constituting the justices of the peace of each township “its board of supervisors,” the statute refers to those-who are qualified and acting justices of the township; and that the powers of such board are not withdrawn or annulled because- *155 a given township may, under the general law, be entitled to a larger number of justices, and has not seen proper to avail itself of the privilege. We make no question of tbe general principle insisted upon by defendant, that where a deliberative or ministerial body consists of a definite number, in the absence of other specifications, a majority of such number is required for a quorum. This has been held in reference to our Legislature, fixed by the Constitution at a definite number. But we think, as stated, that in establishing the board of supervisors, and providing, as the law does, that the justices of the peace of each township shall constitute its board, the statute refers, as stated, to justices who were qualified and acting; and therefore, the two justices who made the order in the present case were the board of supervisors for Bethel Township, qualified and competent to perform the duties of such board. This is not only the primary meaning of the language of the statute, and in accord with public convenience, but, if further assurance were required, we are confirmed in this interpretation by the consideration that in this, as in most other matters of importance coming within the scope of their duties, on appeal taken, the question is to be heard and determined ele novo. We think the case has been correctly disposed of by the learned judge who heard the case below, and his rulings and judgment' are affirmed. No error.