Hudson v. . Hudson

Connor, J., after stating the case: This Court, in Ballew v. Clark, 24 N. C., 23, said: “The general rule is that sanity is to be presumed until the contrary be proved; and *453 when. an. act is sought to be avoided on the ground of mental imbecility the proof of the fact lies on the person who alleges it. On the other hand, if a general derangement be once established or conceded, the presumption is shifted to the other side and sanity is then to be shown at the time the act was done. Similar language is used in Wood v. Sawyer (Johnson will case), 61 N. C., 251 (p. 277). The general principle embodied in the instruction is conceded by counsel for appellee, but they insist that the testimony does not bring the case within the rule. That the presumption of sanity obtains until it is shown .that, prior to the execution of the deed, the grantor was insane, in the sense of being mentally unsound, for some appreciable period of time, excluding the idea of a mere mental aberration or derangement, caused by sickness, accident, or other temporary cause or condition. This, we assume, was the reason upon which his Honor declined to give the instruction. “The rule that when insanity is proved or admitted to have existed at any particular time it is to be presumed to continue applies only to cases of what is called ‘general’ or ‘habitual’ insanity. Like all presumptions, it arises from our observation and experience of .the mutual connection between the facts shown to exist and those sought to be established by inference from those facts; and when observation and common experience fail to show that the insanity proved, in the particular case, was, in its nature, permanent, the presumption fails. AYhen insanity appears as the result of some special and temporary cause, and experience shows that the cause being removed the effect will- probably disappear, the presumption does not prevail.” Buswell on Insanity, sec. 195. “There must be kept in view the distinction between the inferences to be drawn from proof of an habitual or apparently confirmed insanity and that which may be only *454 temporary. The existence of tbe former, once established, would require proof from the other party to show a restoration or recovery; and, in the absence of such evidence, insanity would be presumed to continue. But if the proof only shows a case of insanity directly connected with some violent disease with which the individual is attacked, the party alleging the insanity must bring his proof by continued insanity to that point of time which bears directly upon the'subject in controversy, and not content himself with proof of insanity at an earlier period.” Hix v. Whit tlemore, 45 Mass., 545. The law is well stated in 22 Cyc., 1116: “The presumption arises only in cases where the insanity is continuing and permanent in its nature or where the cause of the disorder is continuing or permanent.” The fact that a party has “spells,” during Avhich his mind was affected, does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of showing insanity. Stewart v. Flint, 59 Vt., 144; Brown v. Riggin, 94 Ill., 560. Occasional flightiness and wandering of intellect during sickness is not sufficient to change the burden of proof. McMaster v. Blair, 29 Penna. St., 298. Delirium tremens, prior to the homicide, caused by strong drink, does not cast upon the State the burden of showing sanity at the time of the act. State v. Sewell, 48 N. C., 245. In the light of these and other authorities, sustained by the reason of the thing, we think that his Honor was correct in declining the instruction. While the testimony regarding her acts and language prior to the execution of the deed were competent to be considered, and for that purpose were submitted to the jury, they do^ not' show habitual insanity within the meaning of the rule of law which rebuts the presumption of sanity at the time of the act in question. The exceptions to the charge as given are without merit. *455 While there was strong evidence tending to sustain plaintiffs’ contention the case has been fairly submitted to the jury, who doubtless knew the witnesses and were capable of duly weighing their testimony and opinions. The aged grantor appears to have been content with the disposition of her land, and, in the light of the verdict, we see no reason for disturbing the judgment. No- Error.