Horton v. . Wilson Co.

*75 Sea well, J. Tbe Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 — Act of 25 June, 1938, chapter 676; 52 Stat. 1060; 29 U. S. C. A., secs. 201-219 — with some exceptions not pertinent to this case, provides a schedule of minimum wages and maximum hours for every employee “who is engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.” Secs. 6 (a) and 7 (a). Section 3 (b) defines commerce as used in the Act as follows: “ 'commerce’ means trade, commerce, transportation, transmission or communication among the several states or from any state to any place outside thereof.” It has been said that the Congress has not exhausted its full power under the Commerce Clause in this legislation. It may well include categories not now within the confines of the Act. But it has greatly broadened the conception of interstate commerce, and extended its reach or comprehension of the instrumentalities employed, particularly on the human side, as a means of removing burdensome inequalities and as a measure of social justice to those employed, including in the Act a vast number of persons not theretofore considered in this connection, but whose exclusion would defeat the purpose of the Act. Sec. 2 .(a). In doing so it has stricken down court opinion reflecting a narrower view of the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S., 251, 62 L. Ed., 1101; U. S. v. Darby, 312 U. S., 100, 85 L. Ed., 609; and has hurdled judicial abstractions thought to be defeative of its purpose. U. S. v. Darby, supra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S., 517, 86 L. Ed., 1638; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 87 (U. S.) L. Ed., 393. We have freely entertained cases arising under the Wage and Hour Law, although it imposes a liability with respect to damages not of a character heretofore cognizable in our courts. Hart v. Gregory, 220 N. C., 180, 16 S. E. (2d), 837; Crompton v. Baker, 220 N. C., 52, 16 S. E. (2d), 471; Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U. S., 572, 582, 86 L. Ed., 1682, 1691. But we are dealing with a Federal Law, and it is incumbent upon us to apply the rules of construction obtaining in the Federal jurisdiction, regardless of the cliches of interpretation we might otherwise employ. We are not dealing here with the clause of the Act relating to the production of goods for commerce, nor with the distinctions peculiar to cases where the employee attempts to qualify for the protection of the statute as one who is so engaged. Hart v. Gregory, supra. The clause under which plaintiff claims protection is simpler and broader — -“engaged in commerce” — which we think, if it means anything at all, signifies that the employee is so engaged if his services — not too remotely, but substantially and directly- — -aid in such commerce as above -defined. With reference to that clause, it is said in Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., *76 supra: “It is clear that the purpose of the Act was to extend Federal control in this field throughout the farthest reaches of the channels 'of interstate commerce.” In that connection the opinion quotes from the statement made by Senator Borah, speaking for the Senate Conferees on the Conference Report: “. . . if the business is such as to occupy the channels of interstate commerce, any of the employees who are a necessary part of carrying on that business are within the terms of this bill.” 83 Cong. Rec., 75th Cong., 3rd Sess., Pt. 8, p. 9170. If the plaintiff did so aid the defendant in any phase of its business in which it was itself engaged in interstate commerce, both of them come within the purview of the Act. In the case at bar, the defendant is not aided by Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra, or the absence in the present case of the conditions thought necessary in the Walling case, supra, for the plaintiff’s recovery. The plaintiffs in the two cases are not like situated. There, the suit was by one engaged in the local delivery of the goods to customers, and it was necessary to maintain the theory of continuity of the movement in commerce, despite a temporary interruption in defendant’s warehouse, in order to connect the employment with the commerce. Here, it may be conceded without detriment to plaintiff’s case — or necessary exoneration of the defendant — that the products moving in interstate commerce came to rest in defendant’s Raleigh warehouse without further obligation to the “channels of commerce” theory in its local distribution, if, nevertheless, plaintiff’s services in any substantial and direct way aided in the interstate commerce in which defendant was actually engaged. In the case at bar, the plaintiff contends, and we think with reason, that his services, or at least a substantial part of them, were connected with the flow of goods in commerce before they came to rest, if they did so, in the defendant’s local warehouse, or in connection with that result. But, that the defendant received its own products by shipment to itself or its agency in this State may have an important bearing upon the functions of its Raleigh branch, the extent and manner in which the commerce at the instance of defendant was projected into this State, the participation therein by its local agency, and the connection of the plaintiff with such commerce. In one phase of its business, the defendant was unquestionably engaged in interstate commerce: In gathering its materials of trade, slaughtering livestock, and purchasing meat products outside of the State and shipping them to its warehouse in this State for local or intrastate distribution. Down to the time the products came to rest in the Raleigh warehouse, defendant dealt with them and transported them in interstate commerce, and the agreed facts indicate that its agency here was maintained primarily to aid and facilitate both such transportation and final distribu *77 tion within the State. These products, we think, did not come to rest here without a substantial contribution by the Raleigh agency to that result. The plaintiff, of course, would not necessarily be engaged in interstate commerce because of his connection with the business of the employer, if his own activities were confined solely to assistance in intrastate distribution. The question before us is whether the duties performed by the plaintiff could be considered altogether within the pale of defendant’s local distribution business within the State, or whether they were essential to or in aid of its interstate commerce. Foster v. National Biscuit Co., 31 F. Supp., 244; Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., supra; Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, supra. Doubtless some of the duties performed by one in plaintiff’s position, or similar position, might fit into the concept of a purely independent, local concern, in no wise engaged in interstate commerce; but they would be just as appropriate or necessary to the conduct and management of ,an interstate concern with a set-up dealing altogether in interstate commerce. The acts of the employee, although abstractly similar, take on a different significance according to the activity which they aid. Others of these duties seem more directly concerned with defendant’s interstate commerce. The Raleigh branch was not autonomous. The evidence discloses it to be, in effect, an agency of the defendant, integrated with the Chicago office as an interstate set-up, and acting under the control and management of the home office as an efficacious if not necessary instrumentality in keeping its products flowing in interstate commerce from the various shipping points outside the State to its own warehouses in this State. The existence of the branch office at this, the receiving end of the line, was as necessary to the defendant’s way of doing business as were the facilities by which the products were collected and put into the flow of commerce. Amongst the duties performed by the plaintiff were handling cash from sales of products from the Raleigh branch; making deposit of cash in the Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. at Raleigh; drawing checks on such deposits for all sums in excess of $5,000.00, and making daily remittances to the home office; keeping records of hours worked by office employees .at the Raleigh branch; handling the pay roll of the employees of the Raleigh branch; signing voucher drafts issued by defendant for salaries of employees and payment of other expenses; receiving invoices from the Manager of the Raleigh branch for food products shipped from other states, and cheeking invoices against receiving records to determine shortages in shipments; making out claims against defendant’s source of supply from other states for shortages and overcharges; maintaining the *78 profit and loss account of the Raleigb branch of the corporation; preparing and submitting to the Chicago office statements of profit and loss of the Raleigh branch; receiving from the Chicago office, bulletins containing instructions as to his duty as an employee; deducting and transmitting to Chicago social security tax and a weekly sum for premiums in the "Wilson Employees Mutual Benefit Fund, with the required report; keeping records of the hours of work of the approximately eighteen employees of the defendant’s corporation at its Raleigh branch. Some of these duties may not be of great significance. It may be difficult upon analysis to classify all of them one way or another, but some of them we think essential to the maintenance of defendant’s business, taken as a whole, including its interstate commerce. The plaintiff kept the records of the office generally, without any distinction as to items which might pertain to purely localized business; handled the pay roll of all employees, regardless of whether they were engaged in receiving and storing the incoming products or otherwise; signed vouchers for wages and expenses, the latter presumably including costs of transportation; kept track of the goods moving in commerce to see whether they arrived, and made out claims against the source of supply in other states for shortages and overcharges; dealt directly with the home office in daily transmission of the funds and reports of profit and loss. These duties did not begin with the distribution of the product after it had come to rest in the North Carolina warehouse; they were not all confined to localized activities or to local distribution, or necessary to that branch of the business. They were activated by the necessities of defendant to keep informed as to the interstate movements of its products from points of shipment outside the State, and facilitated their control and reception here. Without some of the services enumerated, whether performed by the plaintiff or some other person, it would seem that the defendant’s business of shipping its products to the Raleigh branch would have been impaired, disorganized, or greatly impeded. It is not necessary that all of plaintiff’s efforts be directed to the interstate commerce side of defendant’s business. It is sufficient if they directly tended to aid in that enterprise. It is not a question of percentage; the de minimis doctrine does not apply in cases of this kind. Ward v. Central Sand & Gravel Co., 33 F. Supp., 40; IIart v. Gregory, 218 N. C., 184, 10 S. E. (2d), 644. There has been no attempt to formulate any general rule applicable to cases of this kind. It is a matter of the application of sound judgment, upon the facts of the particular case and within the limitations of the Act, in fairly appraising the relation of the employee and of his services with respect to the interstate commerce of his employer, where that exists. We think the services of the plaintiff have a reasonable and sub *79 stantial connection with such commerce of the defendant — were intended to be and, in fact, were efficacious in its promotion and conduct- — -and bring him within the protection of the Act. The judgment of the court below is Affirmed.