Brinkley v. . Swicegood

Pearson, C. J. The defendant certainly has no right to complain oí his Honor’s charge. "When a man wrongfully violates his part of the contract, as a matter of course, the other party may sue for the breach; and as a further matter of course, the action may be commenced as soon as the injury is done. This is too plain to allow of discussion. The matter is only complicated, and the judgment contused by reference to the many cases cited in the notes to Culter v. Powell, 2 Smith Lead. Cases, 38, 39. As to whether a servant or agent who is dismissed, without sufficient cause, may not treat the contract as rescinded, and sue immediately on a quantum meruit, for the work he had actually performed; or whether ho may not wait until the expiration of the term of service fixed by the contract, and sue in indebitatus assumpsit, for his whole wages, relying on the idea of constructive performance of all the sendees. Here is a wilful breach of contract, for which the plaintiff has a present cause of action, to recover such an amount of damages as the; jury may think will make full compensation for the injury which he has sustained. There is some reason to suppose that the jury may have beeu misled to the prejudice of the plaintiff, in respect to the measure of damages, by the remark of his Honor, that “ the jury should not take into consideration any damages arising after the issuing of the summons.” That had no bearing on the case. In regard to the damages, it could make no dif *628 ference, whether the summons issued in a week, or a month, or a year after the injury was done, by the plaintiff’s being wrongfully dismissed. Such a consideration would only be relevant, in a case, when the plaintiff waits 'until the expiration of the term, and then sues for the whole of the wages, on the idea of a constructive performance; in which case it seems the defendant may show in diminution of damages, that after the plaintiff was dismissed he had engaged in other lucrative business. Hendrickson v. Anderson, 5 Jones, 248. But as the plaintiff did not appeal, that point is not presented. Upon the question of costs, we concur with his Honor. The Act of 1870-71, repeals the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to costs, and makes no provision for costs in the matter now trader consideration; so, the effect is to restore the Rev. Code in that particular. The repeal of a statute repealing a former statute, leaves the latter in force. Dwarris on Statutes, 676. Per Curiam, Judgment affirmed.