Park View Hospital Ass'n v. People's Bank & Trust Co.

CONNOR, J. The order in which the debts of a deceased person shall be paid by his administrator or executor is prescribed by statute. C. S., 93. For the purpose of determining the priority of such debts, they are classified as follows: “First Class. Debts which by law have a specific lien on property to an amount not exceeding the value of such property. “Second Class. Funeral expenses. “Third Class. Taxes assessed on the estate of the deceased previous to his death. “Fourth Class. Dues to the United States or to the State of North Carolina. *248 “Fifth Class. Judgments of any court of competent jurisdiction within this State, docketed and in force, to the extent to which they are a lien on the property of the deceased at his death. “Sixth Class. Wages due to any domestic servant or mechanical or agricultural laborer employed by the deceased, which claim for wages shall not extend to a period of more than one year preceding the death; or if such servant or laborer was employed during the year current at the decease, then from the time of such employment; for medical services within twelve months preceding the decease. “Seventh Class. All other claims and demands.” It is provided by statute that “no executor, administrator, or collector shall give to any debt any preference whatever, either by paying it out of its class, or by paying thereon more than a pro rata proportion in its class.” C. S., 94. Speaking of the statutory preference of a debt incurred by a decedent for medical services rendered to him within twelve months preceding his death, Clark, C. J., in Baker v. Dawson, 131 N. C., 227, 42 S. E., 588, said : “It must be noted that there is no priority even for medical services rendered the deceased personally, unless he dies. In all other cases, the physician’s bill is like any other debt. If the physician wishes to secure such debts, he must exact security or proceed to collect by law. When the patient is in his last illness, this might be inconvenient or indecent, and as such illness might extend to twelve months, the law endeavors to secure for the patient medical attention by giving a legal priority for such services if rendered to the patient within twelve months preceding his decease. But such reason does not apply to services rendered his wife and children, as to which the physician has extended credit, relying upon the father or husband himself paying the debt incurred. There are no words extending the meaning to such debts other than for personal services to the debtor, and the language of the statute is restrictive — • Tor medical services within twelve months prior to the decease’ — meaning the decease of the debtor, not of his wife or child. The statute being in derogation of the equity of a pro rata distribution, should be strictly construed so as not to confer a priority over other creditors unless clearly called for.” This principle was properly applied in Baker v. Dawson, supra. The decision in that case was manifestly correct. The principle does not require, however, a restricted construction of the words “medical services,” in the instant case, which will exclude from the provisions of the statute services rendered to the deceased within twelve months preceding his death, by the plaintiff, which were rendered upon the advice of his physician, and were reasonably necessary, because of his illness, for his *249 care and comfort, while he was under treatment by his physicians. The purpose of the statute would be defeated by such construction. When the plaintiff admitted G. C. Ward into its hospital, it doubtless felt assured that if he recovered from his illness and was restored to his health, he would pay his hospital bill, and that if he died within twelve months from the date of his admittance, it would have a preferred claim for its services upon his estate. The words “medical services,” as used in the statute, include all services rendered to the deceased, because of his illness, upon the advice of his physician, which were reasonably necessary for his care and comfort, and for his proper treatment by his physicians. There is error in the judgment in the instant case excluding from the provisions of the statute the amount due the plaintiff for board of graduate nurses who attended the deceased while he was a patient in plaintiff’s hospital. It is manifest from the facts agreed and submitted to the court that it was reasonably necessary that his nurses should attend C. C. Ward constantly while he was a patient in plaintiff’s hospital. It was therefore not only convenient but reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to furnish board for said nurses. There is no error in the judgment with respect to the payment by the defendant of the amount due to the plaintiff for services rendered to the deceased. The judgment should, however, include the item of $159.00. In accordance with this opinion, the judgment in plaintiff’s appeal is reversed; in defendant’s appeal the judgment is modified and affirmed. Reversed on plaintiff’s appeal. Modified and affirmed on defendant’s appeal.