Lee v. Charitable Brotherhood

Brogden, J. Tbe decisive question, presented, is whether or not tbe grantee in a deed for a portion of property, prior in date, though subsequently registered, is entitled to invoke tbe equity of reformation, occasioned by mutual mistake, against tbe grantee in a deed for tbe entire property, subsequent in date but prior in registration, it being conceded tbat both deeds were made by tbe same grantor, who is not a party to tbe action. Tbe identical question was presented and answered in tbe affirmative in tbe case of Sills v. Ford, 171 N. C., 733. In tbat case tbe defendant tendered an issue as to mutual mistake in failing to omit bis timber from tbe plaintiffs’ deed. Tbe issue was refused by tbe court upon tbe following grounds: (1) Tbat tbe grantors were not parties to tbe action. (2) Tbat there was no evidence to show tbat tbe reservation was left out by mutual mistake. (3) Tbat tbe defendant was guilty of gross negligence in not having bis deed recorded. In discussing tbe questions raised, Walicer, J., said: “Equity will correct a mistake, either as to fact or law, made by a draftsman of a conveyance or other instrument which does not fulfill or which violates tbe manifest intention of tbe parties to tbe agreement. And tbe denial of one of tbe parties tbat there wasi any mistake will not defeat tbe equity, but it *361 depends altogether upon the finding of the jury from the pertinent evidence, which is of a clear, satisfactory, and convincing character, that a mistake was made in expressing the real agreement.” The Sills case, supra,, has been cited with approval many times, and the principle announced disposes of the main question involved in this appeal. The plaintiff, however, excepts to the ruling of the trial judge in admitting testimony of the grantor of his intention to exempt from the conveyance the lot of defendant. This evidence was competent. In Maxwell v. Bank, 175 N. C., 183, Brown, J., states the rule thus: “To ascertain whether a mistake has been made in describing property in a deed, it is essential to know the intent of the parties, the one in selling and the other in buying, respecting the subject-matter of the conveyance; and if the deed fails to express their intention there is a mutual mistake, relievable in equity by way of reformation, where the proof is clear, convincing and satisfactory.” Plaintiff further assigns as error the testimony of the grantor as to a “verbal option” given to real estate agents to sell the land. The exact testimony of the witness was: “I put it in the hands of Eawls & Tingle, the real estate men, to sell for me. It was a verbal option.” It is clear that the contract referred .to was no more than a mere authority to a broker to sell real estate and such authority is not required to be in writing. Abbott v. Hunt, 129 N. C., 403; Lamb v. Baxter, 130 N. C., 67; Smith v. Browne, 132 N. C., 365; Palmer v. Lowder, 167 N. C., 333; Henderson v. Forrest, 184 N. C., 234. The plaintiff excepts to the testimony of the stenographer who drew the deed and who was instructed to exempt the defendant’s lot therefrom. She testified as follows: “I drew the deed. I have forgotten what instructions were given me with reference to the Brotherhood' lot.” Thereupon, this question was asked: “What was said about where the Brotherhood land was to go, whether in the lot or not?” The witness answered “to exempt the Brotherhood lot.” The plaintiff contends that the witness having first said that she had forgotten what instructions were given., and having afterwards said that she was instructed to exempt the Brotherhood lot, that her testimony should be stricken out. This only raises the question as to the. credibility of the witness, and her credibility and the weight to be given her testimony was for the jury. The record discloses no reversible error and the judgment must be Affirmed.