McCoy v. . Justice

Stacy, O. J., after stating tbe case: Tbe demurrer was sustained and tbe action dismissed because it is not alleged that tbe witness, upon whose testimony tbe verdict in question was rendered, has been convicted of perjury, or that tbe falsity of tbe evidence has been established by writing or unimpeachable record, and tbe decision in Kinsland v. Adams, 172 N. C., 765, 90 S. E., 899, is cited as authority for tbe position, as well as Moore v. Galley, 144 N. C., 81, 56 S. E., 681. Tbe complaint, as we understand it, alleges much more than the procurement of a verdict by means of false testimony or tbe subornation of perjury. It contains allegations of criminal conspiracy, fraud, subornation of witnesses, suppression of evidence, and jury attaint. This brings tbe case within tbe doctrine announced in Stockton v. Briggs, 58 N. C., 314, to tbe effect, that “If a party obtains a judgment at law by fraud, as by subornation of perjury, or tbe like foul means, equity will give relief — not by taking possession of tbe case, going into tbe trial of legal rights and granting a perpetual injunction, but by acting in aid of tbe common law and decreeing that tbe party shall consent to set tbe judgment and verdict aside and have a new trial at law, and in tbe meantime, as ancillary to this relief, an injunction will be granted.” To like effect are tbe decisions in Peagram v. King, 9 N. C., 295 and 605; Burgess v. Lovengood, 55 N. C., 457, and Scales v. Trust Co., 195 N. C., 772, 143 S. E., 868. ¥e are not now concerned witb tbe admissibility of evidence or tbe question as to whether tbe plaintiff can make good bis allegations by competent proof, but, deeming tbe facts set out in tbe complaint to be true, tbe accepted rule when tbe sufficiency of a pleading is challenged by demurrer, we think a cause of action has been stated. Reversed.