Davenport v. . Board of Education

Walker, J., after stating the case: If the plaintiffs had any equity in their case it was completely and categorically denied in the answer, which denial is fully sustained by the exhibits. We must assume that Judge Lane found such facts as would support his judgment, though there are no special findings set out in the case on appeal. Bowers v. Lumber Co., 152 N. C., 604. While we may review .findings of. fact in such cases, we will not reverse what are apparently the judge’s findings with good and sufficient ground for such action by him, but will adopt his view of the facts unless clearly erroneous, and we are unable to say that stick, is the case in this record,' but, on the contrary, we concur with the judge in this respect, believing that he reached the proper conclusion both as to the facts and the law. The judge evidently found the facts to be in accordance with the denials and averments contained in the answer, and the affidavits filed before him by the defendant, and generally -that the board of education of McDowell County had acted strictly within the powers and authority conferred upon it by the school law as contained in the Consolidated Statutes, chapter entitled “Education,” and in its several articles, especially article-10. The two districts, Nebo.and Carlysle, were consolidated into one, known as the Nebo District, because of advantages to the school children of the higher education provided by the school for advanced pupils situated in that part of the consolidated district, formerly Nebo School Tax District, and they reserved the schools in what was formerly Carlysle District for the *575 primary grades. We would not lightly interfere witb tbe judgment and discretion of tbe local board in snob matters when it does not appear tbat tbe same bas been illegally exercised or grossly abused, as is tbe case bere. Tbe law bas committed tbe control and supervision, tbe formation of districts, and tbeir consolidation in given cases, to tbe local boards, and we do not intervene in bebalf of any one wbo supposes bimself to bave been aggrieved by tbeir action except upon some clear showing tbat tbey are acting contrary to tbe law, and so far restrain tbeir action only as to keep them within tbe law and tbe rightful exercise of tbeir powers. Tbe gravamen of tbe complaint bere seems to be tbat tbe Nebo school is too inconveniently and distantly located, witb reference to tbe children in what was formerly Carlysle District, to be accessible and available to them. But this is one of tbe matters committed to tbe sound judgment and discretion of tbe board of education in tbe new, or Nebo District. A similar question was presented in Brodnax v. Groom, 64 N. C., 244, as to taxation and tbe building of bridges, and tbe Court said in regard to it: “But tbe power to tax is assumed, and an attempt is made to restrain its exercise, ‘except for tbe necessary expenses of tbe county.’ "Who is to decide what are tbe necessary expenses of a county? Tbe county commissioners, to whom are confided tbe trust of regulating all county matters. ‘Repairing and building bridges’ is a part of tbe necessary expenses of a county as much so as keeping tbe roads in order, or making new roads; so tbe case before us is within tbe power of tbe .county commissioners. How can this Court undertake to control its exercise? Can we say such a bridge does not need repairs; or tbat in building a new bridge near the site of tbe old bridge it should be erected as heretofore, upon posts, so as to be cheap, but warranted to last for some years; or tbat it is better policy to locate it a mile or so above, where tbe banks are good abutments, and to bave stone pillars, at a heavier outlay at tbe start, but such as will insure permanence and be cheaper in tbe long run? In short, this Court is not capable of controlling tbe exercise of power on tbe part.of tbe General Assembly, or of tbe county authorities, and it cannot assume to do so, without putting itself in antagonism as well to tbe General Assembly as to tbe county authorities, and erecting a despotism of five men; which is opposed to tbe fundamental principles of our Government, and tbe usages of all times past. For tbe exercise of powers conferred by tbe Constitution, tbe people must rely upon tbe honesty of tbe members of tbe General Assembly, and of tbe persons elected to fill places of trust in tbe several counties. This Court bas no power, and is not capable if it bad tbe power, of controlling the exercise of power conferred by tbe Constitution, upon tbe legislative department of the Government, or upon tbe county *576 authorities.” Matters of this kind must be left largely to the good judgment and discretion of the local authorities, who know far better than we do what will best promote the interests of those who have confided the trust to them, and to whom they are responsible for its just and proper performance. In Smith v. School Trustees, 141 N. C., 143, relied on by the defendant for the position that the courts will enjoin local authorities in the exercise of their powers, it appears that the wrong imputed to the defendants in that case was a distinct and direct violation of the law, and even of the Constitution, in the management and disposition of school funds. They were not exercising merely a lawful discretion, but were acting unlawfully and in the application and disbursement of school funds, and contrary to a former decision of this Court. Lowery v. School Trustees, 140 N. C., 33. ¥e should not interfere with the exercise of powers by the local school authorities, charged with the duty of providing the necessary facilities for the education of the children of the State in their respective communities, unless the legal right of some one, who asks for relief, is being clearly violated. It does not so appear in this case, but the contrary. The power and authority of the local school boards are adapted to the full and proper performance of the duties imposed upon them, and have recently been somewhat enlarged and simplified, and made more flexible (Laws of 1921, ch. 179), and we should be careful not unduly to restrict these powers, the full exercise of which is so essential to the efficient conduct and management of our public schools. Where the schoolhouses shall be placed in the district, and in what manner they shall be conducted, are obviously matters which must be decided by the school authorities, who have done so in this case. They had the right to consolidate the two districts, Carlysle and Nebo, into one district, both districts having the same rate of taxation (Paschal v. Johnson, ante, 129 (110 S. E., 841). The McDowell board could not be compelled to consolidate Oarlysle District with Oak Grove District, which is in Burke Oounty, and it refused to do so, preferring to administer the affairs of their schools in their own county, rather than have a divided supervision of them. We are without power to reverse their decision in this respect, it not appearing that the board has acted in violation of any law. Since the argument of this cause, it has been suggested that certain facts exist which, as we think, do not appear in the record, such as the bonded indebtedness of Nebo District and the consolidation of Oarlysle District with the district in Burke Oounty. We cannot consider matters not so appearing. We may repeat that the judgment of the court is presumed to be correct, and it is incumbent upon the appellant to show *577 error, if airy exists, and whether we act on the presumption or upon the evidence, and our view of the facts based upon the evidence, which agrees with that of the learned judge, we reach same conclusion that there was no error in the judgment of the court as to the injunction. We cannot assume or infer facts to exist, except as they appear clearly in the record. The case really presents the single question, whether upon the facts as they appear we should undertake to review the action of the board of education of McDowell County, which has done nothing more than exercise its rightful authority under the statute. It is clear that we should decline to do so, in any admissible view of the case. The decision of the judge as to the continuance of the injunction to the final hearing is in accordance with the facts as they now appear, and the law, as we understand them, but he should not have dismissed the action, as the merits of the action and how it shall be finally determined were not before him, and not before us at this time, plaintiff being-entitled to be heard upon the issues raised by the pleadings at the final trial of the case. Moore v. Monument Co., 166 N. C., 212; R. R. v. Mining Co., 117 N. C., 191; Crawford v. Pearson, 116 N. C., 718. The judgment should therefore be modified, as there was no error in refusing to continue thé injunction, but there was error in dismissing the action, and, as thus modified, it is affirmed. Costs of this Court equally divided between the parties. Modified and affirmed. Stacy, J., not sitting.