Cromer v. . Self

*165 BeowN, J. On appeal to this Court the defendant' assigned error as follows: ■ 1. That his Honor erred, in that he failed to dismiss the warrant of attachment, issued in this cause, on the ground that the defendant, at the time of issuing the said warrant, was not a non-resident, and that the property was not subject to attachment. 2. For that his Honor erred in holding that the defendant was not entitled to his personal property exemptions of $500 out of the property attached. It appears from the facts agreed that the defendant had been a resident of the State -of North Carolina all his life up to the date of his leaving, and was a merchant in the city of Winston, N. C., for many years; that at July Term, 1901, of the Superior Court of Forsyth County, he was convicted of fornication and adultery and sentenced to twelve months on the county roads and, at the same term of court, an indictment was returned by the grand jury for larceny; that immediately after the term of court in which the defendant was convicted and said indictment was found, defendant offered to sell his property to Cromer Bros. Co., stating that he would have to leave the State; that immediately thereafter defendant fled the State to avoid the consequences of sentence and indictment, and was absent at the time the warrants of attachment were issued, and is now absent, and his whereabouts is unknown; that the summons in each of these, actions was returned by the constable, endorsed “not to be found in Forsyth County”; that the defendant’s wife and children are now living in Winston, N. C., and have been living in said city all the time; that prior to the sale the defendant Self, through his counsel, demanded his personal property exemptions out of the property levied on, but the constable refused to allot same, but sold all the property, contending that the defendant was not entitled to personal property exemptions, but was a non-resident of the State. *166 The only question presented by tlie assignments of error relates to the status of the defendant. Upon the facts agreed is he, within the spirit-and meaning of the Constitution, a resident of this State? Is he entitled to have his persona] property exemption set apart in the fund from the sale of the goods? The counsel for the defendant contends that the question presented has been heretofore decided adversely to the plaintiffs in the case of Chitty v. Chitty, 118 N. C., 647. It is true in that case-a question somewhat similar was considered by the Court, but the Court was divided and the views of the dissenting Justice are set forth strongly and with much weight of authority. But we are not called upon to determine how much weight we will give the casé ,a’s a precedent in determining this, for the facts ai’e essentially different. In the Chitty Case it is found as a fact that the plaintiff, who claimed his homestead, temporarily absented himself to avoid service of a warrant “with the intention of returning as soon as the .case ¿gainst him should be thrown out of court”; '“that, the plaintiff spent his time in visiting relatives in various States intending to return,” etc. Thus we see that in the Chitty Case a most important fact is found in the claimant’s favor, and that is the animus rever-téndi. “A man retains his domicil i.f he leaves it animo-revertendiA 4 Blackstone, 225; 2 Russel on Crimes, 18; 3 Rawle, 312. In this case there is not only no such finding, but’ the facts fully justify the conclusion that the defendant fled tlie State with no intention to return and serve the sentence which the law has imposed upon him. There is no finding that he is temporarily absent visiting relatives but, on the contrary, it is admitted that his-whereabouts is unknown. Assuming that he may be technically a citizen of the State, he is not a resident within the meaning of Art. 10, sec. 1, of the Constitution, and only a resident can claim the benefit of *167 our exemption laws. Tbe defendant is not temporarily absent to avoid service of process. From the time of his escape, after sentence pronounced condemning him to an ignominious punishment, he' has been a fugitive from justice, for that alone can save him from the vengeance of the law. The motive that led to his flight will induce him to continue his residence beyond the confines of the State indefinitely, for in no other way can he avoid the punishment due to his crime. He has left the State to escape the consequences of his crime and stands in the attitude of defiance to her power. It is not for such that our benevolent exemption laws1 were made. The fact that his family may continue to reside within the State, and that his domicil may be technically here until he acquires another elsewhere, is not enough under the circumstances to render him a resident of this State, for a person may have his domicil in this State and be at the- same time a resident of another. In re Thompson, 1 Wend., N. Y., 43; Frost v. Brisbin, 19 Wend., 11; Haggart v. Morgan, 1 Seld., N. Y., 423. The identical question presented on this appeal was decided by the Supreme Court of New York in Mayor v. Genet, 11 Supreme Court Reports (4 Hun., 487), 63 N. Y., 646, in an opinion which fully sustains the view we take. There are a number of authorities cited in the dissenting opinion of Ciarle, J., in the Chitty Case which fully accord with our judgment in this. The judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.