Barbee v. . Barbee

MerrimoN, C. J. after stating the case: This case has been before this Court by a former appeal disposed of at the *301 last term. In that appeal (see Barbee v. Barbee, 108 N. C., 581) it was decided that the recital in the deed of the payment of the consideration therein specified for the land referred to conveyed by the appellant’s father to him, did not preclude and estop the plaintiffs from showing by parol evidence that the real value of the land was not the consideration recited in the deed, but was in fact $1,200, and that the father intended that the appellant should account for 800 of that sum as an advancement in the division of his estate among his children after his death. It appears from exceptions to evidence that one purpose of this appeal is to ask the Court to overrule or modify that decision. If the appellant was dissatisfied with it he should have made his application to rehear. That would have been the orderly and regular course to pursue. Perhaps we have the power to overrule the decision, but we are entirely satisfied with its correctness, and are not in the least inclined to disturb it. The mere fact that the appellant’s father in his life-time conveyed to him a tract of land worth $1,200, and recited in the deed of conveyance the consideration for it of $100, could not prevent the father from charging the appellant with the value of the land above and beyond the consideration recited in the deed as an advancement, if he saw fit and really intended to do so. The father might find it convenient to do so, and there is no rule of justice, nor principle, nor statute, nor reason of policy that forbids it to be done. It might be better and safer to explain in the deed such purpose, but it is not at all necessary that this shall be done. The purpose to treat a part of -the value of the land as an advancement may be proven by parol evidence, whether the same be in writing or not. The cases of Harper v. Harper, 92 N. C., 300, and Barbee v. Barbee, supra, in effect sustain the view just expressed. It is difficult to conceive of a just reason why a father shall not have the right to require his son to pay part of the value !of a tract of land he conveys to *302 the latter and charge him with the remaining part as an advancement. Meeker v. Meeker, 16 Conn, 383; Speer v. Speer, 14 N. J (Chan.), 240. The evidence is voluminous, and it would servé no useful purpose to recite and advert to it here in detail. It is sufficient to say that we have examined it, and cannot hesitate to decide that there was competent evidence before the referee from which he might find that the father of the appellant intended to charge the latter with $800 of the value of the land referred to, not as a gift, but as an advancement. The objections and exceptions to the admission of evidence before the referee do not appear to have been passed upon by the Court below, and hence they are not before us for review. It seems that it was not intended that we should consider them. Judgment affirmed.