Blaylock v. Southern Railway Co.

AileN, J. Under the authorities in this State it is the duty of a common carrier, receiving a passenger on its trains with a ticket calling for a certain station, and without notice that the train does not stop at that station, to stop the train at the station and permit the passenger to alight. It was so held in Hutchinson v. R. R., 140 N. C., 126, which has been affirmed frequently, notably, in Elliott v. R. R., 166 N. C., 483, in which Brown, J., says: “It is the settled law of this State that where a common carrier receives a passenger upon its train, with a ticket .calling for a certain station, it is the duty of the railroad conppany to stop the train at such station, even though the passenger did not know that this particular train did not stop at such station.” *356 It is also said in tbe latter case, quoting from Thompson on Carriers, sec. 66: “Carrying a passenger beyond bis destination in disregard of bis request to be put off there will afford a good ground of action, and this, though no bodily harm, mental suffering, insult, oppression, or pecuniary loss be shown.” Hutchinson v. R. R., 140 N. C., 124. And the same principle imposes liability on the carrier for wrongfully failing to carry the passenger to his destination. It is also held, in Mace v. R. R., 151 N. C., 404; Norman v. R. R., 161 N. C., 338; Hallman v. R. R., 169 N. C., 130; White v. R. R., 172 N. C., 31, that the passenger has the right to rely on the representation made by the agent selling the ticket, and that the carrier is responsible for injuries brought about by his mistake. The White case is strikingly like the case before us. In that case the evidence tended to prove that on 19 November, 1914, the plaintiff, accompanied by her daughter, purchased from the defendant’s agent at Mackeys Ferry a ticket to Chapanoke, upon the assurance of the agent that the ticket was good for continuous passage upon the through train of the defendant, which passed Mackeys Ferry about 1 o’clock. The plaintiff’s husband, by arrangement, met this through train at Chapanoke to carry his wife to their home, some distance in the country. As the plaintiff did not arrive on this train, the husband returned home. When this train of the defendant, which runs from New Bern to Norfolk and passes Mackeys Ferry, arrived at Edenton, the conductor for the first time informed her that this train did not stop at Chapanoke, and told the plaintiff that if she did not get off at Edenton he would carry her on to some other point. Plaintiff was compelled to get off at Edenton and take the next train, an hour or more later, which was a local train and stopped at Chapanoke. When she arrived at Chapanoke her husband had gone home. It was a rainy, blustery day, and plaintiff was subjected to much inconvenience by reason of having to change trains at Edenton. The court overruled a motion to nonsuit, and said: “The plaintiff had the right to rely upon the assurance of the agent that the train which she took at Mackeys Ferry would stop at Chapanoke to put her off. It was the duty of the agent, when he sold a ticket to Chapanoke, to inform the plaintiff that she would have to take a local train at Edenton, and would arrive at Chapanoke some time after the other train had passed. Upon the assur- ' anee of the defendant’s agent, the plaintiff had reason to believe that she would meet her husband there to take her and her little daughter to their home. Hutchinson v. R. R., 140 N. C., 125, and cases cited.” The plaintiff brings her case well within these principles, as her evi- . deuce is to the effect that she went to the station of the defendant at Graham on 22 December, 1917, with two small children; that she pur- *357 cbased tickets for Terra Cotta, and was told by tbe agent tbe train sbe was about to take stopped at Terra Cotta; that sbe bad gone on tbe same train before, and it stopped at tbis place; that tbe conductor told her tbe train did not stop at Terra Cotta and required ber to leave tbe train at Greensboro; tbat tbe train did not stop at Terra Cotta tbat day; tbat ber mother was at tbe station to meet ber; tbat sbe suffered serious injury, and as we can consider only tbe evidence favorable to tbe plaintiff on a motion for judgment of nonsuit or on an exception to tbe refusal to direct tbe jury to answer tbe first issue “No,” if tbey believe tbe evidence, there is no error in tbe failure to give tbe first instruction prayed for. And tbe same result follows as to tbe prayer on tbe issue of contributory negligence, because tbe jury having found tbe facts according to tbe contentions of tbe plaintiff, ber cause of action was complete when sbe was required to leave tbe train at Greensboro, and sbe then bad the right to recover at lease nominal damages, and up to tbat time there is neither allegation nor proof of contributory negligence. ■ If sbe bad a good cause of action, entitling ber to nominal damages, when sbe left tbe train, ber subsequent conduct in going on tbe street car is material on tbe issue of damages and not on tbe issue of contributory negligence. Tbe evidence of tbe plaintiff as to tbe condition of ber health at tbe time of tbe injury complained of, and subsequent thereto, was competent on tbs issue of damages. • Tbe other exceptions to evidence and to tbe failure to give certain instructions are to tbe refusal to eliminate tbe injuries sustained by tbe plaintiff by reason of going to Pomona on tbe street car from tbe issue of damages, and in tbis respect we are of opinion there is error. “In torts tbe damages must be tbe legal and natural consequences of tbe wrongful act, and such as, according to common experience and tbe usual course of events, might have been reasonably anticipated. “If tbe cause is remote in efficiency and does not naturally result from tbe tort, it will not be considered as proximate. . To be such it must be ‘a, cause tbat produced tbe result in continuous sequence and without which it would not have occurred, and one from which any man of ordinary prudence could have foreseen tbat such a result was probable under all tbe facts as tbey existed.’ Ramsbottom v. R. R., 138 N. C., 42; Brewster v. Elizabeth City, 137 N. C., 392.” Garland v. R. R., 172 N. C., 639. Following tbis rule it has been held tbat damages were too remote, and could not be recovered for exposure and injuries caused by walking from Toecane to Bakesville when there bad been negligence in transmitting a telegram requiring a ear to meet tbe plaintiff at Toecane (Young v. Tel. Co., 168 N. C., 36) ; for exposure in a storm while walking from *358 Toecane to her borne, tbe defendant having negligently carried her beyond her station (Garland v. R. R., 172 N. C., 638); for injuries sustained by falling in a cattle guard while walking from Minneapolis to Cranberry, there being evidence that the defendant negligently failed to stop its train for the plaintiff at Minneapolis when signaled to do so (Brown v. R. R., 174 N. C., 694). These authorities are cited and approved in Johnson v. Tel. Co., 177 N. C., 31, in which the plaintiff sued to recover damages for negligence in the delivery of a telegrata, and as a part of his damage alleged injuries sustained while riding on a freight train and when walking from Dillsboro to Franklin, and the Court, in denying a recovery for these injuries, said: “Without going into the details of the injuries and sufferings endured by the plaintiff on the freight train, and in attempting to walk from Dillsboro to Franklin, it is sufficient to say that in no sense can the delay in the delivery of the telegram be deemed a proximate cause of such injuries. . . . The defendant could not have' •foreseen, or contemplated, that if the message was not delivered the plaintiff would seek transportation by freight, nor that he would be roughly handled on such trip. Still less could the defendant be responsible for the plaintiff undertaking to walk from Dillsboro to Franklin. . . . Both these grounds of alleged damage are too remote and speculative. It is a settled principle that the law looks to the immediate and not-the remote cause of damage, the maxim being, ‘Causa ‘próxima, sed-non remota, spectatur.’ The cause of the damage on the freight train was the negligence of the carrier either in the handling of its train or in the defective condition of its roadbed or equipment. The cause of the over fatigue in attempting to walk out from Dillsboro was the mountainous road and the lack of physical strength in the plaintiff to endure the fatigue, and still more, his own bad judgment in attempting to walk so long a distance.” The plaintiff reached Greensboro about 12 o’clock and left the train at the depot, where there was a waiting room. A local train of the defendant left this depot at 2 o’clock, and if she had taken it, she would have reached Terra Cotta about 2:11 o’clock; but, instead of waiting, and without making inquiry of any one, she took a street ear for Pomona, one-fourth mile from Terra Cotta, which she reached about 2:30 o’clock, and it is for injuries on the street car, and while walking from Pomona, she asks a recovery. They are too remote and could not have been foreseen or anticipated. New trial.