Coggins Ex Rel. Coggins v. Board of Education

BabNHIll, J. The State provides free educational facilities for the children of the State, and each child has a right to attend the schools of- *767 bis district. But tbis is not an absolute right. Schools to be effective and fulfill the purposes for which they are intended must be operated in an orderly manner. Machinery to that end must be provided. Seasonable rules and regulations must be adopted. The right to attend school and claim the benefits afforded by the public school system is the right to attend subject to all lawful rules and regulations prescribed for the government thereof. This is all the plaintiff may claim. 24 E. 0. L., 621. The establishment and operation of the public school system is under the control of the legislative branch of the government, subject only to pertinent constitutional provisions as to uniformity, sec. 2, Art. IX, and length of term, see. 3, Art. IX. Willcinson v. Board of Education, 199 N. C., 669, 155 S. E., 562. It may delegate to local administrative units the power to make such rules and regulations as may be deemed necessary or expedient, and when so delegated it is peculiarly within the province of the adminisrative officers of the local unit to determine what things are detrimental to the successful management, good order, and discipline of the schools in their charge and the rules required to produce those conditions. 24 R. C. L., 576. It is generally held that local school authorities have the inherent power to make rules and regulations for the discipline, goyernment, and management of the schools and pupils within their district. 24 E. 0. L., 574. With us there is ample statutory authority. The school law of the State was revised, codified, and re-enacted in 1923. Ch. 136, Public Laws 1923. This Act, as amended, provides the machinery for the operation of our public school system. 'See ch. 394, Public Laws 1937, and ch. 358, Public Laws 1939. See also Gr. S., ch. 115, for recodification. Each County Board of Education is vested with authority to fix and determine the method of conducting the public schools in its county so as to furnish the most advantageous method of education available to the children attending its public schools. Sec. 31. It may: (1) fix the time of opening and closing schools, sec. 32; (2) determine the length of the school day, sec. 33; (3) enforce the compulsory school law, sec. 34; (4) provide for the teaching of certain subjects in elementary schools, sec. 39; (5) determine the necessity for kindergartens, sec. 40; (6) provide for a training school for each race, sec. 41; (7) make rules and regulations not in conflict with State law for the guidance of the County Superintendent as the enforcement officer, sec. 47; (8) make all just and needful rules and regulations governing the conduct of teachers, principals, and supervisors, sec. 53; (9) provide for the training of teachers, sec. 54. In addition it is given general control and supervision over all matters pertaining to the public schools within its county, sec. 30, and *768 all powers and duties conferred and imposed by law respecting public schools, which are not expressly conferred and imposed upon some other officials, are conferred and imposed upon the county board of education. Sec. 29. What, then, is the present status and authority of the defendant board ? Prior to 1933 it derived its authority from the Act creating the town of Durham public school district, a special charter district, ch. 86, Public Laws 1887. But in 1933 the Legislature adopted a new system of local unit organization of the public schools of the State. Oh. 562, Public Laws 1933. It abolished all special tax and special charter districts and directed the State School Commission to classify each county as an administrative unit, to be divided into convenient school districts. It was further provided that any newly constituted district having a school population of 1,000 or more for the school year 1932-33 in which a special charter school was then being operated should be classified as a city administrative unit, to be dealt with by the State school authorities in all matters of school administration as a county administrative unit. See. 4. Admittedly, this provision included the “Durham public school district,” which has since operated as a city administrative unit. ■ The trustees of a special charter district and their successors, by whatever name known, are retained as the governing body of such district. Sec. 4. (See also sec. 5, ch. 455, Public Laws 1935, sec. 5, ch. 394, Public Laws 1937, and sec. 5, ch. 358, Public Laws 1939.) And the general administration and supervision of their district is committed to their care. G. S., 115-8. Thus the' City of Durham unit, for the purposes of administration, is a county unit, and its trustees are vested with all the power and authority within their district conferred, upon the county boards of education. This includes the power to make, promulgate, and enforce such rules and regulations as they, in their discretion, deem reasonably necessary for the good management of the schools and the discipline of its pupils. Only thus may they fully exercise the “general control and supervision over all matters pertaining to” the schools committed to their care. After investigation and thoughtful consideration the defendant board concluded that membership in secret societies known as Greek letter fraternities and sororities was detrimental to the best interests of the schools. They first sought to remedy the condition through the voluntary co-operation of parents. Failing in this and being convinced that “more effective measures” were essential to eradicate from the schools “influences that are harmful to the existence and promotion of real democratic ideals and proper social behavior” and to guard against “false conceptions of superiority and the setting up of artificial social distinctions,” it adopted the rule set out in the complaint as Exhibit I. *769 Tbe rule makes no attempt to deny plaintiff any instruction afforded by class work or by tbe required curriculum of tbe scbool. Nor is be denied tbe right to participate in extracurricular activities. It is merely made optional with bim to determine whether, against tbe known wishes of tbe scbool authorities, be prefers to continue bis membership in a secret society and thereby forfeit participation in tbe privileges afforded by tbe extracurricular activities of tbe schools, which, by compliance with tbe rule, would be available to bim. He has now arrived at one of tbe crossroads of life. He must decide which course be will take, and tbe choice is bis. Ordinarily, complaints of disaffected pupils of tbe public schools against rules and regulations promulgated by scbool boards for tbe government of tbe schools raise questions essentially political in nature, and tbe remedy, if any, is at the ballot box. But tbe unreasonableness of such a rule is a judicial question, and tbe courts have tbe right of review. They will not hesitate to intervene in proper eases. In doing so, however, it will be kept in mind that tbe local board is tbe final authority so long as it acts in good faith and refrains from adopting regulations which are clearly arbitrary or unreasonable. It will be remembered also that respect for constituted authority and obedience thereto is an essential lesson to qualify one for tbe duties of citizenship and that tbe scbool is an appropriate place to teach that lesson. If the opinion of court or jury is to be substituted for tbe judgment and discretion of tbe board at tbe will of a disaffected pupil, tbe government of our schools will be seriously impaired, and tbe position of scbool boards in dealing with such cases will be most precarious. Tbe Court, therefore, will not consider whether such rules and regulations are wise or expedient. Nor will it interfere with tbe exercise of tbe sound discretion of school trustees in matters confided by law to their discretion. Tbe findings and conclusion of tbe local board are conclusive unless it acts corruptly, in bad faith, or in clear abuse of its powers. Finch v. Fractional School District, 196 N. W., 532; State ex rel. Dresser v. District Board, 135 Wisc., 619, 116 N. W., 232; Tanton v. McKenney, 33 A. L. R., 1175. The Court will intervene only when necessary to prevent such action. Pue v. Hood, Comr. of Banks, 222 N. C., 310; Belk's Department Store, Inc., v. Guilford County, 222 N. C., 441; 47 Am. Jur., 325, 422; 24 R. C. L., 575; McLeod v. State ex rel. Miles, 63 A. L. R., 1161; Pugsley v. Sellmyer, 30 A. L. R., 1212; Tanton v. McKenney, supra; Christian v. Jones, 32 A. L. R., 1340; Wilson v. Board of Education, 233 Ill., 464, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.), 1136, 84 N. E., 697, 13 Ann. Cas., 330. Membership in secret societies is subject to regulation by tbe board, and in adopting tbe rule here challenged tbe defendant acted within tbe *770 authority vested in it by law. 24 R. C. L., 629, 56 C. J., sec. 1097 (d), p. 885, 47 Am. Jur., 423; Wayland v. Board of School Directors, 43 Wash., 441, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.), 352, 86 Pac., 642; Wilson v. Board of Education, supra; Favorite v. Board of Education, 235 Ill., 314, 85 N. E., 402; University of Michigan v. Waugh, 105 Miss., 623, L. R. A. (N. S.), 1915-D, 588; Lee v. Hoffman, 166 N. W., 565, L. R. A., 1918-C, 933. See also Graham v. Jones, 32 A. L. R., 1340; Pugsley v. Sellmyer, supra; Tanton v. McKenney, supra; McLeod v. State ex rel. Miles, supra; Antell v. Stokes, 191 N. E., 407 (Mass.); Anno. 134 A. L. R., 1274. It is not unreasonable, and it does not constitute an unlawful discrimination against plaintiff. Nor does it deprive plaintiff of any right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U. S., 589, 59 L. Ed., 1131. Plaintiff relies in part on sec. 240, ch. 136, Public Laws 1923. Our conclusion here is not in conflict with thé provisions of that section. Persons of school age are entitled to all the privileges and advantages of the public schools of the district in which they reside. Section 240 defines who are “residents” within the meaning of this provision. The complaint fails to state a cause of action. Certainly no irreparable damage is threatened requiring injunctive relief. It follows that the judgment sustaining the demurrer must be Affirmed.