Farrington v. . McNeill

Clark, C. J. “Where the contract sued upon contains only a part of the agreement between the parties, it is competent to show the other part by parol evidence.” Faust v. Bohr, 167 N. C., 360; Buie v. Kennedy, 164 N. C., 290; Audit Co. v. Taylor, 152 N. C., 272; Colgate v. Latta, 115 N. C., 127. This evidence was also compétent to show that the note sued upon was executed upon the condition of a contingency as to its payment. Hughes v. Crooker, 148 N. C., 318; Pratt v. Chaffin, 136 N. C., 350; Quin v. Sexton, 125 N. C., 447; Bresee v. Crumpton, 121 N. C., 122; Penniman v. Alexander, 111 N. C., 427. The evidence is also competent to show failure of consideration. Martin v. Mask, 158 N. C., 444, where the Court cited several authorities that a separate parol agreement entered into at the time of the contract is competent when it does not contradict or vary the contract, but merely tends to show that the written contract was only a part thereof. For instance, in Braswell v. Fope, 82 N. C., 57, it was held competent to prove that notes payable in money were to be surrendered upon the *422 maker signing a judgment and a certain mortgage as security for the money. In Penniman v. Alexander, 111 N. C., 427, it was beld: “Tbe maker of a promissory note or other similar instrument, if sued by the payee, may show as between them a collateral agreement putting the payment upon a contingency.” In Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. C., 61, it was beld that the maker of a note for the purchase money of a stock feeder could prove by parol that at the time the note was given it was agreed that it should be paid only out of the sales of the stock feeder; and in Kernodle v. Williams, 153 N. C., 475 (just reaffirmed at this term in Xernodle v. Xernodle), it was beld that it was “competent to prove a parol agreement that the children should pay only so much of the note given their father as was necessary to pay bis debts, and that the balance should be accounted for as an advancement”; and, further, it was said, which is applicable to this case: “Tbe evidence, if believed, proved a total failure of consideration as to the note sued on.” Carrington v. Waf, 112 N. C., 119. In Nissen v. Mining Co., 104 N. C., 310, it was beld that while parol evidence cannot be admitted to contradict or vary tbe terms of a written contract, it is competent to admit parol testimony, when the written contract does not include tbe entire agreement of tbe parties, which was partly oral and partly in writing. In this case tbe agreement, so far as tbe amount and rate of interest and date of payment are concerned, was in writing and put in evidence. Tbe defendant did not offer evidence to contradict or vary this agreement in any respect, but merely to show a further oral agreement that if tbe land for which tbe note was given, and which Stafford was seeking to recover, was recovered by him in such suit, that in such event she was not to pay tbe note. That is, tbe payment of tbe note was made dependent upon a condition subsequent, and that tbe liability was feasible upon tbe happening of a certain event which has since occurred. It was competent to prove such collateral agreement making tbe note non-pay able upon a contingency which would deprive tbe note of all consideration. It is true, tbe note in this case is under seal, which purports a consideration, but such presumption is rebuttable as between tbe parties thereto. Error.