Sessions v. . Columbus County

Stacy, C. J. It is conceded that as tbe amount of tbe proposed bonds is in excess of two-tbirds of tbe amount by wbicb tbe outstanding indebtedness of tbe county was reduced during tbe preceding fiscal year ending 30 June, 1938, tbe bonds in question may not be issued under Art. V, sec. 4, of tbe Constitution without a vote of tbe people and unless “approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon.” Gill v. Charlotte, 213 N. C., 160, 195 S. E., 368. It is further conceded that in tbe circumstances this approval was necessary regardless of tbe purpose for wbicb tbe bonds were to be used, unless tbe purpose was: (1) To fund or refund a valid existing debt; (2) to borrow in anticipation of tbe collection of taxes due and payable within tbe fiscal year to an amount not exceeding fifty per centum of such taxes; (3) to supply a casual deficit; (4) to suppress riots or insurrections, or to repel invasions. Hallyburton v. Board of Education, 213 N. C., 9, 195 S. E., 21. Tbe defendant alleges, and tbe plaintiff admits, that tbe requirements of Art. Y, sec. 4, of tbe Constitution have been met in tbe instant case. They join issue on whether Art. VII, sec. 7, wbicb requires a favorable “vote of tbe majority of tbe qualified voters,” except for necessary expenses, is also applicable. We think it is. Hallyburton v. Board of Education, supra. It is provided by Art. VII, sec. 7, of tbe Constitution that “No county, city, town, or other municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith, or loan its credit . . . except for tbe necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of tbe majority of tbe qualified voters therein.” It is further provided in Art. V, sec. 6, of tbe Constitution that “Tbe total of tbe State and county tax on property shall not exceed fifteen cents on tbe one hundred dollars value of tbe property, except when tbe county property tax is levied for a special purpose and with tbe special approval of tbe General Assembly.” It is established by tbe authoritative decisions interpreting these sections: 1. That within tbe limitations fixed in Article V, section 6, tbe county commissioners of tbe several counties may levy taxes for tbe “necessary expenses” of tbe county without a vote of tbe people or special legislative approval. Glenn v. Comrs., 201 N. C., 233, 159 S. E., 439. 2. That for a special purpose and with tbe special approval of tbe General Assembly tbe county commissioners of tbe several counties may exceed tbe limitations set out in Article V, section 6, without a vote of tbe people: Provided, tbe special purpose so approved by tbe General *638 Assembly is for a necessary expense of tbe county. R. R. v. Lenoir County, 200 N. C., 494, 157 S. E., 610. 3. That for a purpose other than a necessary expense, whether special or general, a tax may not be levied by the commissioners of any county, either within or in excess of the limitations fixed in Article Y, section 6, except by a vote of the people under special legislative authority. R. R. v. Comrs., 148 N. C., 220, 61 S. E., 690. Summing up the decisions in Henderson v. Wilmington, 191 N. C., 269, 132 S. E., 25, Adams, J., speaking for the Court, said: “(1) That for necessary expenses the municipal authorities may levy a tax up to the constitutional limitation without a vote of the people and without legislative permission; (2) that for necessary expenses they may exceed the constitutional limitation by legislative authority, without a vote of the people; (3) that for purposes other than necessary expenses a tax cannot be levied either within or in excess of the constitutional limitation except by a vote of the people under special legislative authority,” citing Herring v. Dixon, 122 N. C., 420; Tate v. Comrs., ibid., 812. There is no conflict between Art. Y, sec. 4, and Art. YII, sec. 7, of the Constitution. Twining v. Wilmington, post, 655. Both must stand and each be given its proper significance and meaning. Eeconciliation is a postulate of constitutional as well as of statutory construction. Parvin v. Comrs., 177 N. C., 508, 99 S. E., 432. This harmonization is clearly recognized in the County Finance Act, ch. 81, Public Laws 1927, sec. 22, where it is provided: “If a bond order provides for the issuance of bonds for a purpose other than the payment of necessary expenses of the county, the approval of the qualified voters of the county, as required by the Constitution of North Carolina, shall be necessary in order to make the order operative. If, however, the bonds are to be issued for necessary expenses, the affirmative vote of the majority of the voters voting on the bond order shall be sufficient to make it operative, in all cases where the order is required by this act to be submitted to the voters.” The finding and conclusion of the trial court that the hospital here proposed is not a necessary expense of the county within the meaning of Art. YII, sec. 7, of the Constitution is directly supported by what was said in Palmer v. Haywood County, 212 N. C., 284, 193 S. E., 668; Burleson v. Spruce Pine, 200 N. C., 30, 156 S. E., 241; Nash v. Monroe, 198 N. C., 306, 151 S. E., 634; and Armstrong v. Comrs., 185 N. C., 405, 117 S. E., 388. The ruling must be affirmed on authority of these „ eases. It is admitted that the resolution did not receive a favorable vote of a majority of the qualified voters. The recital in the resolution adopted by the commissioners is, that “it is deemed advisable to construct a County Hospital,” not that it is neces *639 sary or essential. It is further observed that the resolution is silent on whether it is to be approved by a majority of the votes cast or by a majority of the qualified voters. Doubtless a more intelligent expression would have been made, had the electorate known with certainty whether the vote was to be against the registration. Hill v. Skinner, 169 N. C., 405, 86 S. E., 351; Rigsbee v. Durham, 98 N. C., 81, 3 S. E., 749. It is further contended by the defendant that the action should be dismissed under section 20 of the County Finance Act, ch. 81, Public Laws 1927, because not brought within thirty days after the first publication of notice of the adoption of the bond resolution. The first publication was on 29 September, and this action was instituted on 30 November following. Jones v. Alamance County, 212 N. C., 603, 194 S. E., 109; Kirby v. Comrs. of Person, 198 N. C., 440, 152 S. E., 165. This section has reference to orders adopted under valid authority of the County Finance Act, and does not extend to matters in conflict with the Constitution. Statutory requirements, in all events, must be made to square with the provisions of the organic law, or else disregarded. Perry v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 387, 112 S. E., 6. In the absence of any showing of reversible error, the judgment will be Affirmed.