Hankins v. . Hankins

BkogdbN, J. When the plaintiff instituted her action against the defendants for damages, both compensatory and vindictive, alleging that the affections of her husband had been alienated, the law imposed upon her the duty of showing, by proper evidence, the following facts: (1) that she and her husband were happily married, and that a genuine love and affection'existed between them; (2) that the love and affection so existing was alienated and destroyed; (3) that the wrongful and malicious acts of defendant produced and brought about the loss and alienation of such love and affection. Brown v. Brown, 124 N. C., 19, 32 S. E., 320; Powell v. Benthall, 136 N. C., 145, 48 S. E., 598; Cottle v. Johnson, 179 N. C., 426, 102 S. E., 769; Rose v. Dean, 192 N. C., 556, 135 S. E., 348; Hyatt v. McCoy, 194 N. C., 760, 140 S. E., 807; Townsend v. Holderby, 197 N. C., 550, 149 S. E., 855. Obviously, if the love and affection of the husband was alienated or destroyed either by his own cupidity, habits, or other cause, without interference or wrongful procurement of a third party, then such third party would not be liable in damages. The plaintiff, however,' assumed the burden of proving that the loss of her husband’s affection was occasioned and brought about by the wrongful and malicious counsel, advice and procurement of her father-in-law, the defendant, J. E. Hankins. She undertook to show that the house in which she was living *362 with, her father-in-law was in bad repair and that the food was neither dainty nor nourishing, consisting principally of half-cooked cowpeas and collards; that her father-in-law was opposed to the church and that he was a disciple of one Haldeman Julius, who, apparently, was engaged in writing articles attacking and ridiculing the church, and particularly showing contempt for the marriage ceremony sanctioned by the church. She introduced a letter from her counsel to the defendants detailing her statement of the deficiencies and delinquencies of the defendant, her father-in-law. In substance the foregoing evidence was found by the trial judge to be incompetent, and he sustained exceptions thereto and awarded a new trial. This Court concurs in the ruling of the trial judge with respect to such exceptions. The plaintiff and her husband voluntarily entered the home of her father-in-law, the defendant, J. R. Hankins. At the time, plaintiff and her husband were hardly able to keep “buckle and tongue” together. If they were willing to accept the hospitality of the father-in-law, the law imposed upon them the duty of taking the home as they found it. If the food was not to the plaintiff’s liking, it is sufficient to note that all other members of the family ate the same food. If the room in which plaintiff and her husband lived needed plastering, it was the defendant’s home, and the plaintiff and her husband were not compelled to continue to reside therein. The evidence discloses that after some period of time the defendants conveyed a part of their homeplace to the plaintiff and her husband, and that thereupon they built their own dwelling and moved into it. In like manner, the evidence with respect to the defendant’s hostility toward the church or his general religious views in the light of the record, was wholly incompetent. The liberality of our Constitution and laws not only recognizes but guarantees to each man the right to construct a religious belief to suit himself, free from the supervision and control of any power on earth. Moreover, the same liberality and security of law stand guard about him even if he has no religion at all. These principles are too fundamental to require debate or elaboration. S. v. Beal, 199 N. C., 278, 154 S. E., 604. Furthermore,-the letter which plaintiff’s attorneys wrote to the defendant, listing the wrongs committed by him was, at least, an ex parte and selfrserving declaration. The defendant presents to the court approximately two hundred exceptions based upon alleged incompetent evidence and erroneous instructions to the jury. Much of this evidence was admitted for the limited purpose of showing the relationship between the parties. It is useless to discuss the evidence bearing upon the relationship of defendant, Minda Hankins, for the reason that a nonsuit was taken as to her. Manifestly, *363 the relationship between the parties constitutes a proper and vital subject of inquiry, and consequently the decisions relating to the subject recognize that wide latitude is permissible, but at the same time the courts invariably sound a warning that such evidence may easily wander too far afield. The relationship between the father, the defendant, and his son, plaintiff’s husband, and the plaintiff herself, would be competent, but, for example, the number of parties the plaintiff had while she was living in her own house or the amount of money the defendant, J. R. Hankins, gave to his own daughters for school purposes, or that the defendant had provided in his will that his body be cremated, constituted items of evidence wholly foreign to the issue. These were not declarations made by the defendant to the plaintiff or to her husband, or about either of them, showing any bias, animus or hostility to the plaintiff or her marriage, and, therefore, had no 'proper place in the case. Having determined that a new trial was properly granted, the court, deems it unnecessary and inadvisable to undertake to discuss further the exceptions presented in the defendant’s appeal. Affirmed.