Midimis v. . Murrell

Varser, J. We are of the opinion that the ruling of the court below is sustained by a proper construction of the stipulation, quoted as No. 1 above. This stipulation relates to rent past due at the date of the execution of the lease, whereby the defendant agreed to pay this sum at the rate of $5 per week, in addition to the rental provided in the lease, with the provision “that upon failure to pay the said $5 per week, then the lessor, at his option, may declare this lease null and void.” This provision authorized the plaintiff to treat the lease as absolutely void when the default occurred in the payment of these weekly installments on the past-due rent account. Therefore, a time was fixed, or an event selected, by which the lease terminated, and upon default, under the stipulation, no notice to quit was necessary. When the parties have by agreement fixed the time for the agreement to terminaté, notice to.quit is unnecessary, because the reason for it ceases. Stedman v. McIntosh, 26 N. C., 291, Mordecai’s Law Lectures, *742 541; 16 R. C. L., 1173; Faylor v. Brice, 7 Ind. App. Ct., 551; Fifty Associates v. Howland, 59 Mass., 214; Treat v. Gasmire, 176 Ill. App., 91; Gunning v. Sorg, 113 Ill. App., 332. In an elaborate note Judge Freeman, in reporting Stedman v. McIntosh, supra, in 42 American Decisions, on page 130, says: “It is a universal rule, both at the common law and by statute, that where the demise is for a fixed term and is to end on a day certain, no ‘notice to quit is necessary. The reason for this rule is obvious. The object of notice is to terminate the tenancy, and when the lease itself fixes the time at which it is to expire, the necessity for any other notice by either party to terminate it is done away with. Each party is apprised from the contract when the lease ends; further action by either to end it would be unnecessary and superfluous. If a tenant holds over after the expiration of a fixed demise without the lessor’s consent, he becomes a mere tenant by sufferance, liable to be ejected without notice.” The same learned author in applying the same rule to leases depending upon a contingency sáys: “Where a lease is to- be terminated on the happening of a contingency, the happening of the contingent event determines the tenancy, and ejectment will lie without further notice to quit.” This note contains a wealth of authority supporting this doctrine and showing its universality. Hence, the default in the payment of the weekly installment gave the plaintiff the right to invoke the aid of the court in summary ejectment. The plain stipulations of the parties fixed this default as the event, upon the happening of which the tenancy terminated. Both parties to the lease had full notice of its terms. On account of this stipulation in the lease and the ruling by the court below, which is fully supported by it, there is no need, on the instant record, to discuss the interesting question, which was ably and earnestly argued by defendant’s counsel, as to notice when the defendant is a tenant at will. There is No error.