Farthing v. Rochelle.

Douglas, J., after stating the facts. We see no. error in the trial of the action, either in the charge of the Court or its refusal to charge, or in the exclusion of evidence. The description of the land in the telegraphic offer was simply, “Your lot,” which may have been situated either in Durham or Reidsville, or in or out of the State of North Carolina. It is not even stated that there is a house on it. It seems that the farthest that this Court has gone in admitting a skeleton description of land is in Carson v. Ray, 52 N. C., 609, where the land was described as follows: “My house and lot in the town of Jefferson, in Ashe County, North Carolina.” It was ’shown that the grantor owned but one house and lot in said town. In the case at bar, there are no words of location, either in the offer or acceptance, while it appears from the tax books introduced by the plaintiffs, that the defendant owned three different lots of land located in or near the city of Durham. What he owned elsewhere does not appear. The charge was therefore correct that “the two telegrams do not sufficiently describe the property to admit parol evidence to identify the land.” Murdoch v. Anderson, 57 N. C., 77; Fortescue v. Crawford, 105 N. C., 29. It seems that this part of the charge referred to the telegramsi taken by themselves, and that his Honor left to the jury the question of the identity of the land as affected by the other testimony. The jury found for the defendant, but we gravely doubt whether it would have been legally possible to locate the land under *568 any testimony. It seems to us that tbe Act of 1891, Cbap. 465, did not intend to do away witb tbe necessity of all description, and thus practically nullify tbe statute of frauds, but simply sucb particularity of description as would frequently be beyond tbe immediate reach of tbe oi’dinary vendor. There must be some form of description to which the evidence can be directed, and by which it can be fitted to the land. We see nothing in the pleadings to cure the invalidity of the contract. The evidence of former negotiations, in no way connected with the present transaction, is not admissible as evidence to locate the land. The same objection applies to the defendant’s deed to Brady, made after the commencement of the suit, and in which no reference is made to this litigation. This deed conveys two lots. Whatever may have been its materiality as to the other issues, was avoided by the verdict of the jury upon the first issue, which would seem to end the case. We may add that the Court properly refused to give the plaintiffs’ second request for instructions. It is admitted by the plaintiffs that the defendant, at the time of the alleged contract, was a married man; that the plaintiffs knew this, and that the defendant’s wife is still living, and refused and still refuses to join in a conveyance of this property to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs, therefore, knew at the time what interest in the land the defendant had the legal power to convey, and can demand no more, even if the telegrams constituted a binding contract. Fortune v. Watkins, 94 N. C., 304. We can only add that the circumstances under which the offer was made, as disclosed by the plaintiffs’ testimony, do not appeal very strongly to the conscience of the Court. The judgment is Affirmed.