Lawrence v. . Eller

Hoke, J., after stating the case: It is recognized as the general rule that a tenant is not allowed to controvert the title of his landlord or set up rights adverse to such title without having first surrendered the possession acquired under and by virtue of the agreement between them. The position does not usually obtain where, after the renting, the title of the landlord has terminated or has been transferred either to a third person or the tenant himself, for, under the doctrine as it now prevails, the loyalty required is to the title, not to the person of the landlord, and in courts administering principles of equity the estoppel is not recognized when the tenant has been misled into a recognition of his lessor’s title by mistake or fraud and under circumstances which would induce a court of equity to hold the landlord a trustee for the tenant, and there are other exceptions of a restricted nature. The general rule, however, is as stated, and, while varying at times in its application, has been everywhere recognized as sound in principle and has always been very rigidly enforced in this jurisdiction. Campbell v. Everhardt, 139 N. C., pp. 502-514; Pool v. Lamb, 128 N. C., p. 1; Springs v. Schenck, 99 N. C., 552; Davis v. Davis, 83 N. C., 71; Farmer v. Pickens, same volume, 550; Wilson v. James, 19 N. C., 349; Abbott & Foster v. Cromartie, 12 N. C., 292; Callendar v. Sherman, 21 N. C., 711; Town v. Butterfield, 91 Mass., 105; Brown v. Keller, 32 Ill., 157; Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala., 530; Rodgers v. Boynton, 57 Ala., 501; Ward v. Ryan, J. R., vol. 10, 76-77, p. 17; Peyton v. Stith, 5 Peters, 485; 2 McAdam Landlord and Tenant, see. 421; 18 A. and E. (2 ed.), p. 414; 24 Cyc., 946. In Davis’s case, supra, Chief Justice Smith said: “It is well settled doctrine that one who, as tenant, gains possession of the land of another cannot resist an action for its recovery, brought after the termination of the lease, by showing a superior title in another or in himself, acquired before or after the contract. The obligation to surrender becomes absolute and indispensable. ‘Honesty forbids,’ says Ruffin, C. J., ‘that he should obtain possession with that view, or, after getting it, thus use it.’ Smart v. Smith, 2 Dev., 258. ‘Neither tenant nor any one claiming under him,’ remarks Daniel, J., ‘can controvert the landlord’s title. He cannot put another person in possession, but must deliver up the premises to his own landlord.’ Callendar v. Sherman, 5 Ired., 711. ‘If he entered as tenant, or, after entry, had become such,’ is the language of Rodman, J., ‘he was estopped from asserting his title until, he had re *214 stored tbe possession to tbe plaintiff.’ Heyer v. Beatty, 76 N. C., 292. Even a homestead right cannot be asserted in opposition to tbe recovery. Abbott v. Cromartie, 12 N. C., 292. Tbe rule does not preclude tbe tenant from showing an equitable title in himself on such circumstances as under our former system would call for tbe interposition of a court of equity for bis relief, and which relief may now be obtained in tbe action, as is held in Turner v. Lowe, 66 N. C., 413. Yet tbe force of tbe general proposition remains unimpaired, that where tbe simple relation of lessor or lessee exists without other complications, tbe latter cannot contest tbe title of tbe former. Forsythe v. Bullock, 74 N. C., 135. Tbe obligation to restore a possession thus obtained, before any inquiry into tbe title is permitted, although springing from tbe contract, rests upon tbe foundation of good faith and honest dealing among men.” In Farmer v. Pickens, same volume, Dillard, J., tersely states tbe position: “It is settled that a person accepting a lease from another is estopped during tbe continuance of tbe lease, and afterwards, until be surrenders the possession to the landlord, to dispute bis title, being a rule founded on a principle of honesty which does not allow possession to be retained in violation of that faith on which it was obtained or continued.” In Springs v. Schenck, supra, tbe Court held: “A tenant cannot be beard to deny tbe title of bis landlord, nor can be rid himself of this relation, without a complete surrender of tbe possession of tbe land.” In Towne’s case, supra: “A tenant at will is estopped from denying his landlord’s title without surrender of tbe leased premises or eviction by title paramount or its equivalent.” In Brown v. Keller: “A tenant must surrender the premises before asserting rights adverse to bis landlord which he acquired after renting tbe premises.” And in Davis v. Williams: “2. A tenant is estopped to dispute tbe title of his landlord, unless bis landlord’s title has expired or been extinguished, either' by operation of law or bis own act, after the creation of tbe tenancy (p. 58). “3. It is only where there is a change in the condition of the landlord’s title for the worse, after a tenant enters into bis contract, in the absence of fraud or mistake of fact, that be is permitted to show tbe change in tbe condition of tbe title (p. 58). “4. A tenant must first surrender tbe premises to his landlord before assuming an attitude of hostility to tbe title or claim of title of tbe latter (p. 58). “5. An estoppel will be enforced in a court of equity as well as in a court of law (p. 59).” A correct application of tbe principle declared and upheld in these *215 cases are in full support of bis Honor’s ruling, it appearing, from a perusal of tbe pleadings, that, without any change having taken place in the title of the lessor since the renting, the plaintiff, after having become defendant’s tenant, and during his tenancy, has undertaken to acquire what he considers a superior title to that of his landlord, and, while maintaining the possession acquired under and by virtue of his lease and without surrender, he institutes the present action to have himself declared the true owner, and that defendants are in fact and truth his tenants. It has been said that the estoppel referred to does not prevail in actions involving an issue as to title, but if such a limitation on the general rule prevails in this jurisdiction, it applies only to actions involving strictly the issue as to title, and does not extend to those where the possession and the right growing out of or incident to it are presented or in any way affected. Peyton v. Stith, 5 Peters, 485; Bigelow on Estoppel (6 Ed.), p. 585; 18 A. and E. (2 Ed.), p. 419. "While the action seeks also to have a deed, referred to in the pleadings, declared to be a cloud on plaintiff’s title, this is only an incident and evidential. The gravamen of the action is to have plaintiff declared the true owner and that defendants are his tenants, and, under the authorities cited, such an action cannot be maintained by plaintiff unless and until he first surrenders the possession to the person from whom he rented. There is no error, and the judgment of his Honor is Affirmed.