Joyner v. . Joyner

MANNING, J., after stating tbe case: ~We think it clear tbat tbe defendant is not entitled, by tbe application of any equitable principle, to have tbe value of tbe improvements made by bim upon tbe land held by tbe trustee, Ayeock, assessed against tbe land, or any judgment therefor against tbe plaintiff. We are referred by bis learned counsel to three cases (Baker v. Carson, 21 N. C., 381; Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C., 9; Pitt v. Moore, 99 N. C., 85) tbat lay down certain equitable doctrines which, they submit, might fit tbe present case and give tbe defendant aid. An examination of these cases, as well as Luton v. Badham, 127 N. C., 96, in which case many of tbe previous decisions of this Court are reviewed, will disclose tbat tbe basis of tbe relief granted in each *183 of these cases was a parol agreement to convey certain land, or an interest therein, which induced an expenditure of money, in good faith, in its improvements and the enrichment of the land, the repudiation of the agreement to convey, and the attempt thereby to perpetrate a fraud. Not'one of the facts essential to the support of the equitable’ doctrine declared in those cases is present here. The plaintiff and defendant, before and in contemplation of marriage, join in the execution of a deed to B. F. Aycock, conveying plaintiff’s property, to be held upon the trusts declared. Subsequent to the marriage, with the deed operative and without any request, promise or inducement, as appears, made to him, the defendant, from the rents and his other sources of income, pays the taxes, occupies the property and makes improvements on the land; later he offers.Ms wife such indignities as render her condition intolerable and her life burdensome; she obtains a divorce a mensa et thoro, because of his misconduct; yet he would have the value of the improvement declared a charge upon the property. When did this equity of the defendant begin? When the attempt to perpetrate a fraud upon him ? It would seem that the defendant, 'by his own misconduct and his own wrongdoing, has brought upon himself his present misfortune. It is the result of his own acts, that ought to have been known by him. Revisal, sec. 2111; Taylor v. Taylor, 112 N. C., 139; Hallyburton v. Slagle, 132 N. C., 959. We can see no ground upon which relief can be extended to him by the equitable power of the court. We do not think his Honor, however, should have attempted to pass upon the contingent interest of the defendant in the property conveyed to Aycock, trustee. The defendant’s interest in that property may be defeated altogether by the happening of the event upon which it is made to depend, or he may lose it by failing to comply with the condition in the deed. We do not pass upon this question. The deed to Aycock is still operative and obligatory; it is necessary that the estate of the trustee be continued to preserve the contingent interests and carry out the terms of the trust; but the plaintiff is entitled, under the deed, to all the rents from the property during her life, and the defendant cannot interfere in any way now with the property or with the rents. Even the statute (section 2111, Revisal) recognizes the possibilities of condonation and the resumption of the marriage relation. In attempting, therefore, to finally determine the contingent interest of the defendant, his Honor was in error, and his judgment will be so modified, and, as modified, is affirmed. The defendant, however, will pay the costs of this appeal. Modified and affirmed.