Glenn v. Gate City Life Insurance

ScheNck, J. The appellant’s first and second assignments of error are to the court’s refusal to grant its motion lodged when the plaintiff had introduced his evidence and rested his case and renewed when all the evidence was in for a judgment as in case of nonsuit (C. S., 567). These assignments of error cannot be sustained, since the evidence supports the findings of fact and these findings sustain the conclusions of law reached by the court. The third assignment of error brought forward by the appellant is to the refusal of the court to enter judgment as tendered by the defendant. This assignment is likewise untenable since the judgment tendered was one of dismissal of the action and the facts found were of a contrary import. The fourth assignment of error brought forward by the appellant is to the court’s “refusing to find as a fact that there was no evidence that the condition of the plaintiff’s eyes has at any time impaired his general health.” It is upon this assignment of error that the appellant bottoms his principal argument for a reversal. By the policies in suit the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff weekly sick benefits — this is an unqualified agreement unless limited by the “additional conditions and agreements” subsequently set out in the policies; in other words, the policies are policies of general coverage, unless by the aforesaid subsequent conditions and agreements they are converted into policies of limited coverage. The subsequent condition and agreement which the defendant contends converts the policies in suit from general to limited coverage is the one which reads: “Weekly benefits for sickness will only be paid when the insured has been confined to his or her bed or house for seven consecutive days.” His Honor found that “the plaintiff was confined in his home for some five or six weeks, by reason of worry due to the loss of his eyes *675 and bis inability to work, but since tbe said five or six weeks immediately following May 23, 1939, tbe plaintiff bas not been confined to bis bed or bouse.” It is tbe contention of tbe defendant tbat tbis finding of fact is in conflict witb tbe subsequent finding of fact that “tbe diseases of tbe eyes is sickness within tbe terms of tbe policy, and tbat tbe disability of tbe plaintiff, which prevents him from performing any occupation is tbe result of said sickness,” and tbat such findings do not sustain tbe conclusion of law tbat tbe plaintiff is entitled to recover under tbe policies from tbe defendant. In view of tbe fact tbat tbe evidence discloses tbat tbe plaintiff was, and “remains totally disabled” from diseases of tbe eyes, we do not concur in tbe contention of tbe defendant. Tbe plaintiff took out tbe policies in suit tbat be might be paid weekly benefits in tbe event of sickness. Tbis was tbe principal object of tbe contract and tbe protection for which tbe insured paid tbe premiums, and any subordinate conditions and agreements in tbe policies should be strictly construed against tbe insurer, since they limit tbe scope and tbe very purpose for which tbe policies were taken out. We are of tbe opinion tbat tbe fact tbat tbe evidence tends to show, and tbe finding of fact is to tbe effect, tbat “tbe plaintiff was confined to bis home for some five or six weeks, by reason of worry due to loss of bis eyes and bis inability to work,” but since said time be bas not been so confined and bas not been attended by a physician, is not such a departure from tbe contract, or such a falling short of its provisions, as to destroy tbe insured’s protection under tbe policies. Tbe purpose of tbe provision relative to tbe insured’s being confined to bis bed or bouse was to describe tbe character and extent of bis illness, rather than to prescribe a limitation upon bis conduct. To give tbe provision relative to tbe insured’s confinement to bis bed or bis bouse tbe construction urged by tbe defendant would be to so magnify tbe letter as to practically nullify tbe principal object of tbe policies. “Not of tbe letter, but of tbe spirit: for tbe letter killetb but tbe spirit givetb life.” 2 Corinthians 3:6. Thompson v. Accident Assn., 209 N. C., 678, 184 S. E., 695; Duke v. Assurance Corp., 212 N. C., 682, 194 S. E., 91. Tbe defendant argues tbat blindness is not such sickness as is contemplated by tbe policies and therefore plaintiff should not recover. Tbe defendant contracted to pay tbe plaintiff “weekly sick . . . benefits” . . . “as long as tbe policy-holder remains totally disabled.” Dr. W. P. Speas, an admitted eye expert, testified for tbe plaintiff: “He (tbe plaintiff) bas a complication of diseases. He bas an optic atrophy. An optic atrophy is a condition in which tbe eye nerve is dead, or approaching tbat. He bas an absolute optic atrophy as near as I can tell from my experience and observation. He also bas a high degree of myopia, or near sigbtedness, a very high degree of tbat, which precludes *676 bis being able to see anything of any size any considerable distance. He bas a scar of tbe cornea. It is supposed to be clear like glass. He bas a scarring there which, if everything else were normal, would cut down his vision. At one time when he was there I felt he had increased tension in the left eye. He has this complication, of diseases any one of which would affect his vision. It is a permanent condition, absolutely. I last saw Nannie (the plaintiff) on the 24th day of this month. His condition is not improved over when I first saw him. The effect of the disease of the optic nerve that I have named is that it prevents it from functioning. The optic nerve carries impulses of sight back to the brain, and it stops that function entirely, optic atrophy does. . . . He could not possibly have useful vision in view of what I have seen in his eyes. In my opinion, it will not become better.” Webster’s New International Dictionary (1935) says: “Sick” means “affected with disease,” and gives “disease” as a synonym .of “sickness.” Therefore it would seem that his Honor was supported in finding from Dr. Speas’ testimony that “the diseases of the eyes is sickness within the terms of the policy, and that the disability of the plaintiff, ... is the result of said sickness, and that the plaintiff is totally disabled from performing or pursuing any work of a gainful character, due to the diseased condition of his eyes.” The testimony of Dr. Speas, as well as the findings of fact of the court, is in the present tense, “he has a complication of diseases,” “the diseases of the eye is sickness,” that the disability "is the result” of said sickness, which supports the findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that the plaintiff was not only sick on 23 May, 1939, but was still sick at the time of the trial, and was therefore entitled to recover sick benefits from the beginning of his sick disability 23 May, 1939, until the time of trial, 110 weeks. The judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.