Walston v. . Bryan

EodmaN, J. Eor the reasons given in Thomas v. Womack, ante 657, we think the Judge had the power to allow all amendments of the process and pleadings which were necessary to bring the case before him for decision on its merits. Without injustice to the Judge, we may assume that he would have allowed all such amendments if he had thought it within his power to do so. This Court has frequently recommended to the Judges a liberal allowance of amendments in the process and pleadings, when the object is to' present a case fairly, on its merits. It is the object of all systems of procedure and pleading, that cases should be so tried, and every case that goes off otherwise than by a decision on its merits, except where one party is grossly negligent, is a discredit either to the system or to the pleaders. We think that we are at liberty to consider this case, as if the proper amendments were made, and as if the defendants had demurred generally to the complaint. We suppose that a decision from this point of view will be more acceptable to the parties, than one which would merely send it back tJ the Judge, to allow amendments which would at last bring it, to this question. We are of opinion that the plaintiff states in his complaint *766 a sufficient cause of action. It has been often decided that where a tenant agrees to pay a certain part of the crop as rent, the property of the whole crop is in Mm until the decision. The principle is the same, when the landlord is to pay a certain part of the crop to a laborer for his wages; in such case, the property in the crop is with the landlord until a decision. In whom the property remains until the separation, depends in all cases upon the agreement; it is not a rule of law, it is simply a question of the interpretation of a contract. He who owns the soil during the year, owns the crop raised on it. Here the declaration states that Bridgers rented the land to Griffin, who agreed to pay part of the crop as rent; the separation therefore was to be made by Griffin, and the property in the whole crop vested in him until the separation was made. Here it was never made. The claim oí Griffin to a set off against the rent, is wholly immaterial, and does not affect the case. Neither does any question of the lien of a landlord on the crop for rent, arise here. Such a claim is personal to the landlord, or to his assignee, and the defendant who represents an execution creditor of the landlord, is not such assignee. In other words, the right of the landlord to the rent, was a mere chose in action, which perhaps a creditor might have made available by supplemental proceedings, under sec. 264, et seq., of the C. O. P., but certainly his execution gave him no right, by a mere levy to separate the rent from the whole crop, and then to sell any particular bales of cotton as being that share. The rent, for aught the creditor could know, might have been paid, in whole or in part; certainly he could not know that any particular six bales of cotton represented that rent. The execution in the hands of the defendant authorized him only to levy on the tangible property of Bridgers; the cotton which he levied on, was not the property of Bridgers at all, but of the plaintiff. The act of the defendant, therefore, was *767 unlawful, and the plaintiff might recover from him, either the value oí the cotton, or the sum which the defendant sold it for. The plaintiff claims only the last. Considering a general demurrer to have been entered, we think it should have been overruled. The judgment of the Court below, therefore, Was substantially right, and is affirmed. The plaintiff will recover his costs in this Court. Per Curiam. Judgment affirmed.