Hudson v. . Underwood

Seawell, J. The only question presented on review is -whether the title to lot 923 passed to the plaintiff, Berta Gulbranson, now Hudson, under the description and pertinent references in the deed. The appellants particularly attack the description reading “together with any and all other property, real, personal and mixed, of which the said M. Gulbranson died seized and possessed, or in which he had owned any interest,” the clause under which plaintiff claims title to Lot 923. They find in it a conflict between a “general description” and a “particular description” in which the latter must prevail; citing Carter v. White. 101 N. C., 30, 7 S. E., 473; Cox v. McGowan, 116 N. C., 131, 21 S. E., 108; Modlin v. R. R., 145 N. C., 218, 230, 58 S. E., 1075; Potter v. Bonner, 174 N. C., 20, 93 S. E., 370; Lewis v. Furr, 228 N. C., 89; and quoting Midgett v. Twiford, 120 N. C., 4, 26 S. E., 626; Lewis v. Furr, supra. Abstractly speaking, the validity and the soundness of the rule cited by appellants might be supported by a generous array of authority, both in text and opinion, but the propriety of its application to the facts before us is the marrow of the case. The rule cannot be invoked where it is manifest that the particular or specific description and the general description were not an attempt to describe the same lands, but related to different parcels. There cannot be any conflict or repugnance between a general description and a particular description unless they refer in whole or in part to the same land; 26 C. J. S., “Deeds,” p. 364, 16 Am. Jur., “Deeds,” s. 288. There is no legal objection, of course, to the conveyance of one parcel of land by specific description and another by general description in the same deed; and unfortunately for the position taken by the appealing defendants the challenged description opens with an “also,” indicating something altogether different, and refers to “any and all other *276 property, real, personal and mixed . . This is sufficient to make a clean break with any logical or legal connection with the rule. The reference to the Gulbranson will follows the general description— not the particular, and does not seem to be a mere statement of a source of title. The reference to the “remainder” interest as an aid to the description cannot be altogether ignored. The deed indicates a knowledge on the part of the grantor that by virtue of the will of Gulbranson she owned lands other than the lot conveyed by metes and bounds; and the description by which she conveyed it is as definite as the description by which she held it, and both are capable of easy ascertainment; Duckett v. Lyda, 223 N. C., 356, 26 S. E. (2d), 918. The question of the sufficiency of the general description to convey the property is not assailed except in the respect mentioned, ami dims not call for discussion. After all the main purpose of rules of construction is to find from its four corners the intention of the grantor in the conveyance; Lofton v. Barber, 226 N. C., 481, 482, 39 S. E. (2d), 263; Krites v. Plott, 222 N. C., 679, 24 S. E. (2d), 531; Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394, 63 S. E., 79. The phraseology of the descriptive clauses, in their ordinary meaning, includes the lot conveyed by metes and bounds and ''also” the property in controversy; and we are constrained to hold that to be the intent of the grantor. The demurrer was properly overruled. The judgment is Affirmed.