Jenkins v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

Winborne, J. This is the question decisive of this appeal: Is there evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, that plaintiff was totally and permanently disabled within the express language of the certificate or policy of insurance? A negative answer comes from recent decisions of this Court in Thigpen v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 551, 168 S. E., 845; Boozer v. Assurance Society, 206 N. C., 848, 175 S. E., 175; Hill v. Ins. Co., 207 N. C., 166, 176 S.. E., 269; Carter v. Ins. Co., 208 N. C., 665, 182 S. E., 106; Lee v. Assurance Society, 211 N. C., 182, 189 S. E., 626; and Medlin v. Ins. Co., 220 N. C., 334, 17 S. E. (2d), 463. Under the authority of these cases, defendant’s motion for judgment as in case of nonsuit should have been sustained. Further treatment of the subject, at this time, would be unnecessarily repetitious. In keeping with these decisions, it is sufficient to say that as plaintiff has agreed, so shall he b.e bound. And even though he and another say *85 that he is not able to work, the fact remains, as revealed in his testimony, that he worked for compensation almost continuously more than eight months, from 5 November, 1941, to July, 1942, the date of the trial of this action. Adverting to similar factual situation in the Thigpen case, supra, Brogden, J., aptly said: “The law is designed to be a practical science, and it would seem manifest that a plain, everyday fact, uncon-troverted and established, ought not to be overthrown by the vagaries of opinion or by scientific speculation.” The judgment below is Reversed.