Pate Hotel Co. v. Morris

Adams, J. Tbe appeal brings up the single question whether tbe writ of mandamus commands tbe levy of a tax which deprives tbe plaintiff of his property without due process of law. Tbe judgment commanding tbe levy is final. Tbe defendants bad opportunity to set up- by way of defense all tbat is alleged in tbe complaint of tbe Pate Hotel Company, tbe present plaintiff, and from an adverse judgment they declined to prosecute an .appeal. Tbe Realty Bond Company takes tbe position tbat tbe questions presented in this appeal have previously been adjudicated in litigation between itself and tbe town of Carolina Beach, and tbat tbe plaintiff, a taxpayer of tbe town, is bound by tbe judgment determining tbe rights of tbe respective parties. It is an established principle tbat a county, municipality, or other governmental body is for certain purposes a representative of its citizens and taxpayers. Tbe relation between them is analogous tO' tbat between a trustee and bis cestui que trust; and a judgment against sucb governmental body in a matter of interest general to all its citizens is binding upon the latter although they are not eo nomine parties to tbe suit. Sauls v. Freeman, 12 A. S. R., 190; Ashton v. City of Rochester, 28 A. S. R., 619. In Freeman on Judgments (5 ed.), sec. 501, it is said: “A judgment for a sum of money against a municipal corporation imposes an obligation upon its citizens which they are compelled to discharge. Every taxpayer is a real, though not a nominal, party to sucb judgment. If, for tbe purpose of providing for its payment, tbe municipal officers levy and endeavor to collect a tax, none of tbe citizens can, by instituting proceedings to prevent tbe levy or enforcement of tbe tax, dispute tbe validity of tbe judgment, nor relitigate any of tbe questions which were or which could have been litigated in tbe original action.” *487 Approving tbis statement of the law this Court has held that if a governmental body fails to avail itself of legal defenses, taxpayers will be concluded by the judgment, the only exception being the commission of a mistake or the perpetration of a fraud. Bear v. Commissioners, 122 N. C., 434. The reversal of the decision in that case upon a petition for a rehearing did not modify or affect the principle under consideration as enunciated by the court. The petition was allowed because the plaintiff, having failed to plead his judgments in estoppel of the matters pleaded in the answer or to demur to the answer, waived his rights, and by his agreement to a finding of facts by the court, went to the hearing on the merits of the consideration upon which the judgments, were granted. This appears in the opinion. Bear v. Commissioners, 124 N. C., 204. The fact that the principle was not affected by setting aside the judgment given in the first appeal definitely appears in later cases. In re Utilities Company, 179 N. C., 151, 164, the Court adhered to its previous conclusion that a municipal corporation is the legal representative of its inhabitants and taxpayers with respect to all matters properly within its jurisdiction and in Eaton v. Graded School, 184 N. C., 471, repeated the observation that a municipal corporation acting in its official capacity represents citizens and taxpayers within its corporate boundaries. The plaintiff is concluded by the judgment awarding the writ of mandamus and cannot attack it on the grounds set forth in its complaint. Indeed, even if the plaintiff Avere not thus concluded its collateral attack of the judgment would be unavailing. Young v. Henderson, 76 N. C., 420. The record discloses no substantial ground for the contention that the judgment complained of deprives the plaintiff of its property Avithout due process of law. As a rule the State determines its OAvn policy in matters of taxation and the Federal GrOArernment is not charged Avith the duty of supervising State action. It is only when the action of the State authorities is found to be arbitrary that the courts interfere with assessments on the asserted violation of the due process clause. Embree v. Kansas City, etc., 240 U. S., 242, 60 L. Ed., 624; Hancock v. Muskogee, 250 U. S., 454, 63 L. Ed., 1081; Goldsmith v. Pendergrast Construction Co., 252 U. S., 12, 64 L. Ed., 427. We have discovered no indication of arbitrary action on the part of the court or the State authorities. We find it unnecessary to consider other phases of the question which are referred to in the brief of the appellee. Judgment Affirmed.