State Ex Rel. Brummitt v. Winburn

BeogdeN, J. Tbe foregoing facts and procedures produce for consideration two questions of law, to wit: (1) Has tbis Court, at tbis time, tbe power to revoke a law license and disbar an attorney? (2) Do tbe facts warrant and justify such revocation and disbarment? Tbe weight of judicial authority in tbis country establishes tbe inherent power of tbe courts to revoke licenses granted to attorneys and to disbar them from tbe practice. Tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States in Ex Parte Garland, 71 U. S., 379, 18 L. Ed., 366, declared. “Tbe attorney and counselor being, by tbe solemn judicial act of tbe Court, clothed with bis office, does not bold it as a matter of grace and favor. Tbe right which it confers upon him to appear for suitors, and to argue causes, is something more than a mere indulgence, revocable at tbe pleasure of tbe court, or at tbe command of tbe legislature. It is a right of which be can only be deprived by tbe judgment of tbe Court, for moral or professional delinquency.” Tbe Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in considering tbe question In Re Opinion of Justices, 180 N. E., 725, said: “Tbe inherent jurisdiction of tbe judicial department of tbe government of attorneys at law is illustrated in several of our decisions to tbe effect that tbe power to remove an attorney for misconduct, malpractice, or deficiency in character, although recognized by statute, is nevertheless inherent and exists without a statute.” See, also, State v. Cannon, 240 N. W., 877; Byrdonjack v. State Bar of California, 281 Pac., 1018, 66 A. L. R., 1507; In re Information to *926 Discipline Certain Attorneys of the Sanitary District of Chicago, 184 N. E., 332, 81 A. L. R., 1059. Moreover, the Supreme Court of North Carolina is committed to the same philosophy of law in Committee of Grievances v. Strickland, 200 N. C., 630, 158 S. E., 110. Consequently, the first question of law propounded must be answered in the affirmative. Indeed, the correctness of the proposition is not controverted by the learned counsel for the respondent, who declare in their brief: “We heartily agree with the oft-repeated statement that, independent of any statute, the Court has the inherent power to disbar an attorney when such disbarment is in the opinion of the Court reasonably necessary for the preservation and defense of its dignity and purity and the continuation of its proper function.” The second question of law must be solved by reference to the pertinent facts. Much has been said and written in the various investigations of the status of respondent concerning his unfortunate professional lapse in his native State of Louisiana. This occurred approximately nine years ago and at a time when Winburn was a mere youth. It is not, and ought not to be, the policy of the law to require a person, who has incurred the condemnation of its mandates, to bear openly upon his bosom through the remaining years of his life the scarlet letter of the sins of his youth, if, in fact, he has been recast in the flaming foundry of experience; or to use the exalted language of the Baptist, “has brought forth therefore fruits meet for repentance.” Of course, these facts should doubtless have a place in the frame-work of the ultimate solution of the problem. Notwithstanding, there are two aspects of the question which challenge the right of the respondent to practice law in this State pursuant to the license granted in 1928 by the Supreme Court of North Carolina. 1. On 2 June, 1931, subsequent to the issuing of license by this Court, the respondent applied for admission to practice in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. In order to obtain such admission he represented to the Court that the charges preferred against him in Louisiana were “dismissed by committee after matter investigated.” There was abundant evidence that such statement was not correct to the knowledge of said respondent. Subsequently he filed an application to practice in the Supreme Court of the United States and in response to a question in said application as to where he had practiced law, stated: “Greensboro, North Carolina, and Washington, D. C.” This statement likewise was not a correct statement to the knowledge of said respondent, thus demonstrating that Winburn was detouring when the situation plainly demanded that he travel the straight road ahead. After considering all the facts the Supreme Court of the United States has solemnly declared that respondent “is an unfit person to practice *927 at the bar of this Court.” The District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina has said the same. The United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has said the same. Manifestly, the action of the Federal courts in this matter does not control the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Nevertheless, the judgments of these courts establish beyond question, the fact of the present unfitness of the respondent. 2. "When the Attorney-General lodged a motion in November, 1933, to revoke the license of the respondent, this Court appointed a committee of the bar of this State, learned in the law and having no interest in the result except to do even and exact justice. They heard the respondent and examined and considered with care all the evidence offered in his behalf. After patient and diligent consideration they unanimously recommended to this Court that the respondent be disbarred. It is manifest that the respondent has been fully heard, and his cause has been considered by a tribunal of fair and impartial men. Therefore, it is the opinion and judgment of this Court that the license heretofore issued by the Supreme Court of North Carolina to the respondent at the Fall Term, 1928, be, and the same is hereby revoked and respondent disbarred from the practice of law in the courts of North Carolina. The rule heretofore issued will be made absolute and the petition of the Attorney-General granted. Motion allowed.