Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Duplin County

Winborne, J. It must be conceded that on the face of the tax records of Duplin County for the years 1941 and 1942 as they existed when these actions were instituted, and so remained until the 3rd day of December, 1945, nearly three and a half years after the first of these actions was instituted, and nearly two and a half years after the second, the excessiveness of the levy of seven cents for “poor, etc.,” was patent. R. R. v. Cumberland County, 223 N. C., 750, 28 S. E. (2d), 238; R. R. v. Beaufort County, 224 N. C., 115, 29 S. E. (2d), 201, and cases cited there. *723 Tbe same is apparent even in the answers filed in these actions, — for the upkeep of the county buildings, the upkeep and maintenance of the county home for the aged and infirm, and the expense of holding courts, and maintenance of jail and jail prisoners are general expenses, and must be covered in the fifteen cents levy limited by the State Constitution, Article V, section 6, for general purposes. See Power Co. v. Clay County, 213 N. C., 698, 197 S. E., 603. However, the expenses of the position of county accountant and of county farm agent, respectively, are held to be for special purposes, and have been given special approval of the Legislature. See Power Co. v. Clay County, supra. Moreover, the General Assembly has declared that “the care and relief of aged persons who are in need and who are unable to provide for themselves is a legitimate obligation of government which cannot be ignored or avoided without injustice to such persons and serious detriment to the purposes of organized society” and is “a matter of State concern and necessary to promote the public health and welfare” — “Old Age Assistance Act,” G. S., 108-17, et seq. In this act provision is made (1) for the creation of “The State Old Age Assistance Fund,” G. S., 108-22, et seq., (2) and for allocation to the several counties of the State an amount mandatorily required to be raised by each, by taxation, and contributed toward expense of administering the Fund. G. S., 108-38. And in respect of the care and relief of dependent children who are in need and who are unable to provide for themselves, similar declaration as a matter of State concern and necessity is made. “Aid to Dependent Children Act,” G. S., 108-44, et seq. In this act also, provision is made (1) for the creation of “The State Aid to Dependent Children Fund,” G. S., 108-51, et seq., and (2) for allocation to the several counties of the State an amount mandatorily required to be raised by each by taxation, and contributed toward expense of administering the Fund. G. S., 108-67. It is noted, however, in connection with these acts that on this appeal the validity of the above mandatory requirements is not challenged. The county levied in each year a tax rate of fifteen cents on the one hundred dollars property valuation for general purposes, the limit fixed by Article Y, section 6, of the Constitution of North Carolina. Therefore, the levy for poor relief was limited’to a rate of five cents on the one hundred dollars property valuation under provisions of G. S., 153-9 (6), formerly C. S., 1297 (8½). Hence, the levy of seven cents for “poor, etc.,” nothing else appearing, exceeded the limit fixed by the statute to the extent of two cents. However, we are of opinion, and hold, that the “corrected statement of the tax levy for 1941,” and “the corrected statement of the tax levy *724 for the year 1942,” entered of record on 3 December, 1945, by the Board of Commissioners of Duplin County, separating the five cents for “the poor” from the two cents rate to raise funds to meet the State’s requirement for administration of the State Old Age Assistance Fund, and the State Aid to Dependent Obildren Fund, as per certificate from State Board of Allotments and Appeals, and toward salaries of county accountant and farm agent, Power Co. v. Clay County, supra, are sufficient to clarify nunc pro tunc the actions of the Board of Commissioners .taken originally in adopting appropriations resolutions, and in levying the taxes .for the years in question. Boards of Commissioners are permitted to amend their records to speak the truth in cases where levies have been made for general and special purposes separately but recorded as a unit in an amount exceeding the constitutional limitation. However, if the record correctly shows the levy as actually made, the board has no power to amend. See Power Co. v. Clay County, supra, where the authorities are cited and assembled. Hence, when this principle is applied to the case in band, it will be assumed, nothing else appearing, that “the corrected statements” entered by the Board of Commissioners on 3 December, 1945, are what they purport to be, corrections, in fact, and not original actions. In tbe light of this bolding, tbe motions for judgment as of nonsuit at tbe close of all tbe evidence should have been allowed. It is not amiss, however, to call attention to tbe plain provisions of tbe County Fiscal Control Act, G. S., 153-114, et seq., with respect to composition of county budget estimates, appropriation resolutions and tax levies that require that “each special purpose to which tbe General Assembly has given its special approval” shall be stated separately. If these provisions be followed, confusion such as is disclosed in tbe record on this appeal would be eliminated, and the expense of probable litigation avoided. Tbe judgment below is Reversed.