Ernul v. . Ernul

Clarkson, J. The appellant in her brief says: “This was a submission of- controversy without action, for the construction of the will of E. S. Ernul, deceased, submitted at the October Term, 1925, of Craven County Superior Court. Upon the submission, judgment was rendered by his Honor, W. M. Bond, judge presiding, as| set out in the record. The executrix, Rosa L. Ernul, appealed to the Supreme Court. Neither the plaintiff, W. C. Ernul, nor -the appellants’ codefendant, Mildred Nelson, are represented by counsel. The appellant, executrix, prays the judgment of the Court for her protection in making settlement of the estate.” Ashe, J., in Alsbrook v. Reid, 89 N. C., p. 153, says: “The former courts of equity entertained, and our Superior Courts still entertain applications for advice and instructions from executors and other trustees, as to the discharge of trusts confided to them, and incidentally thereto, the construction and legal effect of the instrument by which they are created. But the courts of equity never exercised this advisory jurisdiction when the estate devised is a legal one, and the question as to construction is purely legal. The jurisdiction is incident to that over trusts. "Where there is no trust or trustee to be directed, the court of equity never takes jurisdiction.” Bank v. Alexander, 188 N. C., 670. We think appellant, under the facts disclosed in this ease, is within her rights in asking advice. *350 “Tbe plaintiff contends that all the money, both that bequeathed under item six, and that bequeathed under item nine should be held by the executrix as trustee, until such time as Mildred Nelson shall marry and have children, or shall die without haying married and haying children; 'or that if the money or any part of it is turned oyer to Mildred Nelson, she should be required to give bond to insure its safekeeping, and contend that she is young and incompetent to preserve the money for the use of the remaindermen, and that she is a nonresident of the State.” In construing the present will we are dealing with personal property. The general rule gathered from the authorities, is stated in Burwell v. Barde, 186 N. C., 119, as follows: “It is fully recognized that where real property is devised to one for life, remainder over, unless a contrary intent appears in the will, the life tenant is entitled to its possession and. control during the continuance of the estate, subject always to its liability to creditors, under the provisions of law. And the same principle usually prevails as a direct bequest of personal property except where it is given as a residuary bequest to be enjoyed by persons in succession, etc., in which case the property is converted into money and the interest paid to the legatees during the existence of their respective estates. Bryan v. Harper, 177 N. C., 309; Simmons v. Fleming, 151 N. C., 389; In re Knowles, 148 N. C., 461-466; Britt v. Smith, 86 N. C., 305; Ritch v. Morris, 78 N. C., 377; Smith v. Barham, 17 N.. C., 420.” The general rule stated in the Bwwell case, supra, (1) where there is a direct bequest of personal property with remainder over, the life tenant is entitled to its possession and control during the continuance of the estate; (2) where personal property is given as a residuary bequest to be enjoyed by persons in succession, etc., the personal property is converted into money and the; interest paid to the legatees during the existence of their respective estates. If a contrary intent appears in the will, the direct bequest may not come under the general rule. The kind of personal property left by the direct bequest, the relationship and the setting of the parties all have a bearing so that the intent of the testator may be ascertained. The language of item 6 is as follows: “I give, bequeath and devise to my granddaughter Mildred Nelson, five thousand dollars; I appoint my wife, Rosa L. Ernul, guardian for Mildred Nelson, and if Mildred should die before she marries and has children her share of my estate go back to my children.” It will be noted that after the bequest to Mildred Nelson, the testator appointed his wife her guardian. If Mildred should die before she is married and has children' — the $5,000 is to go to the testator’s children. Mildred now resides in the State of Illinois. *351 In Rowe’s Executors v. White, 16 N. J., Eq., p. 411, 84 Am. Dec., p. 169, an interesting case, tbe principle laid down is tbe same as in tbe Burwell case, supra. In tbe Rowe’s Executors case, tbe following is said at p. 172: “Either in tbe case of a legatee for life, or subject to a limitation over, in order to justify tbe requisition of security from tbe first legatee, there must be danger of tbe loss of tbe property in tbe bands of tbe first taker; Slanning v. Style, 3 P. Wms., 334; Conduitt v. Soane, 1 Coll., 285; Homer v. Shelton, 2 Met., 194; Fiske v. Cobb, 6 Gray, 144; Hudson v. Wadsworth, 8 Conn., 249; Langworthy v. Chadwick, 13 Id., 46.” In that case it is further said (pi 173) : “If any real ground of apprehension of danger appeared upon tbe face of tbe pleadings, and was admitted or supported by evidence, tbe court would require tbe security.” Note: (84 Am. Dec. p. 173) “Security is unnecessary from legatee for life, unless there is danger of waste or loss: Covenhoven v. Shuler, 21 Am. Dec., 73; Pelham v. Taylor, 59 Id., 604; see Clark v. Clark, 35 Id., 676; Roper v. Roper, 75 Id., 427; Drummond’s Executor. v. Drummond, 26 N. J., Eq., 239, citing tbe principal case. Tbe principal case is also cited to tbe point that tbe well settled rule in equity is that where it appears that there is danger that tbe principal of tbe legacy will be wasted or lost, a court of equity will protect tbe interest of tbe legatee in remainder by compelling tbe legatee for life to give security for tbe safe return of tbe principal; Howard v. Howard's Ex’rs, 16 Id., 488.” 17 R. C. L., p. 627. Security should be required whenever it is shown that tbe property is in actual danger of loss or injury or where it has been removed from tbe state or there is actual danger of its being removed, or where tbe life tenant is a nonresident. 21 C. J., p. 966. Moon v. Moon, 16 S. C. Eq., p. 327; Riddle v. Kellum, 8 Ga., 374. By analogy we quote from Cobb v. Fountain, 187 N. C., 338, where it is said: “As it is more prudent for a guardian to invest trust funds in bis own state, where they may be kept under bis immediate observation and within tbe jurisdiction of tbe domestic courts, we think- tbe investment of bis ward’s money in securities which are beyond tbe jurisdiction should be disapproved unless made under rare and exceptional circumstances. . . . Other courts have reached substantially tbe same conclusion, as will appear from a few excerpts. ‘While, therefore, we are not disposed to say that an investment by a trustee in another state can never be consistent with tbe prudence and diligence required of him by law, we still feel bound to say that such an investment, which takes tbe trust fund beyond our own jurisdiction, subjects it to other laws and tbe risk and inconvenience of distance and of foreign tribunals, will not be upheld by us as a general rule, and never unless *352 in tbe presence of a clear and strong necessity, or a very pressing emergency.’ Ormiston v. Alcott, 84 N. Y., 339, 343.” Item 9 is as follows: “All other property I may have not disposed of, I want equally divided between my wife, "W". 0. Ernul, Mattie J. Robinson, Katherine Gaskins, Nancy Tuton and Mildred Nelson.” Item 6 must be construed with item 9. Mildred Nelson gets a part under the residuary clause of item 9, but item 6 says: “and if Mildred should die before she marries and has children, her share of my estate go back to my children.” It is clear that this means the $5,000 and what is realized under the residuary clause in item 9. Erom the language of the will, the nonresidence of Mildred Nelson, and the facts and circumstances of this case, security must be given for the $5,000 under item 6 and the fund realized under item 9. If Mildred Nelson is unable to give security the court should appoint a receiver to loan-the fund first lien on real estate, with sufficient margin, or other gilt-edge security, and the corpus be held in accordance with the construction given in this opinion as to the meaning of items 6 and 9 of the will. Interest on the fund -.should be paid to Mildred Nelson semiannually after deducting taxes and legal expenses, until the happening of the contingency set forth in item 6 of the will. The judgment of the court below, in accordance with this opinion, is Modified and affirmed.