Beach v. . Patton

ScheNCK, J. The only allegation of negligence against the defendant Riddick was that his car was left parked for some fifteen minutes on a damp, dark night on a much-used highway after it had been engaged in a collision. Assuming, but not deciding, that the defendant Riddick was *136 negligent in so leaving bis car parked on tbe highway, there is no evidence that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of plaintiff's intestate, and the establishment of the fact that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of the death of the intestate is just as essential to the plaintiff’s cause of action as is the establishment of the negligence itself. Campbell v. Laundry, 190 N. C., 649, and cases there cited. This case, as it relates to the defendant Riddick, is governed by the principle of the case of Burke, Admr., v. Coach Company and Capeheart, 198 N. C., 8, as it relates to the defendant Cape-heart. “The proximate cause of the event must be understood to be that which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produces that event, and without which such event would not have occurred. . . . The test by which to determine whether the intervening act of an intelligent agent which has become the efficient cause of an injury shall be considered a new and independent cause, breaking the sequence of events put in motion by the original negligence of the defendant, is whether the intervening act and the resultant injury is one that the author of the primary negligence could have reasonably foreseen and expected.” Harton v. Telephone Co., 141 N. C., 455; Balcum v. Johnson, 177 N. C., 213. We think the act of E. E. Patton in operating the Plymouth car in such a way as to be forced to drive it off of the pavement on to the shoulder of the highway to avoid a collision with the Riddick car, and thereby collide with and cause the death of the intestate, was a cause new and independent of the alleged negligent act of parking the Riddick car on the highway,' and broke any sequence between such death and such parking of said car, and that the unfortunate result was not one that Riddick could have reasonably foreseen and expected. To hold that the defendant Riddick owed the duty to the plaintiff’s intestate to foresee that a third person would operate a car in such a negligent manner as to be compelled to drive out on to the shoulder of the highway in order to avoid a collision with a car parked on the opposite side thereof, and thereby strike a person standing on the shoulder, would not only “practically stretch foresight into omniscence,” Gant v. Gant, 197 N. C., 164, but would, in effect, require the anticipation of “whatsoever shall come to pass.” We apprehend that the legal principles by which individuals are held liable for their negligent acts impose no such far-seeing and all-inclusive duty. The law only requires reasonable foresight, and when the injury complained of is not reasonably foreseeable, in the exercise of due care, the party whose conduct is under investigation is not answerable therefor. Foreseeable injury is a requisite of' proximate cause, and proximate *137 cause is a requisite for actionable negligence, and actionable negligence is a requisite for recovery in an action for personal injury negligently inflicted. In this ease as it relates to the defendant Riddick there is an absence of foreseeable injury, and consequently there was no error in entering the judgment as of nonsuit as to him. Osborne v. Coal Co., 207 N. C., 545. The judgment is Affirmed.