State v. . Ashe

OlabicsoN, J. Defendant was indicted for abduction of Mrs. Jesse Haynes, a married woman, under C. S., 4225, which is as follows: “If any male person shall abduct or elope with the wife of another, he shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be imprisoned not less than one year nor more than ten years: Provided, that the woman, since her marriage, has been an innocent and virtuous woman; provided further, that no conviction shall be had upon the unsupported testimony of any such married woman.” S. v. O’Higgins, 178 N. C., 708; S. v. Hopper, 186 N. C., 405. One of the essential elements of the offense after the elopement is adultery. *390 “Evidence of a crime may be circumstantial as well- as direct. Prostitution is an offense usually committed in secret, and sometimes circumstantial evidence is the only kind that can be obtained. It is sufficient to show facts and circumstances from which the jury may reasonably infer guilt of the parties. S. v. Eliasson, 91 N. C., 564. From the facts and circumstances, it is a substantial right that the jury must be satisfied of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. S. v. Palmore, 189 N. C., 538.” S. v. Sinodis, 189 N. C., at p. 567; S. v. Poteet, 30 N. C., 23; S. v. Austin, 108 N. C., 780; S. v. Chaney, 110 N. C., 507. We think the charge of the court below gave defendant the humane rule that the jury must be satisfied of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is competent, as a circumstance, to prove that the persons charged with having committed the offense visited places which afforded them an opportunity for the commission of the unlawful act, and in such cases evidence is admissible to show the reputation of the place. Sutton v. State, 124 Ga., 815; 53 S. E., 381; Commonwealth v. Gray, 129 Mass., 474; S. v. Cushing, 86 Vermont, 416, 85 Atl., 770; Wilson v. State, 61 Tex. Cr. App., 628, 136 S. W., 447; Davidson v. State, 76 Tex. Cr., 196, 173 S. W., 1037; Wigmore on Evidence (2d ed.), sec. 78; Sparks v. State, 59 Ala., 82; State v. Brunell, 29 Wis., 435; Whitlock v. State, 4 Ind. App., 432, 30 N. E., 934; State v. Price, 115 Mo. App., 656; 92 S. W., 174; State v. Hendricks, 15 Mont., 194, 39 Pac., 93, 48 Am. St. Rep., 665. See Michigan Law Review, December, 1928, page 216. Some of the above decisions admit evidence solely of the general reputation of the house. We think the material exceptions and assignments of error were to evidence obtained by the State from witnesses examined in behalf of the State to the effect that the 'character of Ruth Owen, at whose house the defendant and Mrs. Jesse Haynes visited, was had, and that the general reputation of Ruth Owen’s house wais bad. That after defendant was bound over to court he visited Mrs. Jesse Haynes at Ruth Owen’s house, carrying with him quite a bunch of groceries; that they fixed and had dinner pretty soon. They all ate around the table, some five to six people: After the dinner, defendant and the Haynes woman went into a room. This circumstance was explained by defendant by saying “that Ruth Owen (who was Mrs. McElroy), and Mr. McElroy himself, who was sick and lying on a bed, were in the room at that time.” The court below, in reciting the evidence, said: “One witness, Mr. Leatherwood, testified he saw her at Ruth Owen’s here in town, which has been testified to by the witnesses to be a house of ill fame or bad character; that he saw this woman there at Ruth Owen’s and saw the *391 defendant, Cling Ashe, go there carrying something like provisions and groceries; that they had dinner, and afterwards Cling Ashe and the woman went off in a room and shut the door.” Under the facts in this case, taken in connection with the other circumstances, this circumstance was relevant — the weight was for the jury.: It may be inferred that “bad” meant “ill fame.” If that was not the meaning as understood at the time, when the court below so .construed it to mean “a house of ill fame or bad character,” the defendant had an opportunity to correct the recital of fact, but did not do so. He cannot be heard now. S. v. Geurukus, 195 N. C., 642. There was no request to limit the evidence. Then, again, “ba.d” is a general word. “To the had, to a bad condition, .implying, variously, illness (in a person), a deficit (in an account), moral ruin, etc.” Webster’s Dictionary. It may be noted that defendant does not make the exceptions and assignments of error to the charge in accordance with the rule laid down in Rawls v. Lupton, 193 N. C., 428. We think there was sufficient evidence to be submitted to the jury and, in the charge, as a whole, there was no prejudicial or reversible error. No error.